Key Indicator
United States: PPI: NSA
United States: University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index (CCI): Preliminary: Anomaly
United States: ISM Manufacturing PMI - Final (SA)
United States: CPI (NSA)
COMEX Inventory: Silver
S&P 500 Index
Global: GDP Gowth Rate - United States
Global Foundries' Revenue
DRAM Makers' Fab Capacity Breakdown by Brand
NAND Flash Makers' Capex: Forecast
IC Design Revenue
Server Shipment
Top 10 MLCC Suppliers' Capex: Forecast
LCD Panel Makers' Revenue
AMOLED Capacity Input Area by Vendor: Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Supplier
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only): Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Sizes: Total
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only)
PV Supply Chain Module Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Cell Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Polysilicon Capacity
PV Supply Chain Wafer Capacity
Global PV Demand: Forecast
Smartphone Production Volume
Notebook Shipments by Brand
Smartphone Production Volume: Forecast
Wearable Shipment
TV Shipments (incl. LCD/OLED/QLED): Total
China Smartphone Production Volume
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Global
ITU Internet Penetration Rate -- Global
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Developed Countries
Electric Vehicles (EVs) Sales: Forecast
Global Automotive Sales
AR/VR Device Shipment: Forecast
China: Power Battery: Battery Output Power: Lithium Iron Phosphate Battery: Month to Date
CADA China Vehicle Inventory Alert Index (VIA)
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue: Forecast
LED Chip Revenue (Chip Foundry+ In House Used): Forecast
GaN LED Accumulated MOCVD Installation Volume
Video Wall-Display LED Market Revenue: Forecast
Consumer & Others LED Market Revenue
2026-08-13
For much of this year, the market's central anxiety was not when the Federal Reserve would start cutting rates, but whether tariff pass-through would force the central bank back into a hiking cycle. That worry built steadily in the first half of the year as tariff costs worked their way into consumer prices and raw material costs climbed. The latest U.S. July CPI report showed both headline and core inflation decelerating from the prior month, with core price growth cooling back to the same level last seen in January and February this year. The conversation has now shifted from whether the Fed will hike again to how long this pause can hold, and that pivot is the structural signal worth watching most closely right now. The main forces behind this cooling are continued easing in energy price pressure and a broad market view that most of the tariff cost pass-through into consumer prices has already worked its way into the data, while a modest year-over-year decline in real average hourly earnings in July has cooled consumer momentum and further undercut the case for renewed tightening. Yet the cooling is not uniform: prices for computer software and peripheral equipment rose more than a fifth from a year earlier to a record high, reflecting upstream cost pressure from AI data centers scrambling for memory chips, a reminder that tech-related goods remain a corner the tariff relief story has yet to reach. The Fed itself is showing internal division, with some officials at last month's meeting already arguing for a hike, and a September decision that falls awkwardly close to the sensitive window around the year's midterm elections is pushing policymakers toward a more cautious pace. Whether the inflation risk has truly passed remains a genuine point of disagreement in the market. Looking one to three months ahead, a September hold remains the dominant market expectation, and hawkish bets have eased only modestly from where they stood before the data, meaning most traders are still pricing in some risk of a policy path skewing slightly hawkish. If the labor market keeps softening and consumer momentum stays weak over the next six to twelve months, the doves could gain further ground, opening the door to a policy pivot next year. This is not an all-clear signal, however: Washington's recent reliance on drawing down oil inventories to cushion price spikes is not a sustainable fix, and any renewed climb in oil prices could reaccelerate energy inflation later this year, giving the hawkish narrative room to resurface.
2026-08-07
U.S. government financing needs continue to rise, but the Treasury has chosen to hold off on expanding medium- and long-term debt issuance. In its quarterly refunding announcement released on August 5, 2026, the U.S. Treasury said it expects to maintain the current auction sizes of nominal coupon securities and Floating Rate Notes (FRNs) for at least the next several quarters, with additional financing needs to be met primarily through Treasury bills (T-bills) maturing within one year. “T-bill and chill” is a term used by market traders to describe this issuance strategy and is not an official Treasury policy name. With coupon security auction sizes temporarily held steady, a larger share of marginal financing needs is being absorbed by T-bills, while medium- and long-term Treasury issuance continues at the existing pace. As of August 5, 2026, total U.S. public debt stood at approximately US$39.83 trillion, including about US$32.10 trillion in debt held by the public, putting the US$40 trillion threshold within close reach. Greater reliance on short-term financing helps limit immediate pressure on the long end of the Treasury market, but it also shortens the maturity profile of government debt, requiring more frequent refinancing and making interest costs more responsive to Federal Reserve policy and money-market conditions. Rising Borrowing Needs Push More Financing Toward T-bills The Treasury’s unchanged issuance guidance covers nominal coupon securities ranging from 2-year to 30-year maturities, as well as 2-year FRNs. The August quarterly refunding totals US$125 billion, comprising US$58 billion of 3-year notes, US$42 billion of 10-year notes, and US$25 billion of 30-year bonds. After refinancing approximately US$96.3 billion of privately held securities maturing around the same period, the operation is expected to raise about US$28.7 billion in new cash. Quarterly refunding accounts for only part of the government’s overall borrowing needs. The Treasury estimates that it will need to borrow US$739 billion in privately held net marketable debt from July through September 2026, US$68 billion more than projected in May, mainly due to lower expected net cash inflows. Borrowing needs for October through December are estimated at US$628 billion. Treasury estimates provided to the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee show that, with auction sizes for nominal coupon securities, FRNs, and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) held unchanged, T-bills would absorb a substantial share of incremental financing requirements. Period Privately Held Net Marketable Borrowing Net Non-Bill Marketable Issuance Assumed Buybacks Implied T-bill Financing Jul.–Sep. 2026 US$739 billion US$375 billion US$45 billion US$409 billion Oct.–Dec. 2026 US$628 billion US$361 billion US$50 billion US$317 billion Note: Non-bill marketable securities include nominal coupon securities, FRNs, and TIPS. Implied T-bill financing is calculated by the Treasury based on current auction-size assumptions and does not represent a predetermined issuance target. Strong Demand for Short-Term Debt Temporarily Eases Long-End Supply Pressure The Treasury’s preference for T-bills partly reflects the cost of long-term financing and the market’s capacity to absorb additional duration. Ahead of the quarterly refunding meeting, Treasury yields had risen significantly as markets repriced energy prices, inflation risks, and the Federal Reserve policy outlook. The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC) noted that 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields had risen to approximately 4.6% and 4.2%, respectively, while markets also assigned a higher probability to future rate hikes. Read More at Datatrack Increasing the supply of 10-year or 30-year Treasuries when long-term yields are already elevated could require higher yields to attract sufficient demand and could raise mortgage, corporate bond, and other long-term financing costs through Treasury benchmark pricing. By comparison, T-bills have short maturities and high liquidity and are widely held by money market funds, banks, and corporate cash-management departments, making additional supply easier for short-term funding markets to absorb. T-bills also provide greater flexibility for cash management. The Treasury can frequently adjust auction sizes across different maturities in response to tax receipts, government spending, debt maturities, and cash balances. For example, the Treasury expects to reduce some short-term bill issuance in September as corporate and non-withheld tax payments flow in, before increasing issuance again in October as seasonal spending rises. T-bills Reach 22.2% of Marketable Debt, Increasing Refinancing and Repricing Risks Treasury materials show that T-bills accounted for approximately 22.2% of outstanding marketable Treasury debt as of July 31, 2026, above the upper end of the 15%–20% medium- to long-term range recommended by TBAC in 2020. The denominator for this ratio includes T-bills, nominal coupon notes and bonds, TIPS, and FRNs. It therefore differs from total public debt, which is approaching US$40 trillion and also includes intragovernmental holdings. A T-bill share above 20% does not imply that the United States is facing an immediate liquidity or default crisis. The expansion of money market funds, increased Federal Reserve holdings of T-bills, and strong demand for highly liquid assets continue to support the market’s capacity to absorb additional supply. The more relevant issue is that a shorter maturity structure forces the government to issue new debt more frequently to repay maturing principal. Fixed-rate 20-year or 30-year Treasuries can lock in borrowing costs for decades, while T-bills mature within one year and therefore reprice much more quickly according to prevailing market conditions. If the Federal Reserve raises rates or short-term funding costs increase, yields on newly issued T-bills would rise rapidly. If the Fed cuts rates, Treasury borrowing costs could also fall more quickly. “T-bill and chill” therefore gives the Treasury greater issuance flexibility at the cost of more frequent refinancing and greater volatility in interest expenses. Read More at Datatrack Changes in money market fund flows, bank reserves, or Federal Reserve balance-sheet policy could also affect demand. If such demand weakens, the Treasury may need to offer higher yields to maintain sufficient participation in bill auctions. The strategy reduces immediate long-end supply pressure while shifting more risk toward short-term rates and money-market liquidity. Issuance Language Shifts to “Changes,” Leaving Room for Higher Coupon Issuance in 2027 The Treasury maintained its guidance that nominal coupon and FRN auction sizes are expected to remain unchanged for at least the next several quarters, but its wording regarding future issuance changed. The May quarterly statement referred to evaluating potential future “increases” in auction sizes, while the August statement adopted the more neutral term “changes.” “Changes” could encompass increases, reductions, or a redistribution of issuance across maturities, providing the Treasury with greater policy flexibility than the previous wording. The shift does not indicate that the Treasury has already decided to alter long-term issuance. A more appropriate interpretation is that the Treasury is reducing the constraints created by its forward guidance and preserving room for potential issuance adjustments in fiscal 2027. Treasury meeting materials indicate that current auction sizes should be sufficient to meet financing needs through the remainder of fiscal 2026. However, based on the median primary dealer forecast for privately held net marketable borrowing, and assuming current coupon security auction sizes and privately held T-bill supply remain unchanged, the cumulative financing gap in fiscal 2027 and 2028 could reach approximately US$1.45 trillion. TBAC therefore believes that the Treasury may need to increase coupon issuance in fiscal 2027 and should update its forward guidance before making actual changes, giving the market sufficient time to absorb additional supply. Market participants expect that, if issuance ultimately needs to rise, the Treasury may initially adjust shorter points on the yield curve, such as 2-year, 3-year, or 5-year notes, to limit the direct impact on long-term term premiums. The Treasury has not yet announced specific maturities or the size of any future increases. Short-Term Financing Delays Long-End Pressure but Does Not Reduce Overall Funding Needs “T-bill and chill” allows the Treasury to use strong demand for short-term assets to absorb additional borrowing while avoiding a sudden increase in long-term debt supply when long-end yields are already elevated. It also makes it easier to manage seasonal fluctuations in tax receipts and government spending. However, the strategy addresses the timing and maturity composition of issuance without reducing the fiscal deficit or changing the government’s ultimate funding requirement. If borrowing needs continue to rise while coupon auction sizes remain unchanged for an extended period, the share of T-bills will continue to increase. If the Treasury eventually needs to close financing gaps after 2027, delaying adjustments could require larger and more concentrated increases in coupon issuance, potentially amplifying supply pressure in the Treasury market. The United States’ growing reliance on short-term debt represents a trade-off in maturity risk: higher refinancing frequency and greater sensitivity to short-term rates are being exchanged for lower immediate supply pressure at the long end of the yield curve. Whether this strategy can be sustained will depend on continued strong demand for T-bills, whether the Federal Reserve policy rate can decline, and whether the fiscal deficit gradually narrows. The next quarterly refunding announcement is scheduled for November 4, 2026, when markets will reassess the T-bill share and any signals of coupon issuance adjustments for fiscal 2027.
2026-08-06
The Bank of Korea raised its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points on July 16, 2026, from 2.50% to 2.75%, marking its first rate increase since January 2023. All seven members of the Monetary Policy Board unanimously supported the decision. The central bank said that stronger exports and investment had improved economic growth, inflation could remain above the 2% target for some time, and financial stability risks related to housing prices in the Seoul metropolitan area, household debt, and exchange-rate volatility continued to rise. It therefore remained necessary to maintain a policy stance consistent with further rate increases. The distinctive feature of this policy shift is that the AI chip boom has simultaneously increased South Korea’s capacity to withstand higher interest rates and intensified demand-side inflation and financial imbalances. Rapid growth in semiconductor exports, corporate earnings, and capital expenditure has reduced concerns that higher interest rates will significantly weaken the broader economy. At the same time, rising household lending and housing prices have made it more difficult for the central bank to maintain an accommodative policy environment. Indicator Latest Data Policy Implication Benchmark interest rate 2.75% Raised by 25 basis points on July 16 Real GDP preliminary estimate for 2Q26 Up 0.6% QoQ and 3.7% YoY Economic expansion remains intact CPI in July 2026 Up 2.8% YoY Lower than in June but still above target Core CPI in July 2026 Up 2.6% YoY Domestic price pressures remain persistent Preliminary semiconductor exports in July 2026 US$41.01 billion, up approximately 179% YoY AI and memory demand support exports Household credit outstanding at the end of 1Q26 KRW 1,993.1 trillion Debt stock remains close to KRW 2,000 trillion Preliminary current account balance in June 2026 US$49.73 billion surplus External financial buffers have expanded Data are current as of August 6, 2026. GDP, export, and current account figures are preliminary and may be revised. Read More at Datatrack Policy Reverses After Four Rate Cuts as Economic Growth and Financial Risks Both Support Tightening The Bank of Korea cut interest rates four times between October 2024 and May 2025, lowering the benchmark rate from 3.50% to 2.50%, before leaving it unchanged for more than a year. The July 2026 rate increase represents a shift in policy priorities from supporting economic activity toward controlling inflation and financial imbalances. The central bank has also not characterized the move as a one-off adjustment. Central banks generally face a trade-off between containing inflation and sustaining economic growth, but the policy conflict is currently less pronounced in South Korea. Real GDP increased by 0.6% quarter over quarter and 3.7% year over year in the second quarter, while real gross domestic income rose by 3.6% quarter over quarter, indicating that stronger export prices and improved terms of trade are raising domestic income. The central bank believes that the benefits of the semiconductor upcycle are gradually spreading from exports and corporate earnings to investment, income, and consumption, potentially increasing demand-side inflationary pressure. Chip Exports Strengthen External Accounts but Also Increase Sensitivity to the AI Cycle Continued global investment in AI infrastructure is supporting South Korean exports of memory and computer products. Exports reached US$98.89 billion in July 2026, up 62.8% year over year. Semiconductor exports totaled US$41.01 billion, increasing by approximately 179% and reaching around 2.8 times their level a year earlier. Computer exports also rose sharply on strong demand for enterprise storage products, while the monthly trade surplus reached US$30.32 billion. The current account surplus expanded to US$49.73 billion in June, setting a new monthly record. Large export and current account surpluses help reduce external financing needs and provide a buffer for the won and energy import costs, while giving the central bank more room to address domestic inflation and asset-market risks. However, the concentration of export growth in semiconductors also makes South Korea’s economy more dependent on global AI capital expenditure and memory prices. When chip demand remains strong, corporate income and investment can spread to domestic demand. If data center investment slows, exports, income, and capital expenditure could weaken at the same time. Headline Inflation Has Eased, but Core Inflation Continues to Support Further Rate Increases When the central bank decided to raise interest rates, CPI inflation stood at 3.2% year over year in June, while core CPI inflation was 2.5%. Oil and agricultural product prices increased cost pressures, while the earlier weakness of the won also raised import prices. At the same time, the central bank was concerned that stronger income and consumption generated by the semiconductor boom could cause inflation to spread from cost-related factors to domestic demand. The latest data show that CPI inflation fell to 2.8% year over year in July and declined by 0.2% from the previous month, mainly because of lower petroleum product prices and fuel-price measures. However, core CPI excluding food and energy rose from 2.5% to 2.6%, its highest level since December 2023, indicating that price pressures related to services and domestic demand remain persistent. The decline in headline inflation over a single month therefore reduces the urgency of consecutive rate increases but is not sufficient to reverse the tightening direction. Minutes released on August 4 showed that some board members believed one rate increase might not be enough to bring inflation back to target and that further preventive action should be considered depending on changes in growth, inflation, and financial risks. The Household Debt Ratio Has Improved, but Debt Levels and Housing Risks Continue to Rise South Korea’s household debt-to-GDP ratio fell to 85.3% in the first quarter of 2026, down 2.9 percentage points from the previous quarter, but the improvement mainly reflected rapid growth in nominal GDP. Household credit outstanding still increased by KRW 14 trillion over the same period to KRW 1,993.1 trillion, while household loans rose by KRW 12.9 trillion to KRW 1,865.8 trillion. A lower debt ratio does not mean that households are substantially repaying their principal. In the second quarter, both housing-related loans and other household loans increased significantly, while housing price growth in Seoul and surrounding areas continued to accelerate. The central bank said that household loans from financial institutions had recently been increasing by around KRW 8 trillion to KRW 9 trillion per month, reflecting continued strength in home-purchase and other borrowing demand. Household debt therefore creates two-way pressure on monetary policy. Higher interest rates can restrain new borrowing, housing prices, and leveraged investment, but they also increase the interest burden on borrowers with existing mortgages and personal credit loans, reducing household consumption. Although the central bank has reasons to continue tightening, the pace of rate increases must avoid causing a sudden deterioration in debt-servicing burdens. Further Tightening Remains Likely, but Its Timing Depends on Inflation, Housing, and the Chip Cycle The Bank of Korea’s next interest-rate meeting will be held on August 27. The decline in headline inflation in July gives the central bank room to wait for more data. However, higher core inflation, faster growth in household lending and housing prices in the Seoul metropolitan area, and the transmission of the semiconductor upcycle into domestic demand all support retaining the option of another consecutive rate increase. The future policy path can be assessed through four indicators: whether core and services inflation ease, the pace of housing price and household loan growth in the Seoul metropolitan area, international oil prices and the won exchange rate, and whether semiconductor export growth can be sustained. If core inflation, housing prices, lending, or depreciation pressure on the won rises again, the probability of an earlier rate increase will increase. If chip exports and domestic demand weaken significantly, the interval between rate increases may lengthen. The Bank of Korea has stated that it will determine the timing and scale of additional rate increases based on the latest data and will not pre-commit to a fixed policy path. This rate increase shows that the Bank of Korea is using the period of strong AI chip activity to address inflation, housing prices, and household leverage in advance. The chip boom has given South Korea greater capacity to withstand higher interest rates, but economic growth and income have also become more concentrated in a single industry cycle. The key question ahead is whether semiconductor earnings can translate into broader income and domestic demand growth while preventing capital from continuing to flow excessively into real estate and leveraged investment.
Brazil’s fiscal pressure intensified further in the first half of 2026. The latest data from the Central Bank of Brazil show that the consolidated public sector recorded a nominal fiscal deficit of BRL 1.318 trillion in the 12 months through June, equivalent to 9.99% of gross domestic product (GDP). This was higher than 9.62% in the 12 months through May and represented a significant increase from 7.3% in June 2025. It was the highest level since April 2021 and was approaching the double-digit deficits recorded during the COVID-19 pandemic, when emergency spending surged. However, a deficit approaching 10% of GDP does not mean that the Brazilian government spent an amount equivalent to 10% of GDP more than it collected during the period. The nominal deficit comprises the primary balance before interest payments and the nominal interest accrued on government debt. In the 12 months through June, interest payments amounted to 8.80% of GDP, while the primary deficit accounted for only 1.19%. This means that approximately 88% of the nominal deficit came from interest costs. Brazil’s most pressing fiscal problem is therefore the financing burden generated by a large debt stock in a high-interest-rate environment. Nearly 90% of the Nominal Deficit Comes From Interest, so the Fiscal Shortfall Cannot Be Attributed Entirely to New Spending The consolidated public sector measured by the Central Bank of Brazil includes the central government, state and local governments, and state-owned enterprises. In the 12 months through June 2026, the consolidated public sector recorded a primary deficit of BRL 157.2 billion, equivalent to 1.19% of GDP. Accrued nominal interest reached BRL 1.161 trillion, or 8.80% of GDP, bringing the nominal deficit to BRL 1.318 trillion. Fiscal Indicator Latest Data Significance Nominal deficit over the past 12 months BRL 1.318 trillion, or 9.99% of GDP Includes the primary balance and debt interest Primary deficit over the past 12 months BRL 157.2 billion, or 1.19% of GDP Reflects the government balance before interest payments Accrued nominal interest over the past 12 months BRL 1.161 trillion, or 8.80% of GDP The main component of the nominal deficit Nominal deficit in June 2026 BRL 166.0 billion Combined primary deficit and interest payments General government gross debt in June 2026 BRL 10.8 trillion, or 81.9% of GDP An important measure of the government’s overall debt burden Public sector net debt in June 2026 BRL 9.0 trillion, or 68.5% of GDP Public debt after deducting certain public-sector assets Note: The deficit figures above use the Central Bank of Brazil’s consolidated public-sector “below-the-line” methodology. Under the Brazilian National Treasury’s “above-the-line” methodology, the central government recorded a primary deficit of BRL 48.2 billion in June. The Central Bank’s consolidated public-sector primary deficit was BRL 55.3 billion. The two figures differ in both coverage and statistical methodology and therefore should not be compared simply by calculating the difference between them. In June alone, accrued nominal interest for the consolidated public sector reached BRL 110.7 billion, rising sharply from BRL 61.0 billion in the same month of 2025. The primary deficit was BRL 55.3 billion, bringing the monthly nominal deficit to BRL 166.0 billion. In addition to interest rates remaining elevated, the Central Bank’s foreign exchange swap operations shifted from a gain of BRL 20.9 billion in June 2025 to a loss of BRL 9.3 billion in June 2026, further increasing interest expenses for the month. The Debt Structure Allows Policy Rates to Pass Quickly Into Government Financing Costs The Central Bank of Brazil began cutting interest rates in March 2026 and delivered its fourth consecutive reduction of 0.25 percentage points on August 5, lowering the Selic benchmark rate from 14.25% to 14.00%. However, 14.00% remains a high interest-rate level, and reductions in the policy rate will not be reflected immediately or proportionately in total interest expenses because the repricing and refinancing of government debt occur with a time lag. The fiscal impact of high interest rates is closely related to the structure of Brazil’s federal public debt. As of June, federal public debt totaled BRL 9.268 trillion. Floating-rate instruments, which mainly move with the Selic rate, accounted for 49.32% of the total. Another 25.90% was linked to price indexes, while fixed-rate securities represented 21.04%. When interest rates and inflation remain elevated, the interest costs of the government’s existing debt also increase. In addition, approximately 20.1% of federal public debt will mature within the next 12 months, corresponding to repayment needs of around BRL 1.86 trillion. Among domestic federal government securities maturing within one year, floating-rate securities account for 40.4%. The government can use its liquidity reserves to repay part of the debt or issue new securities to refinance it. If new debt must continue to offer high yields, the elevated cost of funding will gradually be transmitted to the overall debt stock. This pressure is already reflected in debt-cost data published by the National Treasury. In the 12 months through June, the average cost of federal public debt rose from 12.31% in May to 12.68%, while the average cost of the outstanding stock of domestic federal government securities increased from 13.09% to 13.19%. Over the same period, the average cost of domestic federal government securities issued through public offerings was 14.20%, higher than the cost of the existing domestic debt stock. This indicates that new financing could continue to push up the government’s overall interest burden for some time. Interest Accumulation Is Outpacing the Diluting Effect of Economic Growth on the Debt Ratio Brazil’s general government gross debt rose to BRL 10.8 trillion in June, equivalent to 81.9% of GDP, an increase of 0.9 percentage points from May. Accrued interest raised the debt ratio by 0.8 percentage points during the month, while net debt issuance added another 0.6 percentage points. Nominal GDP growth reduced the ratio by 0.5 percentage points, but this was insufficient to offset the first two factors. Over the first six months of 2026, the general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio increased by a cumulative 3.3 percentage points. Accrued interest raised the ratio by 4.9 percentage points, while net debt issuance added 1.3 percentage points. Nominal GDP growth reduced it by 2.7 percentage points, and exchange-rate movements also provided a small offset. Nevertheless, the overall debt burden continued to increase. This shows that while economic growth can expand the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, it has not been sufficient to keep pace with interest accumulation and new debt issuance. Federal public debt and general government gross debt are not the same indicator. Federal public debt mainly reflects the Brazilian National Treasury’s domestic and external market debt and totaled BRL 9.268 trillion in June. General government gross debt covers the federal government, the social security system, and state and local governments and totaled BRL 10.8 trillion. Both indicators show that debt continues to increase, but they have different coverage and should not be used interchangeably. Fiscal Concerns, Risk Premiums, and High Interest Rates Form a Self-Reinforcing Mechanism Brazil’s current fiscal difficulties are the result of interactions among fiscal policy, financial markets, and monetary policy. When government spending increases, the primary deficit persists, or the credibility of fiscal targets weakens, investors may become concerned that public debt cannot be stabilized over the medium term and consequently demand higher government bond yields. A rising fiscal risk premium may also put depreciation pressure on the Brazilian real, increasing import costs and inflation expectations. When inflation expectations remain elevated, the Central Bank has less room to cut interest rates quickly. A high Selic rate and elevated market yields then increase the cost of floating-rate debt and raise the price of issuing new securities and refinancing maturing debt, causing the nominal deficit and debt stock to continue increasing. The rise in debt subsequently reinforces market concerns about the fiscal outlook, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of rising fiscal risk, persistently high interest rates, increasing interest expenses, and continued debt accumulation. The Central Bank of Brazil has also repeatedly emphasized in its monetary policy communications that fiscal policy affects not only aggregate demand in the short term but also the term premium along the yield curve through expectations concerning debt sustainability. If fiscal discipline weakens, directed credit expands, or doubts emerge about debt stabilization, the economy’s neutral interest rate could rise, reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation. The Economy Remains Resilient, but Growth Cannot Replace Fiscal Adjustment Brazil’s GDP grew by a seasonally adjusted 1.1% quarter over quarter and 1.8% year over year in the first quarter of 2026, reaching BRL 3.3 trillion. Agriculture expanded by 2.0% from the previous quarter, while industry and services grew by 1.0% and 0.5%, respectively. Household consumption and gross fixed capital formation increased by 1.0% and 3.5%. In July, Brazil’s Ministry of Finance maintained its forecast for full-year GDP growth in 2026 at 2.3%. Read More at Datatrack Economic growth helps increase tax revenue and nominal GDP, reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, but it cannot automatically resolve fiscal problems. When the effective interest rate on government debt exceeds nominal GDP growth and the primary balance does not generate a surplus sufficient to offset part of the interest burden, the debt ratio will remain under upward pressure. Brazil’s Ministry of Finance also raised its 2026 forecast for the Broad National Consumer Price Index (IPCA) from 4.5% to 5.1%. The elevated inflation forecast means that even though the Central Bank has begun cutting rates, it will be difficult to return the policy rate rapidly to a lower level. If the government further expands subsidies, preferential financing, or tax cuts to support the economy, these measures may ease the impact of high interest rates on companies and households in the short term. However, they could also increase demand, slow fiscal consolidation, and constrain the scope for additional rate cuts. Improvement in the Primary Balance Will Determine When the Debt Cycle Can Reverse The Central Bank’s further rate cut in August will gradually reduce the cost of floating-rate debt and new financing, but debt repricing takes time, meaning that the government’s average financing costs could remain elevated in the near term. The key question is whether the primary balance can improve and whether the government can reduce the risk premium demanded by markets by controlling expenditure growth and improving the credibility of its fiscal targets. If fiscal adjustment, inflation control, and market confidence improve simultaneously, the Central Bank will have greater room to continue reducing interest rates, and debt costs can gradually decline. Conversely, continued interest accumulation could keep the nominal deficit and debt ratio elevated. Whether Brazil can break out of the cycle of high interest rates, high interest costs, and high debt will ultimately depend on whether the primary balance can shift to a level sufficient to stabilize the debt.
2026-08-05
U.S. semiconductor policy is expanding beyond the buildout of domestic wafer manufacturing capacity to include data transmission, memory access, advanced packaging, materials, and supply chain security across AI computing systems. On July 29, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it had signed letters of intent with seven companies and planned to provide up to US$874 million in federal incentives under the CHIPS and Science Act to accelerate semiconductor research and development for next-generation computing and artificial intelligence. The funding remains at the letter-of-intent stage. The seven companies must complete the Department of Commerce’s due diligence and formal review process before signing final agreements, and the amounts ultimately approved and disbursed could be lower than the stated ceilings. The Department of Commerce will also receive minority, non-controlling equity stakes in the companies, distinguishing these projects from conventional one-way subsidies. The Three Largest Projects Receive Nearly 80% of the Funding, Directly Targeting AI System Bottlenecks The seven projects cover integrated photonics, AI memory, advanced packaging, new computing architectures, dielectric materials, supply chain verification, and optical interconnect components. GlobalFoundries, Kepler Computing Inc. (hereafter referred to as Kepler), and Multibeam Corporation are expected to receive a combined US$685 million, accounting for approximately 78.4% of the total. This shows that policy resources are primarily concentrated on three major AI computing bottlenecks: data transmission, memory access, and chip integration. Company Proposed Incentive Ceiling Main R&D Focus Problem the Project Seeks to Address GlobalFoundries US$300 million Silicon photonics, near-packaged optics, and co-packaged optics Increase AI chip interconnect bandwidth and reduce data transmission power consumption Kepler Computing Inc. US$245 million New AI memory combining 3D integration and ferroelectric technology Improve memory bandwidth, access performance, and energy efficiency Multibeam US$140 million Multi-chip assembly, stacking, and interconnection using thousands of wires Strengthen Chiplet and heterogeneous integration capabilities Extropic US$75 million Thermodynamic sampling units Use less energy for probabilistic computing, simulation, and optimization Thintronics US$50 million Ultra-low-loss interlayer dielectric materials Reduce signal loss in high-speed interconnects and advanced packaging OBSIDIA Semiconductors US$34 million Non-invasive component verification technology Identify counterfeit or maliciously modified electronic components Aeluma US$30 million Large-format, indium-phosphide-free substrate technology Support photodetectors, laser components, and AI optical interconnects Note: The amounts above are the maximum proposed amounts stated in the letters of intent and are not final approvals or disbursed funds. Silicon Photonics and Optical Interconnects Become the Largest Single Investment Area GlobalFoundries is expected to receive up to US$300 million, making it the largest individual project in the package. Through this funding, the U.S. Department of Commerce aims to accelerate the development of near-packaged optics (NPO) and co-packaged optics (CPO) in the United States by two to three years. Traditional AI servers mainly use electrical signals to transmit data among processors, memory, and switches. As transmission distances, bandwidth requirements, and computing cluster sizes increase, copper interconnects face growing pressure from signal attenuation, power consumption, and heat dissipation. Silicon photonics instead uses optical signals to transmit data and places optical components close to computing chips, shortening the electrical signal path while improving bandwidth density and energy efficiency. GlobalFoundries’ project covers next-generation silicon photonics wafers, new optical materials, 3D hybrid bonding, and advanced packaging. The related research and development will be conducted at the company’s facilities in Malta, New York, and Burlington, Vermont. The company stated that under a separate agreement, the Department of Commerce is expected to acquire an equity stake of approximately 1%, although the final ownership arrangement and incentive terms remain subject to confirmation in the final agreement. Optical interconnects have therefore moved beyond being merely a communications component issue and have become a core technology affecting AI data center computing density, heat dissipation, and electricity costs. As the energy consumed by moving data continues to rise, overall system performance may remain constrained by interconnect bandwidth and power consumption even when processor computing power improves. Memory and Advanced Packaging Determine Whether Computing Capacity Can Be Fully Utilized The second-largest project is expected to go to Kepler, with proposed incentives of up to US$245 million. The company plans to use 3D integration and ferroelectric technology to develop a new type of high-performance AI memory. The computing requirements of large AI models are increasing rapidly, but system performance does not depend solely on the theoretical computing power of GPUs or other accelerators. If memory capacity, bandwidth, and data access speeds fail to improve at the same pace, processors may be unable to operate at full capacity while waiting for data, creating the so-called “memory wall.” The U.S. government therefore hopes to cultivate new material and architectural approaches beyond existing high-bandwidth memory, reducing the time and energy costs associated with data movement. Multibeam is expected to receive up to US$140 million to develop multi-chip assembly, stacking, and high-density wire interconnection technologies. As the cost of advanced process nodes continues to rise, AI processors are increasingly relying on Chiplet designs and heterogeneous integration. Computing, memory, communications, and input-output functions are manufactured separately and then combined into a complete system through advanced packaging. Interconnect density, manufacturing yield, and heat dissipation in packaging will therefore directly affect product performance and mass-production costs. Materials, New Computing Architectures, and Supply Chain Verification Fill Upstream Gaps The remaining four projects address materials, optical components, new computing architectures, and supply chain security. Thintronics will develop ultra-low-loss interlayer dielectric materials to reduce signal loss in high-speed interconnects and advanced packaging. Aeluma will develop large-format, indium-phosphide-free substrate technology to support the production of photodetectors and laser components. Extropic plans to use natural thermal fluctuations to develop thermodynamic sampling units, with the aim of completing AI, simulation, and optimization tasks at lower power consumption. OBSIDIA Semiconductors will develop non-invasive component verification technology to identify counterfeit or maliciously modified electronic components. As AI chips are increasingly deployed in data centers, defense systems, and critical infrastructure, component origin, manufacturing history, and authenticity are becoming part of supply chain security. The CHIPS Act Shifts From Fab Construction Subsidies Toward Investment in Critical Technologies The initial policy focus of the CHIPS and Science Act was to attract companies to build or expand wafer fabs in the United States through subsidies, loans, and tax credits. Approximately US$39 billion was allocated to incentives for manufacturing facilities and equipment, while another roughly US$11 billion was directed toward the semiconductor R&D ecosystem. The US$874 million package is not primarily intended to expand existing wafer production capacity. Instead, it supports technologies that are not yet fully mature but could shape the architecture of next-generation AI systems. This indicates that implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act is extending beyond manufacturing capacity expansion toward critical research and development capabilities. The government’s acquisition of minority, non-controlling equity stakes also moves the role of public funding closer to strategic investment rather than one-way subsidies. If supported companies successfully commercialize their technologies, increase in valuation, or are acquired, the government’s equity holdings could generate returns for taxpayers. However, this model also makes policy implementation more complex. The government will need to manage equity valuation, exit mechanisms, and conflicts of interest while avoiding overlap among subsidy review, industry regulation, and shareholder interests. Commercialization Progress Will Determine the Actual Impact of the Policy Investment Most of the projects remain in the research or early commercialization stages. Their actual impact will depend on manufacturing yields, costs, system integration, customer validation, and mass-production capabilities. Subsequent reviews could also change the funding amounts, equity arrangements, or implementation terms of individual projects. Compared with the construction of large wafer fabs, the US$874 million funding package is limited in scale, but its investment direction sends a clear policy signal. As the standalone performance of advanced processors continues to improve, the focus of competition is gradually shifting toward chip-to-chip communications, memory access, packaging integration, and energy efficiency. The United States hopes to use government capital to shorten the development timelines of these critical technologies and retain domestic capabilities in photonics, memory, packaging, materials, and verification.
Global investment in artificial intelligence infrastructure continues to expand, driving demand in Singapore for semiconductors, server-related products, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) expects technology-related industries to contribute the majority of Singapore’s economic growth in 2026, exceeding the approximately 50% share recorded in 2025. This figure refers to the technology sector’s contribution to the increase in annual economic growth, rather than its output accounting for more than half of GDP. Singapore’s economy remains strong, but its sources of growth are becoming increasingly concentrated. GDP grew 5.7% year over year in the second quarter, while manufacturing expanded by 12.2%. Growth in most service sectors and construction, however, slowed from the previous quarter. At the same time, year-over-year growth in average nominal monthly earnings eased from 4.4% in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 3.3% in the first quarter. This indicates that rapid growth in AI-related production and exports has not yet translated into broad-based wage increases and domestic demand expansion across industries. Read More at Datatrack Manufacturing Supported Second-Quarter Growth as Industrial Divergence Continued to Widen According to the advance estimate released by Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), GDP grew 5.7% year over year in the second quarter of 2026, down from 6.3% in the previous quarter. On a seasonally adjusted basis, GDP increased by 1.1% quarter over quarter. Manufacturing was the main growth engine during the quarter, with electronics and precision engineering benefiting from demand for AI semiconductors and related equipment and significantly outperforming other industries. Growth in construction, wholesale and retail trade, and most service sectors slowed from the previous quarter, while chemicals, biomedical manufacturing, and general manufacturing contracted. This shows that although Singapore’s economy continued to grow strongly, its momentum remained highly concentrated in AI-related supply chains. Table 1: Performance of Singapore’s Major Industries in the Second Quarter of 2026 Item Performance in 2Q26 Previous-Period Comparison Current Assessment GDP growth, year over year 5.7% 6.3% in 1Q26 The economy remained strong, but growth slowed slightly from the previous quarter GDP growth, seasonally adjusted quarter over quarter 1.1% 1.3% in 1Q26 Expansion continued, but momentum weakened slightly Manufacturing 12.2% 8.0% in 1Q26 Electronics and precision engineering were the main growth drivers Construction 6.2% 12.9% in 1Q26 Year-over-year growth remained high but slowed significantly Construction, seasonally adjusted quarter over quarter -2.1% 7.4% in 1Q26 Shifted from expansion to contraction Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage 6.3% 9.3% in 1Q26 Continued to grow, but at a slower pace Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, seasonally adjusted quarter over quarter -0.3% 3.5% in 1Q26 Short-term momentum weakened Information and communications, finance and insurance, and professional services 3.9% 4.5% in 1Q26 Growth remained stable but did not accelerate significantly Accommodation and food services, real estate, and other services 2.7% 3.2% in 1Q26 Domestic service activity continued to expand, but at a relatively slow pace Table 2: Singapore Manufacturing Output Performance in June 2026 Manufacturing Segment Year-over-Year Growth Key Assessment Overall manufacturing 7.2% Overall output continued to grow, but internal divergence was significant Electronics 21.3% AI and semiconductor demand remained strong Precision engineering 14.9% Supported by semiconductor equipment and advanced manufacturing demand Chemicals -11.7% Weighed down by raw material supply and cost pressures Biomedical manufacturing -11.4% Affected by product mix and base effects General manufacturing -6.8% Faced weaker external demand and greater cost pressure Overall manufacturing, seasonally adjusted month over month -7.2% Year-over-year growth remained high, but monthly production was volatile Technology Accounts for About One-Fifth of GDP but Contributes Most of the Incremental Growth Technology-related industries accounted for approximately 22% of Singapore’s nominal GDP in 2025, but their growth rate was much higher than that of the overall economy. MAS therefore expects their contribution to economic growth in 2026 to exceed the approximately 50% level recorded in 2025. AI capital expenditure is not only increasing semiconductor and equipment output, but also supporting demand for data storage, communications products, wholesale trade, air freight, and warehousing. This structure allows Singapore to generate a relatively large increase in GDP from a technology sector that represents a smaller share of total output, but it also increases the economy’s sensitivity to the global AI investment cycle. If hyperscale cloud service providers maintain their investment in data centers and hardware, electronics manufacturing, precision engineering, and related trade services could continue to support growth in the second half of the year. If corporate earnings are unable to sustain the current scale of investment, however, the adjustment could quickly spread to production, exports, and logistics activity. The Second-Half Outlook Is Positive, but Business Optimism Remains Concentrated in the AI Supply Chain The latest survey by the Economic Development Board (EDB) showed that 24% of manufacturers expected business conditions to improve between July and December 2026, while 12% expected conditions to weaken, resulting in a net weighted balance of positive 12%. The net weighted outlook for precision engineering and electronics stood at positive 55% and positive 19%, respectively, while chemicals and general manufacturing recorded negative 25% and negative 13%. These figures represent the weighted difference between the share of firms expecting improvement and the share expecting deterioration, rather than output growth rates. Manufacturers’ overall net weighted expectation for third-quarter production stood at positive 26%, with electronics and precision engineering at positive 49% and positive 55%, respectively. The chemicals sector was affected by Middle East-related disruptions to raw material supplies and maintenance shutdowns, while general manufacturing faced weaker export demand and cost pressures. The outlook for the services sector also turned positive, with the net weighted balance rising from negative 4% in the previous survey to positive 13%, mainly supported by wholesale demand for AI servers and networking equipment, the peak travel season, and major events. The Labor Market Remains Resilient, but the Transmission to Resident Employment and Wages Is Weaker Total employment increased by 10,700 in the second quarter of 2026, marking the nineteenth consecutive quarter of growth. The overall unemployment rate remained at 2.0% in June, while the resident unemployment rate stood at 2.9%. Retrenchments increased from 3,830 in the first quarter to 4,500, mainly due to corporate restructuring in some externally oriented industries, but remained below levels typically seen during recessions. Employment growth was driven mainly by non-resident workers in construction and manufacturing. Resident employment continued to increase, but at a slower pace than in the first quarter and was concentrated in essential and public services such as transportation and storage, healthcare, public administration, and education. This means that the contribution of AI manufacturing to GDP and exports may not translate into resident employment gains of a similar magnitude. Average nominal monthly earnings grew 3.3% year over year in the first quarter, down from 4.4% in the previous quarter. MAS believes that labor supply and demand are gradually moving toward balance, with wage growth returning closer to the historical average of 3.7% recorded between 2010 and 2019. Core inflation and headline inflation stood at 1.6% and 1.9%, respectively, in June. Nominal income growth therefore remained above inflation, but wages did not accelerate in line with GDP, indicating that the transmission of strong growth to household income remained limited. Whether AI Momentum Can Broaden Will Determine the Quality of Singapore’s Growth Singapore’s economy is still expected to receive support in the second half of 2026 from AI capital expenditure, semiconductor equipment, and related trade services. The technology sector may also generate spillover effects through corporate profits, demand for professional services, and investment confidence, partly offsetting pressures from energy costs and U.S. tariffs. However, the fact that technology-related industries are contributing most of the incremental growth also means that the economy has become more dependent on a single global investment cycle. Going forward, attention should focus on whether AI orders can further support resident employment, corporate investment, and domestic services, as well as whether nominal income growth begins to accelerate again. If growth remains concentrated in semiconductors, equipment, and export-related supply chains, Singapore’s headline GDP figures may continue to look strong, while the breadth of the expansion and its impact on household income remain comparatively limited.
2026-08-04
In the second quarter of 2026, the U.S. and euro area economies moved in different directions. U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed from an annualized quarter-on-quarter rate of 2.1% in the first quarter to 1.5%, below market expectations. Euro area GDP, meanwhile, shifted from no growth in the first quarter to a quarterly increase of 0.4%, while its year-on-year growth rate also rose to 1.0%. Because the United States reports an annualized quarterly growth rate while the euro area uses a non-annualized quarterly rate, the two figures cannot be compared directly. On a comparable basis, U.S. GDP also grew by approximately 0.4% in the second quarter, indicating that growth rates on the two sides of the Atlantic have moved significantly closer. Read More at Datatrack Read More at Datatrack However, the convergence in growth rates does not mean that the United States and the euro area have entered the same stage of the economic cycle. The United States is slowing from a relatively high growth level, mainly because of lower government spending and a drag from net exports. The euro area, by contrast, is recovering from stagnation, with its major economies all maintaining positive growth. The current pattern is better described as the United States cooling from a high level while the euro area stabilizes from a low base, with clear differences remaining in the foundations of their respective recoveries. Indicator United States Euro Area Initial estimate of real GDP in the second quarter of 2026 Annualized quarterly growth of 1.5%, equivalent to quarterly growth of approximately 0.4% Quarterly growth of 0.4% July manufacturing PMI final reading 53.9 51.9 Latest core inflation Core PCE inflation rose 3.3% year on year in June 2026 Core HICP inflation rose 2.5% year on year in the July 2026 preliminary estimate Latest policy rate Federal funds rate of 3.50%–3.75% Deposit facility rate of 2.25% Note 1: The initial estimates of second-quarter 2026 GDP for both the United States and the euro area were released on July 30, 2026. The United States uses a seasonally adjusted annualized quarterly growth rate, while the euro area uses a non-annualized quarterly growth rate. The U.S. annualized quarterly growth rate of 1.5% in the second quarter is equivalent to a non-annualized quarterly increase of approximately 0.4%. Note 2: The U.S. inflation data refer to the June 2026 PCE price index, while the euro area data refer to the preliminary July 2026 HICP estimate. The reference months, statistical indicators, and release stages differ, so the figures are mainly used to observe the latest inflation trend in each economy and should not be used to compare inflation levels directly. Data are current as of August 3, 2026. U.S. GDP Growth Slows, but Private Demand Has Not Yet Lost Significant Momentum U.S. GDP growth slowed to an annualized quarterly rate of 1.5% in the second quarter, mainly reflecting a shift in government spending from growth to contraction, slower investment and export growth, and a larger increase in imports than in the first quarter. Because imports are deducted in the calculation of GDP, net exports became a significant drag on overall growth. Consumption, private investment, and exports themselves nevertheless continued to make positive contributions to GDP, meaning that the slowdown in headline growth should not be interpreted directly as a rapid deterioration in domestic demand. After excluding more volatile components such as government spending, inventories, and net exports, real final sales to private domestic purchasers, which consist of personal consumption and private fixed investment, increased at an annualized quarterly rate of 3.9% in the second quarter, up from 1.7% in the first quarter. Business investment was supported primarily by industrial equipment, transportation equipment, information-processing equipment, software, and research and development. Growth in information technology and intellectual property products was consistent with continued expansion in AI infrastructure and corporate digitalization investment, suggesting that the U.S. economy is currently experiencing a reconcentration of its sources of growth. Household consumption remains resilient, but financial buffers are shrinking. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased by 0.3% month on month in June, while real consumption rose by 0.4%. Personal income and disposable personal income both increased by only 0.2%, pushing the personal saving rate down to 2.7%. Households are still maintaining spending, but continued consumption growth above income growth means that spending momentum could become more vulnerable if employment conditions weaken or energy prices rise again. The Euro Area Recovers from Stagnation, with Manufacturing Emerging as a Sign of Improvement Euro area GDP increased by 0.4% in the second quarter, improving from zero growth in the first quarter. The European Union as a whole expanded by 0.5%. Ireland and several smaller and medium-sized economies recorded faster growth, Spain maintained relatively strong momentum, and Germany, France, and Italy also avoided quarterly contractions. Although the initial estimates may still be revised, the second-quarter results suggest that the European economy displayed greater short-term resilience than initially expected despite elevated energy prices and continued uncertainty surrounding the situation in the Middle East. Manufacturing also showed clearer signs of stabilization. The euro area manufacturing PMI rose from 51.4 in June to 51.9 in July, while the manufacturing output index increased from 51.7 to 52.9, its highest level since March 2022. Germany improved and Italy remained in expansion, while France and Spain were broadly stagnant, showing that substantial differences remained within the region. The recovery in production still carries risks. New orders increased only slightly in July, and companies raised output mainly by working through previously accumulated backlogs. Employment and purchases of raw materials continued to decline. If new orders fail to take over as a source of growth, manufacturing momentum could weaken again once outstanding work has been completed. The euro area has therefore shown signs of stabilization, but has not yet achieved a full recovery supported by broadly expanding demand. The final U.S. Markit manufacturing PMI reading for July was 53.9, still above the euro area’s final July Markit manufacturing PMI reading of 51.9. However, U.S. manufacturing output growth slowed to a four-month low, new-order growth decelerated for a third consecutive month, and business confidence fell to a nine-month low. This indicates that the narrowing gap between the two manufacturing sectors reflects both improvement in Europe and weakening marginal momentum in the United States. Latest Inflation Trends Diverge as U.S. Inflation Eases in June and Euro Area Inflation Edges Higher in July Because the latest available data refer to different months, the following discussion examines U.S. inflation in June and euro area inflation in July separately. The overall U.S. PCE price index declined by 0.1% month on month in June, while the core PCE index increased by 0.1%. Their year-on-year growth rates slowed from 4.1% and 3.4% in the previous month to 3.7% and 3.3%, respectively. The easing in inflation was driven mainly by lower energy prices, while underlying price pressures remained above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target. The improvement in a single month is therefore insufficient to confirm that inflation has returned sustainably to target. The euro area’s latest figures are the preliminary estimates for July. Headline HICP inflation increased from 2.8% in June to 2.9%, while core inflation rose from 2.4% to 2.5%. Energy-price inflation accelerated from 8.5% to 10.0%, and services inflation also increased to 3.3%. The European Central Bank therefore needs to continue monitoring whether the energy shock spreads further to wages, services, and other goods prices. Growth Rates Are Converging, but the Fed and ECB Still Face Different Policy Considerations At its July meeting, the Federal Reserve maintained the federal funds rate target range at 3.50%–3.75%. The decision passed by a vote of nine to three, with three members favoring a 25-basis-point increase. This shows that even as GDP growth and monthly inflation eased, Federal Reserve officials remained divided over whether the current interest-rate level was sufficient to contain inflation. The European Central Bank also left interest rates unchanged, keeping its deposit facility rate at 2.25%. However, it did not pre-commit to its next policy move and maintained a meeting-by-meeting, data-dependent approach. Compared with the still-resilient private demand in the United States, the euro area has a weaker recovery base but is more exposed to imported energy prices. The ECB must therefore assess both the economic recovery and the risk of second-round inflation effects. U.S. Consumption and European New Orders Will Be Critical in the Second Half of the Year Looking ahead to the second half of the year, U.S. GDP growth may struggle to return rapidly to its previous highs if lower government spending, the drag from net exports, and slower income growth persist. Consumption and investment in equipment, software, and research and development can nevertheless continue to provide support. The main risk is that the saving rate is already low, meaning that a further deterioration in the labor market could lead household consumption to slow. The euro area, meanwhile, needs to transform the current rebound, which has been driven by improving confidence, the completion of backlogged orders, and domestic demand in several countries, into more sustained growth in new orders, business investment, and household consumption. If energy prices remain elevated, they will simultaneously squeeze real household income, corporate profits, and the room available for monetary policy. The convergence in U.S. and euro area momentum therefore more closely resembles the intersection of two different economic trajectories. The United States still has support from private demand, but its growth rate has slowed from a high level. The euro area has moved out of stagnation, but must still demonstrate that its recovery can spread from production to new orders and domestic demand. Whether these two conditions are met will determine whether the narrowing growth gap across the Atlantic proves temporary or develops into a more durable economic rebalancing.
Russia possesses abundant crude oil supplies, yet it experienced gasoline and diesel shortages in the summer of 2026. Data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) show that Russia produced approximately 9.9 million barrels per day of crude oil and lease condensate in 2025, ranking second globally behind the United States. However, continued Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries, oil depots, and transportation facilities have disrupted part of the country’s crude oil processing capacity, making it difficult to convert crude oil into the gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel needed by the domestic market. The Russian government therefore announced on July 30 that exports of gasoline, diesel, marine fuel, and diesel-related products would be suspended from August 1 through January 31, 2027. However, beginning September 1, diesel, marine fuel, and diesel-related products exported by direct producers will no longer be subject to the restrictions, while intergovernmental agreements and humanitarian aid will also be exempted. This means that August will be the strictest phase of the export controls, while subsequent diesel supply will continue to be adjusted according to domestic market conditions and the pace of refinery restarts. Damage to Refining Capacity Prevents Crude Oil Supply from Being Converted into End-Use Fuels Crude oil must undergo distillation, cracking, desulfurization, and blending before it can be turned into gasoline and diesel. Once critical refinery equipment is damaged, the domestic market may still lack directly usable fuel even if oil fields continue producing. Ukraine expanded its drone attacks from the spring onward, forcing several large Russian refineries to shut down. In early July, gasoline production at one point was sufficient to cover only approximately 65% of normal summer demand, prompting some regions to impose purchase limits and resulting in queues at gas stations. Diesel exports also contracted rapidly. Russia’s exports of diesel and diesel-related products averaged approximately 817,000 barrels per day in 2025, but fell to around 234,000 barrels per day in early July 2026. At the same time, crude oil that could not be processed domestically was redirected to overseas markets. The latest market estimates indicate that Russia’s crude oil exports from western ports may rise by 4% in August from July to approximately 2.7 million barrels per day, reflecting how lower refinery throughput is changing the country’s export structure. Export Restrictions and Fuel Imports Proceed in Parallel, Showing That Supply Has Not Fully Recovered To increase domestic supply, Russia has not only restricted exports but has also unusually begun importing gasoline. Russia has imported fuel by sea from India and Morocco, while also increasing gasoline shipments by rail from Belarus and Kazakhstan. Approximately 30,000 metric tons of Moroccan gasoline arrived in Murmansk at the end of July, mainly to fill short-term shortages in specific regions and fuel categories. These imports remain insufficient to replace Russia’s large domestic refining capacity. Shipping distance, port transshipment, fuel specifications, and the limited surplus supply of neighboring countries all constrain import volumes. The Russian government has also established temporary fuel supply arrangements for the agricultural sector to ensure fuel availability for farm machinery and transportation during the autumn harvest season, indicating that the authorities remain concerned about regional shortages and price volatility. Declining Russian Exports Intensify Competition for Global Refined Product Supplies As Russia reduces refined product exports, some refineries in the Middle East have yet to fully recover, while refinery runs in Asia also remain low. The IEA’s July report showed that although global refinery throughput increased by 1.5 million barrels per day in June from the previous month, it was still 6 million barrels per day lower than a year earlier. Crude oil supply has recovered faster than refining activity and refined product supply, causing supply-demand conditions and price trends for crude oil to diverge from those of refined products such as gasoline and diesel. Changes in the international crude oil market can be referenced through “New York Mercantile Exchange: Energy Futures - Brent Crude Oil,” but crude oil futures prices do not fully reflect supply pressure in refined product markets. Read More at Datatrack As of July 30, the European diesel crack spread had at one point risen to a record high of USD 74.66 per barrel, while jet fuel refining margins also exceeded USD 80 per barrel. Russia’s traditional buyers, including Turkey and Brazil, therefore needed to turn to the United States, India, and other refining centers for supplies, further intensifying competition for cargoes across different regions. Although the United States has become an important alternative supplier, its additional supply capacity is also approaching its limit. “New York Mercantile Exchange: Energy Futures - West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil” reflects price changes in the U.S. crude oil market, but whether the United States can increase gasoline and diesel supply still depends on refining capacity and refined product inventories. EIA data show that U.S. crude oil and petroleum product exports reached a record high of 13.6 million barrels per day in April. During the week ending July 24, U.S. crude oil inputs to refineries averaged 17.336 million barrels per day, with the utilization rate reaching 97.2%. Distillate fuel oil inventories increased by 1.1 million barrels from the previous week to 110.6 million barrels, but remained approximately 10% below the five-year average for the same period. With facilities operating close to full capacity, the room for a substantial short-term increase in refined product output is relatively limited. Shortages May Ease Partially, but Refined Product Price Risks Remain Elevated As some refineries resume production, pressure on domestic supply in Russia is expected to ease gradually. Allowing direct producers to resume some diesel exports from September will also help prevent refiners from cutting throughput because of inventory accumulation once supply conditions improve. However, if major refineries, pipelines, or export terminals are attacked again, Russia may once more tighten restrictions. The Russian case highlights the gap between crude oil supply and refined product availability. Increasing crude oil exports cannot immediately fill shortages of diesel and gasoline because other markets are also constrained by refining capacity, fuel specifications, and logistical conditions. The Northern Hemisphere is about to enter the agricultural harvest and freight peak season. If diesel prices remain elevated, costs will gradually be transmitted to agriculture, road transportation, industrial production, and merchandise distribution. The key factors over the coming months will be the pace of Russian refinery restarts, the actual scale of export exemptions from September, and whether refining centers in the United States, India, and the Middle East can provide more alternative supply.
2026-07-30
Although Philippine inflation has retreated from its April peak, monetary policy is still far from shifting toward easing. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Governor Eli Remolona Jr. said that the Monetary Board could still raise interest rates by 50 basis points at its August 27 meeting, equivalent to a two-notch rate hike, although the probability of such a move remains low. His remarks indicate that the central bank is assessing whether oil prices, minimum-wage increases, U.S. tariffs, and peso depreciation could jointly raise business costs and import prices, causing inflation to spread further into core goods and services. The BSP faces the challenge of inflation remaining significantly above target while economic growth has slowed rapidly. Should all four pressures worsen simultaneously, the central bank may need to accelerate its rate hikes to stabilize the exchange rate and inflation expectations. However, should energy prices and the peso gradually stabilize, current policy signals and market reactions suggest that the BSP would be more likely to raise rates by 25 basis points or pause for further observation. The Philippines’ Tightening Cycle Is Not Over After Two Consecutive Rate Hikes After conflict in the Middle East drove global energy prices higher, Philippine inflation increased from 2.4% in February to 4.1% in March before surging to 7.2% in April. The BSP therefore raised its policy rate by 25 basis points to 4.5% on April 23, marking its first rate hike since October 2023. It delivered another 25-basis-point increase in June, bringing the policy rate to 4.75%. The BSP also raised its average inflation forecast for 2026 from 6.3% to 6.4% and its 2027 forecast from 4.3% to 4.5%. Inflation is not expected to fall to 3.1% until 2028. This indicates that the central bank does not expect the current inflationary episode to disappear immediately with short-term fluctuations in oil prices and still needs to prevent rising costs from spreading into corporate pricing, wages, and household inflation expectations. Headline inflation declined to 6.8% in May and then to 6.4% in June, but it remained above the BSP’s 3% inflation target and the upper bound of its 2%–4% tolerance range. More importantly, core inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, increased from 4.1% in May to 4.4% in June. This indicates that price pressures are spreading from fuel and food into other goods and services. Oil Prices and the Peso Reinforce Each Other’s Impact on Imported Inflation The Philippines is highly dependent on imported oil. Rising international oil prices therefore directly increase fuel, transportation, and power-generation costs, while also feeding into food prices through logistics, fertilizer, fishing, and agricultural production. Transportation inflation surged from 9.9% in March to 21.4% in April, while the cost of housing, water, electricity, gas, and other fuels also rose significantly, showing that the energy shock has already entered household living costs. Higher oil prices also increase Philippine demand for U.S. dollars, placing pressure on the external balance and weighing on the peso. The peso closed at 61.847 per U.S. dollar on July 24, setting a record low. As of 11:30 a.m. on July 30, the peso had recovered to around 61.360 per U.S. dollar in intraday trading. Although it had strengthened from its record low, it remained near historically weak levels. Peso depreciation raises the local-currency cost of dollar-denominated oil, fertilizer, animal feed, and machinery. Oil prices and exchange rates are therefore not independent risks. Higher oil prices increase import spending, while a weaker peso further magnifies the local-currency cost of the same imported products, creating a reinforcing cycle of imported inflation. Although raising interest rates cannot increase the supply of oil, it can enhance the attractiveness of peso-denominated assets and reduce the risks of disorderly currency depreciation and rising inflation expectations. Read More at Datatrack Wage Adjustments Increase the Possibility of Cost Pressures Spreading into Service Prices The National Capital Region raised its minimum wage beginning on July 25. The daily minimum wage for non-agricultural workers initially increased from 695 pesos to 755 pesos and will rise again to 780 pesos in January 2027. The full adjustment amounts to 85 pesos per day, or approximately 12.2%, and affects more than 1.1 million workers. Higher wages help compensate households for rising living costs, but they also increase operating expenses for labor-intensive sectors such as retail, food services, transportation, and personal services. Companies that cannot absorb these costs through productivity improvements or narrower profit margins may raise their prices. An increase in the minimum wage could also lead to adjustments in other salary brackets, extending the impact beyond workers who are directly paid the minimum wage. The BSP is reassessing the inflationary impact of the wage adjustment. Should other regions subsequently follow with similar increases, the supply-driven inflation initially caused by energy costs could evolve into second-round effects in which wages and service prices reinforce each other. U.S. Tariffs Indirectly Affect Domestic Prices Through Exports and the Peso Beginning on July 24, the United States imposed an additional 12.5% tariff under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 on Philippine goods that were not included on the exemption list. The Philippine Department of Trade and Industry initially estimated that approximately 34.28% of the country’s exports to the United States, worth about US$6.25 billion, could be affected. More than 60% of Philippine exports to the United States may qualify for exemptions, including semiconductors, certain electronic products, automotive and aerospace components, and selected agricultural and mineral products. The tariff’s primary impact comes indirectly through export revenue, business investment, and foreign-exchange supply. Should exporters be required to lower prices to absorb the tariffs, or should U.S. orders shift to other manufacturing locations, the Philippines’ dollar earnings could decline. This could increase depreciation pressure on the peso and raise the cost of imported goods. First-Quarter GDP Growth Slows to 2.8%, Limiting the Central Bank’s Scope for Aggressive Rate Hikes The Philippine economy grew by only 2.8% year on year in the first quarter of 2026. Household consumption increased by 3%, while capital formation contracted by 3.3%. The services sector expanded by 4.5%, whereas industrial output declined by 0.1%. These figures indicate that current inflationary pressures are primarily driven by energy, exchange-rate, and broader cost factors. A substantial rate hike could help stabilize the peso and inflation expectations, but it would also increase the cost of corporate financing, mortgages, and consumer credit, further weakening investment and consumption. A single 50-basis-point rate hike therefore remains a low-probability scenario. The BSP may accelerate monetary tightening if oil prices surge again, the peso experiences disorderly depreciation, core inflation continues to rise, or wage costs are passed through more broadly into selling prices. Should energy prices and the exchange rate gradually stabilize, the central bank would be more likely to raise rates by 25 basis points or pause for further observation, balancing the need to curb inflation against the risk of causing a further economic slowdown. Philippine Policy Is Shifting Toward Preventing Inflation from Becoming Entrenched Philippine headline inflation has declined from 7.2% in April to 6.4% in June, but core inflation has risen to 4.4%. This indicates that although the initial energy-price shock has eased, price pressures continue to spread into other parts of the economy. Oil prices and the peso are contributing to imported inflation, higher wages are increasing the risk of second-round effects, and U.S. tariffs are creating indirect pressure through export earnings and the exchange rate. By keeping a 50-basis-point rate hike on the table, the BSP is seeking not only to reduce current inflation but also to prevent widespread corporate price increases, higher wage demands, and inflation expectations from moving away from the target. The future direction of monetary policy will depend on whether the four pressures worsen simultaneously, while weak economic growth means that the threshold for more aggressive central bank action remains relatively high.
Although the United States has yet to finalize its policy on tariffs on refined copper, the global copper supply chain has already begun to adjust. Attracted by tariff expectations and the copper price premium in New York, refined copper has continued to flow into the United States, pushing up inventories at the Commodity Exchange, or COMEX. Inventories at the London Metal Exchange, or LME, and the Shanghai Futures Exchange, or SHFE, have declined simultaneously. After weak imports in the first quarter, China’s restocking demand recovered in the second quarter and in June, further tightening the availability of freely tradable physical copper in Asia and Europe. The principal imbalance in the global copper market now lies in the geographic distribution of inventories. When U.S. prices exceed international prices, traders have an incentive to ship copper from Asia and Europe to the United States. This has gradually created a regional divergence characterized by rising inventories in the United States and tighter physical supply in non-U.S. markets. Refined Copper Is Already Flowing into the United States Before Tariff Policy Is Finalized The United States previously invoked Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on semi-finished copper products and certain copper-intensive derivative products, with rates varying by product category. Refined copper cathodes, copper ores, concentrates, and copper scrap were not included. The U.S. Department of Commerce previously recommended imposing a 15% tariff on refined copper beginning in 2027 and raising the rate to 30% in 2028. However, the president must still decide whether to adopt the recommendation based on an updated market assessment submitted by the department. As of July 30, 2026, publicly available information did not indicate that the United States had announced a final tariff plan for refined copper. Policy uncertainty has created opportunities to redirect physical copper across markets. When COMEX copper futures settlement prices exceed the closing price of LME three-month copper futures by enough to cover freight, insurance, financing, storage, and delivery costs, traders can purchase copper in Europe or Asia and ship it to the United States for sale or storage in COMEX warehouses. Read More at Datatrack In a report published on July 24, Morgan Stanley estimated that the United States had imported approximately 335,000 metric tons of copper ahead of potential tariffs since the beginning of 2026. Annualized at the pace prevailing at the time, this volume was equivalent to approximately 2.3% of global copper demand. An earlier estimate cited in a public report on June 8 placed the volume at 260,000 metric tons. The two figures reflect different measurement dates and indicate that copper inventories continued to move toward the United States under the influence of tariff expectations. These figures represent Morgan Stanley’s estimate of accelerated imports and inventory transfers. They are not equivalent to official U.S. customs data on total refined copper imports. Based on the July 22 figures from “COMEX Copper Futures Settlement Price” and “LME Three-Month Copper Futures Closing Price,” the converted New York–London price spread was approximately USD 507.70 per metric ton, equivalent to about 3.7% of the LME price. Because the two markets differ in contract maturity, quotation time, and delivery location, the spread should primarily be used to gauge the incentive for cross-market physical shipments. It should not be treated as a risk-free arbitrage return. Indicator Latest Market Signal Market Implication Morgan Stanley's July 24 estimate of accelerated U.S. imports since the beginning of the year Approximately 335,000 metric tons Tariff expectations continue to attract copper into the United States Converted spread between nearby COMEX copper and LME three-month copper on July 22 Approximately USD 507.70 per metric ton Cross-market shipping incentives remain in place COMEX inventories in mid-July Approximately 625,000 metric tons Global visible inventories are becoming increasingly concentrated in the United States Total LME inventories on July 20 Approximately 295,300 metric tons Down about 24% from the end of May Share of cancelled LME warrants on July 20 Approximately 56% A large portion of inventories has been designated for withdrawal SHFE inventories on July 29 Approximately 69,600 metric tons Inventories fell to a two-and-a-half-year low, reflecting continued depletion of available inventories in China Yangshan copper import premium on July 17 USD 100 per metric ton The premium rose to a 14-month high, indicating a recovery in import demand Note: Publication dates and inventory methodologies vary across exchanges. The table uses the latest available figure for each indicator, with the applicable date shown separately. Aggregate Inventories Remain High, but Tradable Physical Supply Outside the United States Is Tightening As of the end of June 2026, combined copper inventories at the LME, COMEX, and SHFE totaled approximately 1.066 million metric tons, up 43% from the end of 2025 and the highest level since 2003. Based solely on the aggregate figure, the copper market might appear to retain an ample supply buffer. However, most of the increase has been concentrated in the United States, while European and Chinese markets have continued to draw down inventories. The amount of copper actually available at the LME is also lower than the headline inventory figure suggests. On July 20, approximately 56% of LME copper inventories had been converted into cancelled warrants, indicating that holders had instructed warehouses to prepare the metal for withdrawal. Cancelled warrants do not mean that the metal has already left the warehouse, nor do they necessarily indicate an increase in end-user consumption. However, this inventory can no longer be regarded as freely available metal that is immediately accessible for delivery. Tightening supply for nearby delivery also pushed LME spot copper above the three-month futures price for the first time since January 2026, creating backwardation. This indicates that buyers are willing to pay more to secure immediate supply. The location of inventories and the status of warehouse warrants have therefore become more informative indicators of short-term market conditions than the aggregate level of global inventories. Accelerated U.S. Imports and Chinese Restocking Are Competing for Physical Copper A distinctive feature of the copper market in 2026 is that the United States has been accumulating inventories in anticipation of potential tariffs, while China resumed purchases in the second quarter following weak imports in the first quarter. The two markets have therefore begun competing simultaneously for limited physical supply. China imported approximately 1.41 million metric tons of refined copper in the first half of the year, down 14.3% from the same period a year earlier, indicating that cumulative imports remained below the previous year’s level. However, second-quarter imports increased 42% from the first quarter and were 3% higher than a year earlier. Imports reached 281,307 metric tons in June, up 0.5% from the previous month and the highest level since September 2025, indicating that Chinese import demand had recovered from its first-quarter low. Available inventories in China continued to decline during the same period. SHFE copper inventories fell to approximately 69,600 metric tons by July 29, their lowest level in two and a half years. The Yangshan copper import premium also rose to USD 100 per metric ton on July 17, reaching a 14-month high. Declining inventories, rising imports, and a higher import premium collectively indicate that China continued to require imported physical copper despite elevated prices. In the near term, Chinese import demand has been supported by maintenance at domestic smelters, limited substitution from copper scrap, and restocking requirements. Over the medium and long term, investment in power grids, renewable energy, electric vehicles, and AI data centers continues to support end-user demand. As U.S. importers accelerate purchases ahead of a possible tariff and China increases procurement, less refined copper is available to buyers elsewhere in Europe and Asia, further widening regional supply disparities across the global copper market. Mine Supply Contraction and an Apparent Refined Copper Surplus Are Occurring Simultaneously Data from the International Copper Study Group, or ICSG, show that global copper mine production declined 1.9% year over year to 9.38 million metric tons during the first five months of 2026, while copper concentrate production fell 3.4%. Production declined significantly in Chile and Indonesia, while accidents and operational problems affected several large mines. These disruptions pushed global copper concentrate treatment charges to low levels, reflecting greater difficulty among smelters in securing feedstock. During the same period, global refined copper production still increased by approximately 3% to 12.05 million metric tons, exceeding apparent consumption of 11.83 million metric tons and producing an apparent surplus of approximately 220,000 metric tons. The main drivers were higher refined copper production in China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, together with growth in secondary refined output from copper scrap. However, an apparent statistical surplus does not mean that every region has access to sufficient physical supply. Some of the additional metal has already been shipped into U.S. warehouses, while other inventories are constrained by location, warrant status, deliverable specifications, and logistics. As a result, a modest global statistical surplus in refined copper can coexist with tight physical conditions in Europe and Asia. Regional Price Spreads Are Changing Trade Flows and Industrial Costs Regional price spreads are first changing the direction of copper trade. As long as the U.S. premium is sufficient to cover transportation and financing costs, refined copper produced in Chile, Peru, Canada, and other locations is more likely to be shipped preferentially to the United States. Buyers in Europe and Asia seeking to retain supply may therefore need to pay higher physical premiums, sign longer-term procurement contracts, or maintain larger safety inventories. Rising U.S. inventories also do not mean that domestic supply capacity has materially improved. Imported copper can provide a short-term buffer, but it cannot rapidly expand mining and smelting capacity. Should a tariff on refined copper take effect, downstream industries—including wires and cables, power-grid equipment, automobiles, construction, electronics, and data centers—could face higher raw-material costs before additional domestic supply becomes available. Inventory movements driven by policy expectations also carry the risk of reversal. In July 2025, the market widely anticipated that the United States would impose a 50% tariff on refined copper. However, the final measures covered only semi-finished copper products and certain copper-intensive derivative products, leaving refined copper outside the tariff scope. COMEX copper prices and the New York–London price spread subsequently fell sharply. When inventory flows are driven primarily by policy expectations and cross-market price spreads, a policy outcome that falls short of market expectations can cause both trading positions and physical shipments to reverse rapidly. The Tariff Decision Will Determine Whether Regional Divergence Persists If the United States adopts the Commerce Department’s earlier recommendation to impose a 15% tariff on refined copper beginning in 2027, the COMEX premium over the LME could widen again, and traders may continue shipping copper into the United States before the tariff takes effect. Once the policy is implemented, inventories accumulated in advance could provide a temporary buffer, but higher import costs would still gradually be transmitted to downstream manufacturers. If the United States abandons the refined copper tariff, the COMEX premium could narrow. Some inventories might be re-exported or remain in U.S. warehouses for an extended period, while physical supply pressure in Asia and Europe could ease. If the decision continues to be delayed, traders will still have an incentive to retain inventories in the United States, and the global market will continue to incur additional storage, financing, and logistics costs. Key indicators to monitor include the final U.S. tariff decision and implementation schedule, the COMEX–LME price spread, the share of cancelled LME warrants, SHFE inventories, the Yangshan copper premium, and copper concentrate treatment charges. Together, these indicators will determine whether tight physical conditions persist outside the United States and whether U.S. inventory accumulation can continue. The central risk in the copper market now stems from a geographic mismatch between physical supply and end-user demand. Once regional price spreads begin determining where copper is shipped, tariffs affect not only prices but also the logistics, storage, pricing mechanisms, and supply security of the global metals market.
2026-07-29
Europe’s natural gas market tightened again in the summer of 2026. As of late July, underground natural gas storage facilities across Europe were approximately 55% full, the lowest level for the same period since 2021. Estimates of the normal seasonal level vary across data providers, with EnergyRiskIQ placing it at approximately 75% and GEF at approximately 67.5%, but both indicate that Europe’s inventory rebuilding is significantly behind schedule. Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) natural gas futures rose sharply in July. ICE Endex data show that the last traded price of the August 2026 contract increased from EUR 43.060 per MWh on July 1 to EUR 63.595 per MWh on July 24, representing an increase of approximately 47.7%. As of 11:28 a.m. GMT on July 28, the price had fallen back to EUR 56.535, but remained approximately 31.3% above its level at the beginning of July. As natural gas prices rose rapidly, European Union Allowance (EUA) prices remained elevated at close to EUR 80 per metric ton. The combined burden of natural gas and carbon emissions costs is raising production expenses for gas-fired power generation and energy-intensive industries. Ahead of the 2026/27 heating season, Europe therefore faces simultaneous risks involving energy security, industrial competitiveness, and rising inflationary pressure. Lagging Inventory Rebuilding Reduces Europe’s Winter Supply Buffer Europe’s underground storage facilities can cover approximately 30% of winter natural gas consumption, providing an important buffer during import disruptions, sudden temperature declines, or demand peaks. High consumption during the 2025/26 winter caused storage levels to fall to approximately 28% at the beginning of the inventory rebuilding season. Although injections continued during the summer, replenishment remained significantly behind normal seasonal levels as of late July. Under the European Union’s current framework, member states are required to fill underground gas storage facilities to 90% between October 1 and December 1. If high prices, supply disruptions, or technical problems make inventory rebuilding difficult, countries may deviate from the target by up to 10 percentage points. Energy consultancy Wood Mackenzie estimates that even if Qatar restores most of its production capacity by the end of September, European inventories may reach only approximately 75% by November 1. If supply disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz persist, storage levels could fall below 70%. When inventories remain below normal levels, the market has less capacity to absorb severe cold weather, equipment failures, and additional supply disruptions. Traders may also bid more aggressively to secure winter supplies, causing low inventories to be reflected first in higher risk premiums before gradually passing through to physical supply conditions and end-user costs. Recovering Asian LNG Demand Further Raises Europe’s Inventory Rebuilding Costs Following the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe sharply reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas and shifted toward the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. This transition diversified Europe’s sources of supply, while also making the region more exposed to Asian demand, international spot prices, and disruptions along major shipping routes. European LNG imports in July 2026 were estimated at only approximately 6.3 million metric tons, the lowest level since September 2024. Asian demand recovered noticeably over the same period, absorbing approximately 4 million metric tons of U.S. LNG between June and July, a record volume. Some cargoes that might otherwise have been shipped to Europe were consequently redirected to Asia. Supply risks in the Middle East have further constrained available cargoes. The Strait of Hormuz carries approximately one-fifth of global LNG shipments. With Qatari supply disrupted, Asian buyers must compete for additional cargoes from the United States and other regions, while Europe must pay higher prices to attract deliveries. Europe’s inventory problem has therefore expanded from a regional storage shortfall into global competition between European and Asian markets for limited LNG supplies. Surging Natural Gas Prices and Elevated Carbon Costs Prevent Industrial Expenses from Falling Quickly Higher natural gas prices directly raise household heating expenses and corporate gas costs. They also pass through to wholesale electricity prices through Europe’s marginal pricing mechanism. When gas-fired power plants are needed to meet the final unit of electricity demand, their fuel and carbon emissions costs influence the market-wide electricity price. EUA prices remained close to EUR 80 per metric ton in July. Although their increase was smaller than that of natural gas, they continued to raise the emissions costs of gas- and coal-fired power generation. Because coal-fired generation produces more carbon emissions per unit of electricity than gas-fired generation, elevated carbon prices also limit power producers’ ability to reduce fuel expenses by increasing coal-fired output, making it easier for higher natural gas prices to pass through to wholesale electricity prices. Industries including chemicals, fertilizers, glass, ceramics, paper, steel, and non-ferrous metals simultaneously bear fuel, electricity, and emissions allowance costs. European Commission data show that although industrial natural gas and electricity prices in Europe have fallen from the peak of the 2022 energy crisis, they remain approximately two to four times higher than those of major trading partners. A renewed increase in energy prices would further weaken investment and export competitiveness in Europe’s energy-intensive industries. Energy Inflation Restricts ECB Policy Flexibility as Winter Temperatures Become a Critical Variable Wholesale natural gas prices do not usually pass through immediately or proportionately to consumer prices. Corporate hedging contracts, fixed-rate agreements, government subsidies, and pricing adjustment cycles delay the transmission. Energy shocks therefore tend to affect corporate procurement and production costs first, before gradually appearing in merchandise prices, transportation expenses, and household energy bills. Read More at Datatrack Official data released by Eurostat on July 17 show that the euro area’s Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) inflation rate fell from 3.2% in May to 2.8% in June. Energy inflation also declined from 10.8% to 8.5%, but remained an important source of upward pressure on overall prices. On July 23, the European Central Bank maintained its deposit facility rate at 2.25% and stated that the full inflationary impact of the energy shock had not yet materialized. It will continue monitoring the extent to which companies pass on higher costs and whether second-round effects emerge. Consequently, even as economic growth and industrial activity slow, the ECB cannot disregard the effects of energy prices on inflation expectations and corporate pricing. If natural gas prices remain elevated for an extended period, the scope for further monetary easing will be reduced. Europe still has LNG import capacity, Norwegian pipeline supplies, and lower natural gas demand than in 2022, meaning that a comprehensive supply crisis has not yet emerged in the near term. Risks during the 2026/27 winter will depend primarily on the pace at which shipments through the Strait of Hormuz and Qatari production recover, the strength of Asian LNG demand, and winter temperatures. A mild winter would reduce inventory withdrawals. If supply disruptions continue and Europe experiences a prolonged period of severe cold, natural gas prices, electricity prices, and industrial costs could rise again, increasing the risk that energy-related inflationary pressure persists into the first half of 2027 and further weakening European industrial competitiveness and monetary policy flexibility.
2026-07-28
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced on July 23, 2026, that it would take final action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against 60 economies that had failed to establish or effectively enforce bans on imports of products made with forced labor. Tariffs of 10% or 12.5% took effect on July 24, U.S. Eastern Time. This marks the first time the United States has simultaneously imposed Section 301 tariffs on multiple economies on the grounds that they failed to adequately regulate imports of goods produced with forced labor. The investigation covered the United States’ 60 largest trading partners, which together account for 99.4% of total U.S. imports. However, this figure refers to the share of imports originating from the economies under investigation. It does not mean that 99.4% of all U.S. imports will be subject to the new tariffs, as semiconductors, certain critical raw materials, and products already covered by Section 232 measures remain exempt or excluded. With U.S. imports of finished goods remaining near historical highs in recent years, the measures could still affect a broad range of cross-border supply chains and importer costs despite the numerous product exemptions. Read More at Datatrack The measures also replaced the temporary Section 122 tariff that expired on July 24. Unlike Section 122, which is subject to a 150-day limit, Section 301 does not carry the same fixed expiration date. This indicates that the United States is incorporating forced labor, human rights, and supply-chain governance into a longer-term trade-enforcement framework. The 60 Economies Are Divided into Four Tiers, with MFN Stacking Determining the Actual Tariff Burden USTR established different tariff treatments based on whether each economy had adopted, enforced, or committed to implementing a ban on imports of products made with forced labor. In addition to the two headline rates of 10% and 12.5%, the more important distinction is whether the new tariff is added to the existing most-favored-nation tariff, or MFN tariff. Tariff treatment Representative economies Calculation method 10% without MFN stacking Taiwan, European Union Combined MFN and Section 301 tariffs capped at 10% 10% added to MFN Canada, Mexico, United Kingdom, India, Indonesia, and others An additional 10% imposed on top of the existing MFN tariff 12.5% without MFN stacking Japan, South Korea, Switzerland Combined MFN and Section 301 tariffs capped at 12.5% 12.5% added to MFN China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, Brazil, and others An additional 12.5% imposed on top of the existing MFN tariff For example, if a Taiwanese product previously faced an MFN tariff of 4%, the additional Section 301 tariff would be 6%, bringing the combined rate to 10%. If the existing MFN tariff is already 10% or higher, no additional Section 301 tariff will be imposed. By comparison, for an economy subject to a 10% tariff added on top of MFN treatment, a product with an existing MFN rate of 4% would face a final tariff of 14%. Economies such as China and Vietnam, which are subject to a 12.5% tariff added to the existing MFN rate, may also face other pre-existing duties. Their actual cost of exporting to the United States could therefore be significantly higher than the apparent 2.5-percentage-point difference in the headline rates. Enforcement Expands from Specific Products to Economy-Wide Import Regimes, Making Supply-Chain Compliance a Market-Access Requirement The United States has long maintained a system for prohibiting imports of goods made with forced labor. Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes U.S. Customs and Border Protection to issue withhold release orders when it possesses reasonable information indicating that goods may have been produced using forced labor. Such orders can prevent products associated with specific companies, commodities, or sources of supply from entering the United States. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, or UFLPA, enacted in 2021, established a rebuttable presumption for goods produced wholly or partly in China’s Xinjiang region or linked to designated entities. Such goods are presumed to involve forced labor unless the importer can provide sufficient evidence to address the relevant concerns. The latest Section 301 measures expand the scope of scrutiny from individual goods and suppliers to the import-control regime of an entire economy. U.S. authorities will assess whether each economy has established a ban on imports of goods made with forced labor and whether the relevant laws are being effectively enforced. When an economy’s system fails to meet U.S. requirements, a broad range of goods originating from that economy may be subject to additional tariffs. Section 301 has traditionally been used to address intellectual-property violations, industrial subsidies, market-access restrictions, and other unfair trade practices. Its extension to labor rights and supply-chain governance demonstrates that the United States is increasingly using tariff treatment to encourage trading partners to change their domestic laws and enforcement practices. This shift also increases companies’ supply-chain management responsibilities. Exporters will need to monitor not only their direct suppliers, but also the sources of raw materials, lower-tier suppliers, working conditions at contract manufacturers, procurement records, and product flows. Relevant documentation must be available for customs inspections or customer audits. Even when an individual product has not been identified as involving forced labor, it may still face higher U.S. tariffs if its economy of origin lacks an effective import-control regime. Supply-chain traceability is therefore evolving from an internal management function into a condition for accessing the U.S. market. The Taiwan government has stated that it will use the Foreign Trade Act as the legal basis for controlling imports of products made with forced labor, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Labor will jointly establish screening and blocking mechanisms. Taiwan’s ability to retain preferential access to the U.S. market will depend on whether these commitments can be translated into enforceable regulations, inspection procedures, and supply-chain traceability systems. Exemptions Reduce Risks to U.S. Supply, While Taiwan’s Traditional Industries Gain a Relative Advantage Although the new system covers 60 major U.S. trading partners, USTR has excluded several categories of products that could otherwise create double taxation or disrupt U.S. supply security. Major exemptions include informational materials, donated goods, travelers’ personal baggage, and products and components already subject to Section 232 tariffs. Products that the United States cannot produce in sufficient quantities, whose taxation could cause domestic supply shortages or broader economic disruption, or for which additional tariffs would not help address forced-labor concerns may also qualify for exemption. This arrangement allows the United States to increase compliance pressure on its trading partners while reducing the risks of domestic shortages, higher prices, and production disruptions. Certain economies have also received economy-specific product exemptions, indicating that the United States is using tariff rates and exemptions as policy incentives to encourage trading partners to establish and enforce bans on imports of goods made with forced labor. Taiwan and the European Union are the only two economies receiving the 10% treatment without MFN stacking. Under the U.S. calculation method, if the existing MFN tariff on a Taiwanese product is below 10%, the Section 301 tariff will only make up the difference so that the combined rate reaches 10%. If the existing MFN tariff is already 10% or higher, the applicable Section 301 tariff will be zero. This arrangement gives Taiwan a lower effective tariff burden than Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland, which are subject to a combined ceiling of 12.5%, and also places Taiwan in a more favorable position than most economies that must add a further 10% or 12.5% tariff on top of their existing MFN rates. Regarding product exemptions, the Taiwan-U.S. Economic and Trade Working Group reported that the United States granted Taiwan exemptions covering 2,231 agricultural and industrial products. These comprise 322 agricultural products and 1,909 industrial products, with 118 products receiving Taiwan-specific exemptions. Under the industrial-product classification published by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, the 1,909 exempt industrial products consist of 1,817 products covered by global exemptions and 92 products covered by Taiwan-specific exemptions. The difference between the two sets of figures mainly reflects whether agricultural products are included and does not represent a conflict between the data sources. Semiconductors and major information and communications technology products are currently exempt from the forced-labor-related Section 301 tariffs. Steel, aluminum, copper, lumber, automotive components, and certain pharmaceutical products already covered by Section 232 measures are also excluded from the scope of the new tariffs. Among non-exempt goods, Taiwanese machine tools and machinery are subject to a 10% ceiling, lower than the 12.5% rates applied to Japan and South Korea, creating a tariff advantage of 2.5 percentage points. Industries such as hand tools, plumbing hardware, bicycles, plastics, textiles, and medical devices may also gain more favorable pricing conditions relative to competitors in China and Vietnam, whose products are subject to the new tariffs on top of existing duties. Lower tariffs can improve the relative pricing position of Taiwanese products, although actual orders will continue to depend on product specifications, delivery schedules, exchange rates, production capacity, and customer qualification. The benefits are likely to emerge first in traditional manufacturing sectors characterized by intense price competition and greater flexibility in replacing suppliers. The Excess-Capacity Investigation Remains Underway, Leaving Taiwan’s Overall U.S. Tariff Treatment Unsettled Following the completion of the forced-labor investigation, another Section 301 investigation into structural excess capacity and overproduction remains underway. The investigation covers 16 economies, including China, the European Union, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India, and Mexico. It involves 20 major industries, including semiconductors, steel, aluminum, electric-vehicle batteries, and solar modules. Although semiconductors and major information and communications technology products are currently exempt from the forced-labor tariffs, they may still be affected by the outcome of the excess-capacity investigation. Taiwan’s current 10% treatment without MFN stacking therefore applies only to the tariff arrangement under the forced-labor investigation and should not be regarded as the final tariff treatment for all Taiwanese exports to the United States. The latest U.S. action shows that trade-enforcement tools are expanding beyond inspections of individual goods and sanctions on specific companies to assessments of national legal systems and supply-chain governance capabilities. For export-oriented economies, future competitiveness will depend not only on pricing, technology, and delivery performance, but also on the ability to establish verifiable systems covering labor conditions, human rights, and product-origin traceability. Tariffs directly alter the cost of goods, while supply-chain transparency will increasingly determine whether companies can preserve long-term access to the U.S. market.
Chinese DRAM manufacturer ChangXin Memory Technologies, or CXMT, officially listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s STAR Market on July 27, 2026. The company’s shares were issued at RMB 8.66 each, opened at RMB 49.50 on the first trading day, reached an intraday high of RMB 55.03, and ultimately closed at RMB 49, up 465.8% from the offering price. Its market capitalization at the close was approximately RMB 3.28 trillion, briefly making it the most valuable listed company in the A-share market. CXMT recorded full-day trading turnover of RMB 141.187 billion on its first day, becoming the first A-share company to exceed RMB 100 billion in daily turnover. The surge in trading activity temporarily caused system disruptions at some brokerages, reflecting strong market expectations for China’s memory self-sufficiency, AI-related memory demand, and the localization of semiconductor equipment. However, only approximately 6.73% of CXMT’s total post-offering shares were freely tradable during the initial listing period. The limited free float amplified share-price volatility and the liquidity premium. More important than the first-day price increase is the industrial significance of the IPO. After gaining access to large-scale public-market funding, China’s DRAM industry is moving beyond its initial mass-production breakthrough and entering a new stage in which capacity expansion, technology upgrades, and supply-chain localization are advancing simultaneously. Record RMB 57.9 Billion STAR Market Fundraising Provides CXMT with New Expansion Capital CXMT raised approximately RMB 57.919 billion through the offering, surpassing Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation and setting a new fundraising record for a STAR Market IPO. If the over-allotment option is exercised in full, the total proceeds could rise to approximately RMB 66.607 billion. Item Listing and Offering Data Listing date July 27, 2026 Stock code 688825 Offering price RMB 8.66 Closing price RMB 49 First-day closing gain 465.8% Market capitalization at the close Approximately RMB 3.28 trillion Base offering proceeds Approximately RMB 57.919 billion Proceeds after full exercise of the over-allotment option Approximately RMB 66.607 billion Proportion of freely tradable shares not subject to lock-up restrictions Approximately 6.73% First-day trading turnover RMB 141.187 billion The strategic placement investors included the National Social Security Fund, insurance capital, semiconductor supply-chain companies, the sponsor’s co-investment vehicle, and employee asset-management plans. The shares are subject to lock-up periods of approximately 12 to 36 months. These long-term funds may help stabilize the shareholder structure during the initial listing period, although the gradual release of restricted shares in the future could increase the tradable supply and prompt the market to reassess the company’s valuation. According to the prospectus, CXMT will use the proceeds for three projects: technical upgrades to mass-production lines for memory wafers, DRAM technology upgrades, and research and development of advanced dynamic random-access memory technologies. The company previously relied primarily on funding from the governments and state-owned capital of Hefei and Anhui, the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, and other financial institutions. Following its STAR Market listing, the public capital market will become an important financing channel for the next phase of production-line upgrades and technology development. CXMT Ranks Fourth Globally in Capacity and Has Become the Core of China’s DRAM Localization Strategy CXMT was founded in 2016 and is headquartered in Hefei, Anhui Province. It primarily develops, manufactures, and sells dynamic random-access memory, or DRAM. The market generally regards CXMT as the leading company in China’s DRAM industry. According to the company’s prospectus, its production capacity ranks first in China and fourth globally, although it remains behind the three international leaders: Samsung Electronics, SK hynix, and Micron. DRAM is primarily used to temporarily store data being processed by a processor and is widely used in smartphones, personal computers, servers, automotive electronics, and industrial equipment. As AI models grow in scale and data-processing volumes increase, server demand for both conventional DRAM and high-bandwidth memory is also rising. The global DRAM market has long been dominated by Samsung, SK hynix, and Micron, which possess leading process technologies, large-scale capacity, customer certifications, and extensive manufacturing experience. After establishing large-scale mass-production capabilities, CXMT became an important company in China’s effort to reduce its dependence on memory imports and fill gaps in the domestic semiconductor supply chain. CXMT and Yangtze Memory Technologies have different product positions. CXMT primarily develops DRAM, while Yangtze Memory focuses on NAND Flash. The two companies respectively address the computing-memory and long-term data-storage markets, together forming the core of China’s memory localization strategy. Public-Market Capital Takes Over from Policy-Backed Funding as Capacity and Process Upgrades Advance Together DRAM is one of the most capital-intensive segments of the semiconductor industry. Building a memory wafer fabrication plant requires investment in factory buildings, cleanrooms, lithography, deposition, etching, cleaning, inspection, metrology, and automation equipment. After production begins, manufacturers must still complete process introduction, yield improvement, and customer certification before nominal capacity can be converted into actual shipments. CXMT has continued to expand its 12-inch DRAM wafer capacity. The IPO proceeds will strengthen its ability to advance production-line upgrades, equipment installation, and product development simultaneously, moving China’s DRAM industry from an early mass-production breakthrough into a stage of competition at scale. Read More at Datatrack CXMT’s recent financial performance also reflects the effects of capacity expansion and a recovery in the DRAM cycle. Revenue increased from RMB 9.087 billion in 2023 to RMB 24.178 billion in 2024 and then rose further to RMB 61.799 billion in 2025. Over the same period, net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company amounted to a loss of RMB 16.340 billion, a loss of RMB 7.145 billion, and a profit of RMB 1.875 billion, respectively. The company therefore returned to profitability in 2025. After entering 2026, rising DRAM prices, higher shipment volumes, and an improving product mix further amplified the company’s earnings. CXMT generated approximately RMB 50.8 billion in revenue in the first quarter, representing year-on-year growth of approximately 719%. The company expects first-half revenue of RMB 110 billion to RMB 120 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company of approximately RMB 50 billion to RMB 57 billion. Memory wafer manufacturers have high fixed-cost structures. When selling prices and capacity utilization rates increase, profit growth is generally stronger than revenue growth. If the market becomes oversupplied and product prices decline, high depreciation expenses can also rapidly compress gross margins. CXMT’s current earnings growth therefore reflects both market-share gains and an upswing in the industry cycle. Its long-term competitiveness must still be tested across a complete market cycle. AI Supports the DRAM Cycle as CXMT’s Expansion Accelerates Equipment Localization AI demand affects CXMT through two main channels. First, AI servers require more memory, directly increasing global DRAM demand. Second, international manufacturers such as Samsung and SK hynix are allocating more advanced production capacity to higher-margin HBM products, constraining the supply of general-purpose DRAM used in personal computers, smartphones, and conventional servers. Under these supply-and-demand conditions, CXMT can benefit from higher general-purpose DRAM prices and capacity utilization rates even before securing a major share of the HBM market. However, as CXMT and other manufacturers continue to expand, additional supply could expose the memory market to renewed pricing pressure over the medium to long term. CXMT’s capacity expansion will also increase demand for deposition, etching, cleaning, metrology, and inspection equipment. As the United States restricts exports of certain advanced semiconductor equipment to China, Chinese wafer manufacturers have a stronger incentive to increase the adoption of domestic equipment. Chinese equipment suppliers such as Naura Technology Group, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment, and ACM Research Shanghai are expected to gain more opportunities to validate their products on mass-production lines. Semiconductor equipment must demonstrate process stability, defect control, production efficiency, and maintenance capabilities in actual manufacturing environments. If domestic equipment passes certification on CXMT’s production lines, it could subsequently be introduced at other Chinese wafer fabrication plants, increasing the penetration rate of domestically produced equipment. However, international equipment manufacturers still possess technological advantages in lithography, metrology, and certain advanced process stages. Equipment localization will therefore remain a gradual process. EUV and Advanced Packaging Constraints Remain as High-End HBM Mass Production Awaits Validation Although CXMT has established large-scale DRAM production capabilities, it still trails Samsung, SK hynix, and Micron in advanced processes, product performance, yields, and certification by high-end customers. One key constraint is access to extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment. International memory manufacturers have gradually introduced EUV into advanced DRAM processes, while Chinese manufacturers affected by export controls must rely on deep ultraviolet lithography combined with multiple patterning and other process adjustments. DUV multiple patterning can still support process scaling, but the additional exposure, deposition, and etching steps increase manufacturing costs and process complexity and may also affect yields and production efficiency. Market reports have identified HBM3 and HBM3E as possible future technology directions for CXMT, but the company’s prospectus has not disclosed a clear mass-production timetable. In addition to advanced DRAM processes, HBM requires die stacking, advanced packaging, thermal management, and joint validation with AI-chip customers. Research and development, sample delivery, customer certification, and stable mass production are separate stages. Actual progress must therefore be assessed through product shipments and revenue contributions. First-Day Premium Valuation Still Requires Fundamental Validation as Market Attention Shifts to Capacity and Yields Valuation views on CXMT diverged substantially after its listing. Optimistic institutions focus on China’s import substitution, market-share gains, AI-related memory demand, and future HBM potential, and tend to value CXMT as a growth-oriented semiconductor company. More conservative views emphasize that DRAM remains highly cyclical and that the lack of access to EUV equipment may constrain progress in advanced processes. As trading enthusiasm subsides and restricted shares are gradually released, production capacity, product yields, cash flow, and actual profitability will become more important valuation factors. The first issue to monitor is whether new wafer fabrication plants begin production on schedule and achieve higher yields. The second is the cost competitiveness of DDR5 and advanced processes, followed by whether HBM can pass customer certification and generate stable shipments. Large-scale fundraising can accelerate fab construction, equipment purchases, and technology development, but process experience, yield management, and customer certification still require time to accumulate. Whether CXMT can further reshape the global DRAM market will ultimately depend on the actual efficiency of its additional capacity, the mass-production progress of advanced products, and the company’s financial resilience during the next downturn in the memory cycle.
2026-07-27
At the San Francisco AI Summit held on July 24, 2026, the South Korean government announced semiconductor cooperation worth a combined US$950 billion between Korean companies and global technology firms. SK Group will establish five-year advanced memory supply partnerships with NVIDIA and other companies, while Samsung Electronics will expand its cooperation with Broadcom across memory, AI chip foundry services, and advanced packaging. The significance of the initiative extends beyond its headline value. As high-bandwidth memory (HBM), server DRAM, and advanced packaging become key constraints on AI infrastructure expansion, major technology companies are moving to secure memory capacity several years in advance. Memory procurement is consequently shifting more rapidly from quarterly negotiations toward multi-year long-term supply agreements. US$950 Billion Consists of Two Five-Year Partnerships Led by SK and Samsung According to the South Korean government, SK Group will pursue approximately US$750 billion in five-year advanced memory supply cooperation with NVIDIA and other global technology companies. Samsung Electronics, meanwhile, has signed a five-year memorandum of understanding with Broadcom covering more than US$200 billion in cooperation. Together, the two arrangements make up the announced US$950 billion semiconductor cooperation package. Cooperation Value and Duration Main Scope SK Group and global technology companies Approximately US$750 billion over five years Long-term supply of advanced memory, including more than US$500 billion in cooperation between SK and NVIDIA Samsung Electronics and Broadcom More than US$200 billion over five years Advanced memory including HBM, AI chip foundry services, and advanced packaging The cooperation between SK and NVIDIA, valued at more than US$500 billion, covers next-generation memory and AI data centers. SK hynix will jointly develop memory solutions including HBM, while SK Telecom plans to build AI data centers with capacity of up to 2GW using NVIDIA’s Vera Rubin platform and SK hynix HBM4. The first facility is expected to begin operations in 2027. Samsung’s cooperation with Broadcom covers HBM, sub-2nm foundry manufacturing, and 2.3D and 2.5D advanced packaging. This reflects growing demand among AI chip customers for tighter integration across memory, logic semiconductors, and packaging. SK is pursuing a model that combines memory supply with data center infrastructure, while Samsung is seeking customers through its integrated memory, foundry, and packaging capabilities. The summit also announced AI data center cooperation with total capacity of approximately 5GW. Based on NVIDIA B200-equivalent computing capacity, this would correspond to roughly two million GPUs. This infrastructure initiative is separate from the US$950 billion semiconductor cooperation package. In addition, South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT signed a memorandum of understanding with AMD in San Francisco on July 23. The two sides will jointly build and validate AI computing infrastructure combining AMD CPUs and GPUs with Korean-developed neural processing units (NPUs). The cooperation indicates that South Korea is also seeking to integrate domestic NPUs with global CPU and GPU platforms while expanding its broader AI computing ecosystem. US$950 Billion Does Not Represent Immediate Investment or Guaranteed Revenue The US$950 billion package covers memory supply, foundry manufacturing, advanced packaging, and joint development arrangements. The full amount will therefore not immediately become revenue for Samsung Electronics or SK hynix following the signing of the agreements. The more than US$500 billion in cooperation between SK and NVIDIA involves both memory and AI data centers, while Samsung’s US$200 billion arrangement with Broadcom is based on a memorandum of understanding. The amount ultimately realized will depend on procurement volumes, product pricing, customer qualification, and mass-production progress. The US$950 billion figure is therefore better understood as a five-year cooperation framework that improves visibility into future demand. Longer AI Platform Development Cycles and HBM Supply Constraints Drive Long-Term Agreements Traditional memory procurement is highly sensitive to quarterly contract prices, spot prices, and inventory cycles. AI data centers, however, operate on longer procurement timelines. GPUs and custom AI accelerators often require several years of design and validation, while HBM must be co-developed, integrated into advanced packaging, and qualified for mass production alongside computing chips. Major technology companies are therefore negotiating specifications and supply volumes for several future product generations in advance. A number of US cloud service providers have already signed multi-year long-term agreements (LTAs) with memory manufacturers. Large customers can use purchase commitments to secure capacity and relatively stable pricing, while suppliers can plan process transitions, equipment investment, and product development with greater confidence. Customers without long-term agreements, or those seeking additional supply beyond existing contracts, may face higher prices and longer lead times. HBM uses larger dies, more stacked layers, and more complex packaging processes than conventional DRAM, resulting in higher wafer-capacity consumption per bit. As suppliers allocate more capacity to HBM, the wafer resources available for server RDIMMs, PC DRAM, and mobile memory are also constrained. New-generation AI platforms are simultaneously increasing the memory capacity installed in each accelerator, making it difficult for overall bit supply growth to keep pace with demand. According to the latest TrendForce research, server DRAM contract prices are projected to rise by 13%–18% quarter over quarter in the third quarter of 2026. RDIMM bit supply is expected to increase by only approximately 15%–20% in 2027, potentially lagging growth in server CPU shipments. Server DRAM contract prices may continue rising sequentially through the second half of 2027, although the pace of increase is expected to moderate. Suppliers are responding to demand for AI and high-end memory by expanding capital expenditure. SK hynix’s DRAM capital expenditure has increased significantly in recent years, indicating greater investment in memory capacity and process upgrades. However, higher capital expenditure does not immediately translate into marketable bit supply. Equipment installation, process migration, product qualification, and yield improvement all take time, making it difficult to fully alleviate HBM and server DRAM supply pressure in the near term. Read More at Datatrack DRAM and NAND Flash Supply-Demand Conditions May Diverge in the Second Half of 2027 The effects of long-term supply agreements are not uniform across memory products. The latest NAND Flash research indicates that the NAND Flash supply-demand bit gap is expected to remain at approximately negative 4%–5% in 2026, meaning the market will remain undersupplied. However, process upgrades, the addition of new capacity, and weak smartphone and notebook demand could push the NAND Flash supply-demand gap into positive territory in the second half of 2027. By comparison, HBM and server DRAM remain constrained by wafer and advanced packaging capacity, meaning supply pressure may persist for longer and long-term agreements could provide stronger support for both availability and pricing. Long-Term Agreements Improve Visibility, but Execution Still Depends on Demand and Infrastructure Long-term supply agreements help memory manufacturers plan capacity and investment, but they may also increase customer and capacity concentration risks. If more advanced capacity is allocated in advance to a small number of major AI customers, smaller server companies and consumer electronics manufacturers may face greater difficulty obtaining supply. If AI capital expenditure falls below expectations, procurement volumes, pricing, and delivery schedules could also be renegotiated. The realization of these agreements will depend on customer qualification and production yields for HBM4, sub-2nm processes, and advanced packaging, as well as the availability of electricity, land, cooling systems, network infrastructure, and financing for AI data centers. South Korea’s newly announced cooperation shows that competition in the global memory industry is shifting toward multi-year capacity and technology partnerships. In addition to spot and quarterly contract prices, future assessments of the memory market will need to monitor HBM capacity allocation, LTA coverage, AI customer capital expenditure, and the pace at which new supply enters the market.
On July 23, 2026, the European Commission announced that Google’s business practices in search services and Google Play violated the Digital Markets Act (DMA), imposing combined fines of €890 million. On July 24, Trump responded by stating that the United States would launch an investigation into the European Union under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and threatened substantial tariffs, extending what began as a dispute over competition rules for technology platforms into the broader transatlantic trade relationship. Two Platform Violations Result in Combined Google Fines of €890 Million The EU penalties cover two violations involving Google Search and Google Play. Both center on the risk that Google, which controls major platform gateways while also operating its own services, could use platform rules to give its businesses a competitive advantage. In search services, the EU found that Google gave its own services greater visibility in search results for shopping, hotels, transportation, sports, and other categories through higher rankings, more prominent layouts, and specialized filtering features, while third-party providers found it difficult to compete under equivalent conditions. Because Google operates search, travel, shopping, and content services at the same time, the presentation of search results directly affects traffic, transaction opportunities, and advertising revenue. The EU therefore imposed a €460 million fine under the DMA’s requirements for fair and non-discriminatory treatment. The other violation concerns Google Play. The EU said Google restricted app developers from informing users about cheaper external purchasing channels and prevented them from directing consumers to websites or other platforms to complete transactions. The DMA does not prohibit platforms from charging reasonable customer acquisition fees, but the EU concluded that Google’s steering-related fees and charging periods exceeded reasonable limits, leaving developers potentially liable for continuing costs even when transactions were completed outside Google Play. The EU therefore imposed an additional fine of €430 million. Violation Main Issue Identified by the EU Fine Google Search self-preferencing Google's own shopping, travel, and other services received greater visibility, while third-party providers were not offered equivalent display conditions €460 million Google Play restrictions on external steering Developers were restricted from promoting cheaper external transaction channels, while related fees exceeded reasonable limits €430 million Total Two DMA violations €890 million The EU also required Google to complete corrective measures within 60 days of the decision, including presenting third-party search services fairly and easing restrictions on developers’ ability to introduce external offers, communicate with users, and complete transactions outside Google Play. Google responded that the requirements could force the company to remove real-time hotel, flight, and restaurant information commonly used by European consumers and weaken Google Play’s security protections. The company may still appeal the decision. Compared with the one-time fine, changes to search traffic allocation, advertising placements, and Google Play’s fee structure could have a more significant effect on Google’s long-term business model. Trump Turns the Digital Regulatory Dispute into a Section 301 Trade Issue In a July 24 post on Truth Social, Trump accused the EU of using regulations and fines to “plunder” American companies and taxpayers. He announced that the United States would immediately launch an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and impose substantial tariffs on the EU as soon as possible. He also cited previous EU regulatory cases involving Apple, Meta, Amazon, and Google, framing the latest penalty as part of a systemic pattern in which the EU has targeted U.S. technology companies. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer also said that EU enforcement actions increased uncertainty for American companies operating in Europe and created material risks to transatlantic trade stability. Section 301 authorizes the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate whether a foreign government’s policies are discriminatory, unreasonable, or burdensome to U.S. commerce. If the investigation reaches an affirmative finding, the United States may impose tariffs, restrict imports, or adopt other trade measures. The targets of those measures do not have to be directly related to the original dispute. Therefore, even if the dispute originates from digital platform regulation, the United States could still use tariffs on physical goods to exert negotiating pressure on the EU. Trump’s announcement that an investigation would begin immediately does not mean that the USTR has completed the formal initiation process or that tariffs have already taken effect. The USTR would generally still need to publish a notice, define the scope of the investigation, solicit comments from interested parties, and hold hearings where appropriate. Only after completing those procedures would it determine whether the EU measures meet the conditions for action under Section 301 and which products any tariffs would cover. As of July 27, 2026, publicly available information remained centered on Trump’s political announcement and criticism from the U.S. Trade Representative, while formal procedures from the USTR were still pending. Whether the investigation remains limited to the Google case or expands to the DMA as a whole or other EU digital regulations will be critical in determining whether the tariff risk becomes more substantial. Section 301 has recently received greater attention partly because U.S. courts have restricted the government’s use of emergency powers to impose tariffs. Compared with emergency-based measures, Section 301 provides clearer investigative and tariff authority, although it also requires public notices, comment procedures, and other statutory processes. The United States recently used a separate Section 301 investigation involving imports of products made with forced labor to impose tariff measures on 60 economies, setting total tariff-rate floors of 10% or 12.5% depending on the economy. Those measures took effect on July 24, but they belong to a different investigative process from the dispute triggered by the EU’s fine against Google. The existing rates therefore cannot be applied directly to the Google case. If the United States later introduces a new list of EU products, the applicable rates, tariff-stacking method, and scope of exemptions will still depend on a formal USTR announcement. The U.S.-EU Dispute Could Spill Over from Platform Rules to Real-Economy Industries Google’s product design and revenue model could face adjustments. If Google is required to reduce the priority given to its own travel, shopping, and other services in search results, third-party platforms could receive more traffic. Easing restrictions on external steering could also weaken Google Play’s control over digital transactions and its ability to collect commissions. If the EU extends similar rules to AI search services, the way Google launches new functions in Europe could also face additional constraints. The digital services dispute could be converted into tariffs on physical goods. If the United States imposes additional tariffs on EU products, European exporters may raise prices, absorb part of the cost, or redirect exports to other markets, while U.S. importers and consumers could also bear part of the burden. Automobiles, machinery, consumer goods, and food products with significant export value or political sensitivity could become tools for U.S. pressure and bilateral negotiations. Global digital regulatory systems could become increasingly fragmented. The EU regards the DMA as a framework for preserving market openness and competition, while the U.S. government may treat fines, platform restrictions, and data regulations as non-tariff trade barriers. Major technology companies could increasingly face both the EU’s market-access requirements and U.S. government pressure related to industrial competitiveness and technological leadership. Formal USTR Action and Google’s Corrective Measures Will Determine Whether the Conflict Escalates The two key issues ahead are whether the USTR formally initiates the investigation and whether the EU accepts Google’s proposed corrective measures. If Google adjusts its search presentation and external-steering rules within the 60-day period and avoids additional EU penalties, the United States and the EU may still have room to reduce tensions through negotiations. The baseline scenario is that the United States first uses investigative procedures and tariff threats to pressure the EU into negotiations, without immediately entering a broad tariff confrontation. The risk scenario is that the USTR determines that the DMA or related enforcement measures are discriminatory, proposes a tariff list covering EU products, and triggers EU retaliation. The decisive issue is whether the United States formally converts a digital regulatory dispute into tariffs on physical goods. If Section 301 is ultimately used to respond to EU enforcement against technology platforms, future compliance disputes involving major technology companies will be more likely to spill over into manufacturing, consumer markets, and cross-border investment.
2026-07-24
Continued expansion in global artificial intelligence infrastructure investment has driven rapid growth in Taiwan’s exports of semiconductors, servers, and information and communications technology products. The export boom has not only lifted economic growth but also pushed Taiwan’s current account surplus to a historically high level, drawing closer attention to the New Taiwan dollar exchange rate, the central bank’s foreign exchange operations, and life insurers’ hedging policies. In July 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury released its latest Report to Congress on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States. The report stated that Taiwan’s current account surplus as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 14.1% in 2024 to 19.6% in 2025, while its goods and services trade surplus with the United States nearly doubled to US$145.0 billion. As both Taiwan’s current account surplus and its trade surplus with the United States exceeded the U.S. thresholds, Taiwan remained on the foreign exchange policy Monitoring List. A current account surplus approaching one-fifth of GDP reflects Taiwan’s competitive advantage in the global AI supply chain, but it also indicates rising imbalances among export earnings, capital flows, and exchange rate policy. AI Demand Drives Rapid Expansion in the Goods Surplus The current account consists of goods, services, primary income, and secondary income, with trade in goods traditionally serving as the main source of Taiwan’s surplus. The latest revised data from Taiwan’s central bank show that the current account surplus reached US$179.77 billion in 2025, an increase of US$67.06 billion from 2024. The goods surplus rose from US$99.36 billion to US$174.95 billion, an increase of US$75.59 billion, making it the main contributor to the expansion in the current account surplus. The services balance remained in deficit, while primary income continued to record a surplus. Indicator 2024 2025 Current account balance Surplus of US$112.71 billion Surplus of US$179.77 billion Current account surplus as a share of GDP 14.1% Approximately 19.5% Goods balance, balance-of-payments basis Surplus of US$99.36 billion Surplus of US$174.95 billion Services balance Deficit of US$12.20 billion Deficit of US$13.58 billion Primary income balance Surplus of US$30.27 billion Surplus of US$25.91 billion Secondary income balance Deficit of US$4.72 billion Deficit of US$7.51 billion Note: The 2024 and 2025 balance-of-payments figures are based on the latest revisions published by Taiwan’s central bank in May 2026. Based on the data available at the time of writing, the Taiwan section of the U.S. Treasury’s July 2026 foreign exchange report placed Taiwan’s 2025 current account surplus at 19.6% of GDP, while the quantitative assessment table in the same report listed the ratio at 19.5%. The expansion in the surplus has been highly concentrated by industry. Continued growth in demand for AI, high-performance computing, and advanced process technologies has boosted exports of semiconductors, electronic components, servers, and information and communications equipment. The U.S. Treasury also noted that strong U.S. demand for Taiwanese technology products, together with advance purchases by some importers in anticipation of tariff changes, further widened Taiwan’s surplus with the United States. Taiwan’s external surplus continued to increase in 2026. In the first quarter of 2026, Taiwan recorded a current account surplus of US$62.53 billion, an increase of US$32.84 billion from the same period a year earlier, including a goods surplus of US$58.01 billion. Goldman Sachs forecasts that if the AI chip export boom continues, Taiwan’s current account surplus could exceed 20% of GDP in 2026. Domestic economic growth forecasts have also been revised upward. On July 24, the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research raised its forecast for Taiwan’s 2026 economic growth rate to 10.38%, while the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research projected growth of 10.35%. This indicates that AI demand has extended from exports into equipment investment, corporate earnings, stock market wealth effects, and part of private consumption. The Current Account Surplus Creates Appreciation Pressure, but Capital Flows Determine the Actual Exchange Rate When exporters receive payments in U.S. dollars and repatriate and convert the funds into New Taiwan dollars, the supply of U.S. dollars and demand for New Taiwan dollars in the market increase. Therefore, growth in goods exports and the current account surplus generally creates medium- to long-term appreciation pressure on the New Taiwan dollar. However, a current account surplus does not mean that all foreign exchange earnings will immediately be converted into New Taiwan dollars. Companies may use the funds to establish overseas production facilities, while financial institutions and households may purchase overseas equities, bonds, or other foreign-currency assets, creating financial-account outflows that offset part of the appreciation pressure. Taiwan’s financial account recorded a net increase in assets of US$154.79 billion in 2025, up from US$93.40 billion in 2024. Within this total, the net increase in direct investment assets rose from approximately US$20.92 billion to US$34.36 billion. Overseas investment by Taiwanese companies, large holdings of foreign assets by life insurers, and overseas financial asset allocation by households all help absorb the foreign exchange surplus generated by the current account. The movement of the New Taiwan dollar therefore depends on the combined effects of exporter conversions, corporate overseas investment, foreign investor flows into and out of Taiwan’s stock market, life insurers’ hedging demand, and central bank operations. Taiwan Remains on the U.S. Foreign Exchange Monitoring List The U.S. Treasury mainly uses three quantitative criteria to assess the foreign exchange policies of major trading partners: the bilateral trade surplus with the United States, the current account surplus, and persistent, one-sided intervention in the foreign exchange market. U.S. Treasury assessment criterion Threshold Taiwan’s 2025 performance Goods and services trade surplus with the United States At least US$15 billion US$145.0 billion Current account surplus as a share of GDP At least 3% Approximately 19.5% Persistent, one-sided foreign exchange intervention Net purchases in at least 8 out of 12 months, with total purchases equal to at least 2% of GDP Full-year net purchases equal to 0.8% of GDP, below the threshold Taiwan exceeded the first two thresholds, but the central bank’s full-year net foreign exchange purchases totaled US$7.7 billion in 2025, equivalent to 0.8% of GDP, below the U.S. threshold. Taiwan therefore remained on the Monitoring List but was not designated a currency manipulator. It is worth noting that the full-year figure conceals differences in operations across periods. Taiwan’s central bank purchased US$13.25 billion in foreign exchange during the first half of 2025, equivalent to approximately 3.1% of GDP during the same period, with most purchases concentrated in May when the New Taiwan dollar faced rapid appreciation pressure. Partial foreign exchange sales in other months reduced the full-year net purchase ratio to 0.8%. The U.S. Treasury also noted that the New Taiwan dollar appreciated by 4.5% against the U.S. dollar in 2025, but some private-sector models based on the current account, purchasing power parity, and the real effective exchange rate still indicated that the currency may be undervalued. As Taiwan’s surplus expands further, U.S. attention to the scale and transparency of Taiwan’s foreign exchange intervention is likely to continue. In November 2025, Taiwan’s central bank and the U.S. Treasury issued a joint statement committing to disclose foreign exchange intervention data at least quarterly, with a one-quarter lag, indicating that exchange rate policy transparency has become an important issue in bilateral discussions. New Life Insurance Hedging Rules Become a New Exchange Rate Variable The latest U.S. foreign exchange report included a separate section on Taiwan’s life insurance industry, reflecting the growing importance of insurers’ overseas assets and hedging activity in determining supply and demand for the New Taiwan dollar. As of 2025, Taiwan’s life insurance industry had approximately US$1.2 trillion in assets, equivalent to 131% of GDP. Around 60% was invested in overseas assets, representing more than US$700 billion in foreign asset exposure. Because policy liabilities are primarily denominated in New Taiwan dollars while overseas assets are mostly denominated in U.S. dollars, life insurers need to use forward foreign exchange contracts, currency swaps, and other instruments to manage exchange rate risk. When life insurers raise their hedge ratios, they generally establish positions that sell U.S. dollars and buy New Taiwan dollars, increasing demand for the local currency. A lower hedge ratio, by contrast, helps reduce appreciation pressure on the New Taiwan dollar. Beginning in late 2025, the Financial Supervisory Commission adjusted related accounting and reserve rules, allowing life insurers to amortize foreign exchange gains and losses on certain foreign bonds over the remaining life of the bonds, reducing the effect of short-term exchange rate fluctuations on current-period earnings. Taiwan’s life insurance hedge ratio had fallen to approximately 45% by February 2026, down from 60% in September 2025 and around 70% before the pandemic. Lower hedge ratios can reduce high hedging costs and decrease life insurers’ demand to purchase New Taiwan dollars in the foreign exchange market, but insurers must also bear greater exchange rate risk. If the New Taiwan dollar appreciates rapidly, the New Taiwan dollar value of overseas assets may decline, affecting insurers’ net worth and capital adequacy. The Financial Supervisory Commission has stated that the new rules are intended to improve the financial reporting of long-term assets, reduce excessive hedging costs, and strengthen the capital resilience of the life insurance industry. Insurers are required to allocate part of the hedging costs they save to reserves, gradually building a buffer to absorb future foreign exchange losses. From the perspective of the foreign exchange market, lower hedging demand may also reduce demand for the New Taiwan dollar and ease appreciation pressure. Short-Term New Taiwan Dollar Depreciation Does Not Eliminate Long-Term Policy Pressure Although the current account surplus continued to expand, the New Taiwan dollar still weakened at one point in July 2026. On July 24, the interbank closing exchange rate was NT$32.358 per U.S. dollar, representing a depreciation of NT$0.092 from the previous trading day. Taiwan’s stock market also fell by more than 1,000 points at one point during the same session. At the time, escalating conflict in the Middle East pushed Brent crude oil futures above US$100 per barrel, intensifying concerns over energy supplies and renewed inflation. The U.S. dollar and U.S. Treasury yields rose simultaneously, while the decline in Taiwanese equities and expectations of foreign capital outflows caused short-term capital flows to temporarily outweigh demand for the New Taiwan dollar generated by exporter conversions. Read More at Datatrack If high oil prices and New Taiwan dollar depreciation occur simultaneously, they will also raise the local-currency cost of imported energy. The government can delay part of the cost pass-through through CPC Corporation, Taiwan Power Company, and price stabilization mechanisms, but corporate production costs and fiscal burdens may still increase. Inflation forecasts are also approaching levels closely watched by the central bank. The Taiwan Institute of Economic Research forecasts CPI inflation of 1.98% in 2026, while the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research projects 2.02%. If tensions in the Middle East persist and increase energy prices and imported inflation, the central bank may face greater pressure to raise interest rates. However, Taiwan’s economy remains clearly divided across industries. Exports and investment in AI and semiconductors are growing rapidly, while traditional industries face weak demand, exchange rate pressures, and higher costs. If the central bank raises interest rates and this leads to New Taiwan dollar appreciation, or if it directly allows the exchange rate to reflect surplus-related pressures more visibly, it could help contain imported inflation but may further weaken the competitiveness of traditional exporters and increase foreign exchange and valuation pressure on life insurers’ overseas assets. AI Gains Are Turning into Exchange Rate and Financial Policy Challenges Taiwan’s current account surplus has approached 20% of GDP, reflecting the large volume of foreign exchange earnings generated by AI and semiconductor exports. The key factor for the subsequent exchange rate trend is whether these funds are repatriated and converted by exporters or redirected into overseas investments and foreign-currency assets. In addition to monitoring whether Taiwan’s current account surplus exceeds 20% of GDP in 2026, it will also be necessary to examine the actual destination of export earnings and the ability of life insurers’ capital to withstand exchange rate movements after reducing hedging. AI exports remain a major pillar of Taiwan’s economic growth, but their effects have extended to exchange rates, inflation, and financial regulation. As the external surplus grows, the central bank and the Financial Supervisory Commission will increasingly need to balance appreciation pressure on the New Taiwan dollar, imported inflation, the competitiveness of traditional industries, and foreign exchange risk in the life insurance sector.