Key Indicator
United States: PPI: NSA
United States: University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index (CCI): Preliminary: Anomaly
United States: ISM Manufacturing PMI - Final (SA)
United States: CPI (NSA)
COMEX Inventory: Silver
S&P 500 Index
Global: GDP Gowth Rate - United States
Global Foundries' Revenue
DRAM Makers' Fab Capacity Breakdown by Brand
NAND Flash Makers' Capex: Forecast
IC Design Revenue
Server Shipment
Top 10 MLCC Suppliers' Capex: Forecast
LCD Panel Makers' Revenue
AMOLED Capacity Input Area by Vendor: Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Supplier
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only): Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Sizes: Total
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only)
PV Supply Chain Module Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Cell Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Polysilicon Capacity
PV Supply Chain Wafer Capacity
Global PV Demand: Forecast
Smartphone Production Volume
Notebook Shipments by Brand
Smartphone Production Volume: Forecast
Wearable Shipment
TV Shipments (incl. LCD/OLED/QLED): Total
China Smartphone Production Volume
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Global
ITU Internet Penetration Rate -- Global
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Developed Countries
Electric Vehicles (EVs) Sales: Forecast
Global Automotive Sales
AR/VR Device Shipment: Forecast
China: Power Battery: Battery Output Power: Lithium Iron Phosphate Battery: Month to Date
CADA China Vehicle Inventory Alert Index (VIA)
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue: Forecast
LED Chip Revenue (Chip Foundry+ In House Used): Forecast
GaN LED Accumulated MOCVD Installation Volume
Video Wall-Display LED Market Revenue: Forecast
Consumer & Others LED Market Revenue
2026-07-24
Continued expansion in global artificial intelligence infrastructure investment has driven rapid growth in Taiwan’s exports of semiconductors, servers, and information and communications technology products. The export boom has not only lifted economic growth but also pushed Taiwan’s current account surplus to a historically high level, drawing closer attention to the New Taiwan dollar exchange rate, the central bank’s foreign exchange operations, and life insurers’ hedging policies. In July 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury released its latest Report to Congress on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States. The report stated that Taiwan’s current account surplus as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 14.1% in 2024 to 19.6% in 2025, while its goods and services trade surplus with the United States nearly doubled to US$145.0 billion. As both Taiwan’s current account surplus and its trade surplus with the United States exceeded the U.S. thresholds, Taiwan remained on the foreign exchange policy Monitoring List. A current account surplus approaching one-fifth of GDP reflects Taiwan’s competitive advantage in the global AI supply chain, but it also indicates rising imbalances among export earnings, capital flows, and exchange rate policy. AI Demand Drives Rapid Expansion in the Goods Surplus The current account consists of goods, services, primary income, and secondary income, with trade in goods traditionally serving as the main source of Taiwan’s surplus. The latest revised data from Taiwan’s central bank show that the current account surplus reached US$179.77 billion in 2025, an increase of US$67.06 billion from 2024. The goods surplus rose from US$99.36 billion to US$174.95 billion, an increase of US$75.59 billion, making it the main contributor to the expansion in the current account surplus. The services balance remained in deficit, while primary income continued to record a surplus. Indicator 2024 2025 Current account balance Surplus of US$112.71 billion Surplus of US$179.77 billion Current account surplus as a share of GDP 14.1% Approximately 19.5% Goods balance, balance-of-payments basis Surplus of US$99.36 billion Surplus of US$174.95 billion Services balance Deficit of US$12.20 billion Deficit of US$13.58 billion Primary income balance Surplus of US$30.27 billion Surplus of US$25.91 billion Secondary income balance Deficit of US$4.72 billion Deficit of US$7.51 billion Note: The 2024 and 2025 balance-of-payments figures are based on the latest revisions published by Taiwan’s central bank in May 2026. Based on the data available at the time of writing, the Taiwan section of the U.S. Treasury’s July 2026 foreign exchange report placed Taiwan’s 2025 current account surplus at 19.6% of GDP, while the quantitative assessment table in the same report listed the ratio at 19.5%. The expansion in the surplus has been highly concentrated by industry. Continued growth in demand for AI, high-performance computing, and advanced process technologies has boosted exports of semiconductors, electronic components, servers, and information and communications equipment. The U.S. Treasury also noted that strong U.S. demand for Taiwanese technology products, together with advance purchases by some importers in anticipation of tariff changes, further widened Taiwan’s surplus with the United States. Taiwan’s external surplus continued to increase in 2026. In the first quarter of 2026, Taiwan recorded a current account surplus of US$62.53 billion, an increase of US$32.84 billion from the same period a year earlier, including a goods surplus of US$58.01 billion. Goldman Sachs forecasts that if the AI chip export boom continues, Taiwan’s current account surplus could exceed 20% of GDP in 2026. Domestic economic growth forecasts have also been revised upward. On July 24, the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research raised its forecast for Taiwan’s 2026 economic growth rate to 10.38%, while the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research projected growth of 10.35%. This indicates that AI demand has extended from exports into equipment investment, corporate earnings, stock market wealth effects, and part of private consumption. The Current Account Surplus Creates Appreciation Pressure, but Capital Flows Determine the Actual Exchange Rate When exporters receive payments in U.S. dollars and repatriate and convert the funds into New Taiwan dollars, the supply of U.S. dollars and demand for New Taiwan dollars in the market increase. Therefore, growth in goods exports and the current account surplus generally creates medium- to long-term appreciation pressure on the New Taiwan dollar. However, a current account surplus does not mean that all foreign exchange earnings will immediately be converted into New Taiwan dollars. Companies may use the funds to establish overseas production facilities, while financial institutions and households may purchase overseas equities, bonds, or other foreign-currency assets, creating financial-account outflows that offset part of the appreciation pressure. Taiwan’s financial account recorded a net increase in assets of US$154.79 billion in 2025, up from US$93.40 billion in 2024. Within this total, the net increase in direct investment assets rose from approximately US$20.92 billion to US$34.36 billion. Overseas investment by Taiwanese companies, large holdings of foreign assets by life insurers, and overseas financial asset allocation by households all help absorb the foreign exchange surplus generated by the current account. The movement of the New Taiwan dollar therefore depends on the combined effects of exporter conversions, corporate overseas investment, foreign investor flows into and out of Taiwan’s stock market, life insurers’ hedging demand, and central bank operations. Taiwan Remains on the U.S. Foreign Exchange Monitoring List The U.S. Treasury mainly uses three quantitative criteria to assess the foreign exchange policies of major trading partners: the bilateral trade surplus with the United States, the current account surplus, and persistent, one-sided intervention in the foreign exchange market. U.S. Treasury assessment criterion Threshold Taiwan’s 2025 performance Goods and services trade surplus with the United States At least US$15 billion US$145.0 billion Current account surplus as a share of GDP At least 3% Approximately 19.5% Persistent, one-sided foreign exchange intervention Net purchases in at least 8 out of 12 months, with total purchases equal to at least 2% of GDP Full-year net purchases equal to 0.8% of GDP, below the threshold Taiwan exceeded the first two thresholds, but the central bank’s full-year net foreign exchange purchases totaled US$7.7 billion in 2025, equivalent to 0.8% of GDP, below the U.S. threshold. Taiwan therefore remained on the Monitoring List but was not designated a currency manipulator. It is worth noting that the full-year figure conceals differences in operations across periods. Taiwan’s central bank purchased US$13.25 billion in foreign exchange during the first half of 2025, equivalent to approximately 3.1% of GDP during the same period, with most purchases concentrated in May when the New Taiwan dollar faced rapid appreciation pressure. Partial foreign exchange sales in other months reduced the full-year net purchase ratio to 0.8%. The U.S. Treasury also noted that the New Taiwan dollar appreciated by 4.5% against the U.S. dollar in 2025, but some private-sector models based on the current account, purchasing power parity, and the real effective exchange rate still indicated that the currency may be undervalued. As Taiwan’s surplus expands further, U.S. attention to the scale and transparency of Taiwan’s foreign exchange intervention is likely to continue. In November 2025, Taiwan’s central bank and the U.S. Treasury issued a joint statement committing to disclose foreign exchange intervention data at least quarterly, with a one-quarter lag, indicating that exchange rate policy transparency has become an important issue in bilateral discussions. New Life Insurance Hedging Rules Become a New Exchange Rate Variable The latest U.S. foreign exchange report included a separate section on Taiwan’s life insurance industry, reflecting the growing importance of insurers’ overseas assets and hedging activity in determining supply and demand for the New Taiwan dollar. As of 2025, Taiwan’s life insurance industry had approximately US$1.2 trillion in assets, equivalent to 131% of GDP. Around 60% was invested in overseas assets, representing more than US$700 billion in foreign asset exposure. Because policy liabilities are primarily denominated in New Taiwan dollars while overseas assets are mostly denominated in U.S. dollars, life insurers need to use forward foreign exchange contracts, currency swaps, and other instruments to manage exchange rate risk. When life insurers raise their hedge ratios, they generally establish positions that sell U.S. dollars and buy New Taiwan dollars, increasing demand for the local currency. A lower hedge ratio, by contrast, helps reduce appreciation pressure on the New Taiwan dollar. Beginning in late 2025, the Financial Supervisory Commission adjusted related accounting and reserve rules, allowing life insurers to amortize foreign exchange gains and losses on certain foreign bonds over the remaining life of the bonds, reducing the effect of short-term exchange rate fluctuations on current-period earnings. Taiwan’s life insurance hedge ratio had fallen to approximately 45% by February 2026, down from 60% in September 2025 and around 70% before the pandemic. Lower hedge ratios can reduce high hedging costs and decrease life insurers’ demand to purchase New Taiwan dollars in the foreign exchange market, but insurers must also bear greater exchange rate risk. If the New Taiwan dollar appreciates rapidly, the New Taiwan dollar value of overseas assets may decline, affecting insurers’ net worth and capital adequacy. The Financial Supervisory Commission has stated that the new rules are intended to improve the financial reporting of long-term assets, reduce excessive hedging costs, and strengthen the capital resilience of the life insurance industry. Insurers are required to allocate part of the hedging costs they save to reserves, gradually building a buffer to absorb future foreign exchange losses. From the perspective of the foreign exchange market, lower hedging demand may also reduce demand for the New Taiwan dollar and ease appreciation pressure. Short-Term New Taiwan Dollar Depreciation Does Not Eliminate Long-Term Policy Pressure Although the current account surplus continued to expand, the New Taiwan dollar still weakened at one point in July 2026. On July 24, the interbank closing exchange rate was NT$32.358 per U.S. dollar, representing a depreciation of NT$0.092 from the previous trading day. Taiwan’s stock market also fell by more than 1,000 points at one point during the same session. At the time, escalating conflict in the Middle East pushed Brent crude oil futures above US$100 per barrel, intensifying concerns over energy supplies and renewed inflation. The U.S. dollar and U.S. Treasury yields rose simultaneously, while the decline in Taiwanese equities and expectations of foreign capital outflows caused short-term capital flows to temporarily outweigh demand for the New Taiwan dollar generated by exporter conversions. Read More at Datatrack If high oil prices and New Taiwan dollar depreciation occur simultaneously, they will also raise the local-currency cost of imported energy. The government can delay part of the cost pass-through through CPC Corporation, Taiwan Power Company, and price stabilization mechanisms, but corporate production costs and fiscal burdens may still increase. Inflation forecasts are also approaching levels closely watched by the central bank. The Taiwan Institute of Economic Research forecasts CPI inflation of 1.98% in 2026, while the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research projects 2.02%. If tensions in the Middle East persist and increase energy prices and imported inflation, the central bank may face greater pressure to raise interest rates. However, Taiwan’s economy remains clearly divided across industries. Exports and investment in AI and semiconductors are growing rapidly, while traditional industries face weak demand, exchange rate pressures, and higher costs. If the central bank raises interest rates and this leads to New Taiwan dollar appreciation, or if it directly allows the exchange rate to reflect surplus-related pressures more visibly, it could help contain imported inflation but may further weaken the competitiveness of traditional exporters and increase foreign exchange and valuation pressure on life insurers’ overseas assets. AI Gains Are Turning into Exchange Rate and Financial Policy Challenges Taiwan’s current account surplus has approached 20% of GDP, reflecting the large volume of foreign exchange earnings generated by AI and semiconductor exports. The key factor for the subsequent exchange rate trend is whether these funds are repatriated and converted by exporters or redirected into overseas investments and foreign-currency assets. In addition to monitoring whether Taiwan’s current account surplus exceeds 20% of GDP in 2026, it will also be necessary to examine the actual destination of export earnings and the ability of life insurers’ capital to withstand exchange rate movements after reducing hedging. AI exports remain a major pillar of Taiwan’s economic growth, but their effects have extended to exchange rates, inflation, and financial regulation. As the external surplus grows, the central bank and the Financial Supervisory Commission will increasingly need to balance appreciation pressure on the New Taiwan dollar, imported inflation, the competitiveness of traditional industries, and foreign exchange risk in the life insurance sector.
AI investment is rapidly reshaping Taiwan’s electricity demand structure. In June 2026, the Ministry of Economic Affairs released the latest National Electricity Supply and Demand Report, raising its forecast for average annual electricity demand growth from 1.7% to 2.5% for 2026–2035, the second-highest projection on record. An internal assessment by Taiwan Power Company, or Taipower, also indicates that electricity consumption by the semiconductor industry could increase from approximately 52 billion kWh in 2026 to 110 billion kWh in 2035, while its share of Taiwan’s total electricity consumption could rise from 17% to 30%. In ten years, nearly one out of every three kWh consumed in Taiwan could be used for semiconductor manufacturing. This demand is being driven simultaneously by advanced logic processes, high-bandwidth memory (HBM), advanced packaging, and AI data centers (AIDCs). As manufacturing processes become more complex, more production equipment, cleanrooms, cooling systems, and facility systems are required to operate. AIDCs also have relatively high load factors and backup power requirements, further concentrating electricity demand in specific areas. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has identified approximately 1.1–1.2 GW of AIDC electricity applications through 2035, while the power system has retained additional supply headroom capable of accommodating approximately 2–3 GW of new applications. Key Indicator Latest Data Statistical Scope Average annual growth rate of nationwide electricity demand Approximately 2.5% Ministry of Economic Affairs forecast for 2026–2035 Semiconductor industry electricity consumption Approximately 52 billion kWh in 2026 and 110 billion kWh in 2035 Taipower internal assessment Semiconductor industry’s share of nationwide electricity consumption Approximately 17% in 2026, 24% in 2030, and 30% in 2035 Taipower internal assessment AIDC electricity applications Approximately 1.1–1.2 GW through 2035 Identified and projected application capacity AIDC power supply planning headroom Approximately 2–3 GW System headroom available to accommodate subsequent applications Planned additions of gas-fired generating units Approximately 26 GW in cumulative additions from 2026 to 2035 Combined plans by Taipower and private power producers, rather than a net capacity increase Industrial Expansion Is Outpacing Power Infrastructure Development Read More at Datatrack Although Taiwan’s total electricity consumption declined slightly in 2025 from the previous year, production cuts in traditional industries and energy-saving measures masked growth in electricity demand from the semiconductor and information and communications technology industries. As incremental electricity demand becomes increasingly concentrated in wafer fabs, advanced packaging facilities, and data centers, power supply pressure will also become more differentiated across industries and regions. The greatest challenge lies in the timing gap between industrial construction and power supply development. Semiconductor plants and other electronics factories can usually complete construction or expansion within two to three years, while some companies can move even faster by converting existing facilities. The construction cycle for data centers is also generally shorter than that of large power plants. By contrast, large power plants involve land acquisition, environmental impact assessments, local engagement, and lengthy construction, with development periods frequently exceeding ten years. Transmission and substation projects may also be constrained by land acquisition, local coordination, and construction progress, causing new loads to emerge before the required power supply capacity is fully in place. To address long-term demand, the Ministry of Economic Affairs plans to add approximately 26 GW of gas-fired generating units on a cumulative basis between 2026 and 2035, covering Taichung, Hsinta, Tung Hsiao, Talin, Hsieh-ho, and several private power plants. However, additional generating capacity must still be supported by transmission lines, substations, energy storage, and backup systems. As solar power increases daytime supply capacity, pressure on the system is gradually shifting toward evening peak periods, requiring coordinated dispatch among gas-fired generation, hydropower, and energy storage. AI data centers and semiconductor plants also require stable voltage and uninterrupted power supply. Even when sufficient supply headroom exists nationwide, individual projects may still face connection delays and site-selection constraints if specific science parks or metropolitan areas lack adequate substation capacity. Electricity Rate Freezes Ease Inflation Pressure but Shift Costs onto Taipower’s Balance Sheet In March 2026, the Electricity Tariff Review Committee decided to maintain the average electricity rate at NT$3.7823 per kWh after considering energy prices, consumer inflation, and industrial competitiveness. Freezing electricity rates can slow the transmission of energy costs to consumer prices and corporate expenses, but it also makes it more difficult for fuel, grid, and incremental capacity costs to be reflected promptly in end-user prices. As of the end of May 2026, Taipower’s accumulated losses still reached NT$367.2 billion, with liabilities of approximately NT$2.78 trillion and a debt ratio of 91.6%. Taipower will still need to invest in power plants, transmission and substation facilities, and energy storage. If electricity rates continue to lag behind actual costs, the funding gap will still have to be covered through borrowing, government capital injections, or budgetary support. However, an across-the-board increase in industrial electricity rates may not address the problem precisely. During the September 2025 electricity rate review, the Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that industrial electricity rates at the time had already broadly reflected costs. As AI and semiconductor electricity demand continues to rise, the key issue is how the incremental cost of electricity should be priced and allocated. The establishment of a large wafer fab or data center may require dedicated substations, reinforced transmission infrastructure, backup capacity, and higher-cost stable power supply during nighttime hours. If these expenditures are distributed evenly across all users, the existing rate structure will struggle to reflect differences in electricity consumption time, location, and reliability requirements. Electricity Rate Reform Will Place Greater Emphasis on Large Users and System Cost Allocation Future electricity rate reform may rely more heavily on existing time-of-use pricing, contracted capacity charges, and demand response mechanisms, while further differentiating grid connection costs, peak load responsibilities, and backup obligations. Large users may also reduce peak loads and system costs by adjusting production schedules, installing energy storage systems, and participating in demand response programs. Proposed amendments to the Energy Administration Act are moving in the same direction. During its review of the bill on July 22, 2026, the Legislative Yuan’s Economics Committee discussed an initial threshold of 5 MW in contracted capacity, under which energy users above a certain scale would be required to install self-generation and energy storage equipment. The Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that more than 700 companies in Taiwan have contracted capacities of at least 5 MW, covering industries including semiconductors, petrochemicals, steel, photovoltaics, and AI data centers. However, the actual number of regulated companies will depend on the final threshold, installation ratio, exemption rules, and implementing regulations. The final threshold, installation requirements, and transition arrangements remain subject to legislative approval and implementing rules. The Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that it would consider the constraints faced by urban factories, older industrial parks, and different industrial sites, with a transition period of approximately five years as the preliminary benchmark. Self-generation and energy storage cannot fully replace Taipower’s supply, but they can help reduce peak demand, provide emergency backup, and allow large users to assume part of the responsibility for maintaining grid stability. Rising Electricity Rates Will Deepen the Divide Between Technology and Traditional Industries Semiconductor companies and most technology firms generally have stronger profitability and greater capacity to absorb higher electricity prices. Petrochemicals, textiles and fibers, steel, and retail face higher energy intensity, lower profit margins, and cyclical downturns, making cost increases more likely to directly erode earnings. Fitch Ratings stated in July 2026 that Taiwan’s energy prices had not yet fully reflected high energy costs. If electricity rates were raised by 10%, operating losses in the petrochemical and textile and fiber industries could widen further, while semiconductor companies and most technology firms would have relatively stronger capacity to absorb the increase. Electricity policy therefore needs to address both Taipower’s financial position and differences across industries. Keeping prices suppressed may weaken incentives for energy conservation and limit grid investment, while a rapid across-the-board increase could deepen the divergence in industrial profitability. A more feasible approach would be to allow prices to gradually reflect power supply costs while providing energy-efficiency financing, process improvements, and time-limited transition support to help low-margin industries reduce their energy intensity. The AI Electricity Boom Will Redefine Taiwan’s Power Policy Taiwan’s next-stage electricity challenge has expanded beyond adding generating capacity to whether industrial expansion, grid investment, and electricity pricing can be adjusted in step with one another. As semiconductor facilities and AI data centers continue to increase their electricity consumption, policy attention will focus on how the generation, transmission, substation, and backup costs created by large users’ incremental demand should be priced, and whether regional grids can be completed before new facilities begin production. Key issues to monitor include whether semiconductor electricity consumption grows in line with Taipower’s forecasts, how much of the AIDC application capacity is ultimately developed, whether gas-fired generating units and transmission and substation projects can proceed on schedule, and the final rules requiring large electricity users to install self-generation and energy storage equipment. AI is creating opportunities for exports, investment, and industrial upgrading in Taiwan, while also making stable and affordable electricity an increasingly important condition for corporate investment. The central issue in electricity rate reform will gradually shift toward who should bear the cost of incremental electricity demand and how a more transparent allocation mechanism can be established among energy security, industrial development, and the varying cost-bearing capacities of different industries.
2026-07-22
U.S. restrictions on China’s semiconductor industry are expanding from advanced chips and new equipment exports to equipment maintenance, component supply, and coordination with allied countries. In April 2026, bipartisan lawmakers in the U.S. Congress introduced the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware Act, or MATCH Act, seeking to narrow the differences among the export control regimes of the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan and restrict China’s access to critical wafer fabrication equipment for which it has yet to establish stable domestic production capabilities. As of July 22, 2026, the MATCH Act remains in the legislative process and has not yet become an official ban. On April 22, the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced H.R. 8170, making it eligible for consideration by the full House of Representatives. The Senate has also introduced a corresponding version, S. 4281, which remains under committee review. Neither bill has completed a floor vote, and the final control list, effective date, and methods of allied cooperation may still be adjusted. MATCH Act Calls for Further Alignment of U.S., Japanese, and Dutch Control Standards Existing semiconductor equipment controls are implemented separately by each country. The United States has restricted the export to China of certain equipment used in advanced logic, DRAM, and NAND production and has imposed stricter export licensing requirements on specific Chinese companies and wafer fabs. The Netherlands prohibits ASML from exporting extreme ultraviolet, or EUV, systems to China, while certain more advanced immersion deep ultraviolet, or DUV, systems also require licenses. Since July 2023, Japan has placed 23 categories of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including lithography, etching, deposition, cleaning, and inspection equipment, under export licensing controls. Japan’s rules formally apply to all export destinations and are not directed solely at China, but its equipment list and licensing regime remain an important foundation for U.S. efforts to align allied controls. The latest forecast released by the Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan, or SEAJ, in July 2026 shows that sales of Japanese-made semiconductor manufacturing equipment are expected to increase by 26% to JPY 6.55 trillion in fiscal year 2026 and rise by another 13% to JPY 7.40 trillion in fiscal year 2027. Advanced logic chips required for AI servers, as well as HBM and DRAM capacity expansion, remain the main forces supporting demand for Japanese equipment. The three countries do not apply identical equipment lists, end-user definitions, or maintenance restrictions, and U.S. equipment suppliers generally face stricter constraints. Chinese companies may therefore still purchase equipment from foreign suppliers subject to more lenient restrictions or place equipment at mature-node facilities that are not directly controlled. The MATCH Act requires the United States to prioritize negotiations with equipment-supplying countries such as the Netherlands and Japan and encourage allies to adopt rules with equivalent practical effects. If the bill becomes law and negotiations fail, the U.S. government would be required to use the Export Administration Regulations, critical components subject to U.S. jurisdiction, or other measures to expand restrictions on relevant foreign-made equipment, end uses, and maintenance activities. The original version of the bill proposed broader restrictions on immersion DUV and cryogenic etching equipment, prompting opposition from equipment suppliers. A subsequent revised version removed the China-wide ban on cryogenic etching equipment but retained the direction of controls on immersion DUV systems, specific Chinese wafer fabs, and their affiliated entities. Control area Existing system Direction of the MATCH Act Equipment exports The United States, the Netherlands, and Japan separately implement equipment lists and licensing systems Require allies to impose similar restrictions on critical bottleneck equipment Controlled entities Determined according to equipment performance, process use, entity lists, or specific facilities Include wafer fabs, owners, and affiliated entities Maintenance services U.S. persons and certain U.S. technologies are already restricted Add licensing requirements for the maintenance, upgrading, and technical support of controlled equipment Lack of allied cooperation Mainly addressed through diplomatic coordination and existing export rules May expand the application of U.S. rules to foreign equipment Control Focus Expands From New Equipment to the Operation of Installed Tools Semiconductor equipment requires long-term support from original manufacturers. After installation, lithography, etching, and deposition equipment still requires regular calibration, consumable replacement, software updates, component repairs, and technical services from engineers. Even if equipment has already entered China, the inability to obtain continued maintenance from original suppliers could affect long-term operating efficiency, yield, and capacity utilization. Maintenance restrictions may therefore have a more persistent impact than simply prohibiting exports of new equipment. Chinese wafer fabs may increase inventories of spare parts in advance or seek third-party maintenance services, but high-end equipment involves precision components, proprietary software, and process parameters that third-party providers may struggle to fully replace. If the MATCH Act is formally implemented, export controls would extend from the equipment delivery stage to the entire operating life cycle. Company-level controls could also reduce room for internal equipment transfers. In the past, when restrictions focused on specific facilities, companies could still purchase equipment through mature-node fabs that were not listed and then adjust its use internally within the group. The new framework would examine wafer fabs, owners, and affiliated entities together, potentially exposing companies such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC), Hua Hong Group, and Huawei to broader equipment and service restrictions. China Accounts for About 20% of ASML Revenue, Making DUV and Service Businesses the Main Risks ASML has the clearest exposure to the new round of policy risks. China accounted for approximately 33% of ASML’s total revenue in 2025. In the second quarter of 2026, the company continued to estimate that China would contribute about 20% of its full-year net sales, with incremental demand mainly coming from China’s domestic logic chip business. ASML reported revenue of EUR 9.326 billion and net income of EUR 2.918 billion in the second quarter of 2026. Revenue from its Installed Base Management business, which is related to equipment maintenance and field upgrades, reached EUR 2.762 billion. This shows that policy risks could affect not only new system sales but also maintenance, upgrades, and component revenue. Immersion DUV is currently the most closely watched equipment category. China has long been unable to obtain EUV systems but can still purchase certain DUV systems for mature-node production and for some advanced logic, DRAM, and NAND processes. If restrictions are expanded to all immersion DUV systems, the range of equipment available to Chinese wafer fabs would narrow further, while ASML’s new system and service revenue would also come under pressure. However, China’s revenue share cannot be directly equated with potential losses. The final impact will still depend on equipment models, customer lists, Dutch government licensing policies, and whether installed systems can continue to receive service. ASML is also benefiting from global AI investment and has raised its 2026 revenue forecast to between EUR 43 billion and EUR 45 billion. Advanced logic and memory capacity expansion in Taiwan, South Korea, and the United States could provide a degree of offset to weaker business in China. Tokyo Electron Has Greater China Exposure as Risks Shift Toward Specific Customers and Service Revenue Tokyo Electron, or TEL, holds important positions in etching, thin-film deposition, coating and developing, and thermal processing equipment. China accounted for 34.1% of TEL’s revenue in the fiscal year ended March 2026, higher than ASML’s estimate that China will contribute about 20% of its 2026 revenue, indicating that TEL is more sensitive to changes in semiconductor equipment investment in China. The original version of the bill proposed a comprehensive ban on exports of cryogenic etching equipment to China, and Tokyo Electron was viewed as one of the main companies at risk because it offers relevant product lines. After the revised version removed this broad ban, the risk shifted toward specific customers such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, ChangXin Memory Technologies, and Yangtze Memory Technologies, as well as maintenance and technical support at controlled facilities. Tokyo Electron’s service revenue is also significant. In the fiscal year ended March 2026, revenue from its Field Solutions business reached JPY 626 billion, an increase of 16.3% from the previous year, including components, maintenance, and equipment modifications. If maintenance activities require case-by-case licenses, the impact would gradually extend from new equipment orders to revenue from the installed base. Nikon is also a supplier of immersion DUV equipment. Although its market scale is smaller than ASML’s, Nikon products could also be included if the final rules are determined according to equipment performance. U.S. Equipment Suppliers May Narrow the Competitive Gap, but the China Market Will Continue to Contract U.S. equipment suppliers such as Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA have long been subject to U.S. export rules, and their equipment sales and technical support to certain advanced Chinese wafer fabs are already restricted. These companies have long argued that Dutch and Japanese suppliers face more lenient restrictions, allowing Chinese customers to shift purchases toward non-U.S. suppliers. If allied rules are raised to similar levels, the relative competitive disadvantage of U.S. equipment suppliers in China may narrow. However, an expansion of the list of critical facilities and additional maintenance licensing requirements would still reduce their equipment and service revenue. The main benefit for U.S. equipment suppliers would be more consistent competitive conditions rather than renewed growth in China-related business. The Dutch government has expressed concerns about the United States expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although the Netherlands supports restrictions on sensitive semiconductor technologies, it prefers that export licensing decisions be made independently by the Dutch government and the European Union. Whether Japan is willing to adopt the same Chinese entity lists, equipment standards, and maintenance restrictions as the United States will also affect the actual effectiveness of the legislation. Chinese Wafer Fabs Will First Face Slower Expansion and Higher Maintenance Costs The short-term pressure on Chinese wafer fabs will be concentrated on equipment access, production line expansion, and the maintenance of installed equipment. Logic chip, DRAM, and NAND production requires lithography, etching, deposition, cleaning, and inspection equipment to operate together. Restrictions on a single equipment category may not immediately halt existing production lines, but they could lengthen expansion schedules, increase the difficulty of equipment allocation, and limit process upgrades. Maintenance and component restrictions would increase operating risks for installed equipment. Chinese companies may accelerate the adoption of domestically produced equipment, but equipment substitution must still undergo reliability, yield, and mass-production validation and cannot be completed simply by delivering a machine. The more likely short-term outcomes are slower capacity expansion, higher production costs, and increased inventories of components and spare parts at wafer fabs. Over the longer term, external restrictions will encourage China to increase investment in domestic lithography, etching, deposition, and inspection equipment. However, the degree of localization varies significantly across equipment categories. Even if some domestic equipment has entered production lines, the overall process still requires multiple types of equipment, materials, and software to operate together, meaning localization will not be completed simultaneously across the entire production chain. U.S.-Japan-Netherlands Coordination Will Determine the Actual Strength of the Controls The first issue to monitor is whether the MATCH Act can pass the House and Senate and whether the final text retains core provisions covering immersion DUV systems, affiliated entities, and maintenance licensing. If the bill fails to pass as standalone legislation, some provisions could still be incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act or other major legislative packages. The second key issue is whether the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan can establish common standards. If allies independently introduce rules with equivalent effects, the United States could reduce controversy over the direct expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. If negotiations fail, the United States may use U.S.-origin technology, components, and export administration rules to increase compliance pressure on foreign equipment suppliers. The impact of the new round of equipment controls would gradually expand from whether new systems can be shipped to whether installed equipment can be maintained, upgraded, and kept in operation. ASML and Tokyo Electron would continue to benefit from global AI capital expenditure, but their China orders, service revenue, and regulatory costs would face reassessment. For Chinese wafer fabs, the pressure would also expand from shortages of advanced-process equipment to mature-node capacity expansion and the maintenance of installed production capacity.
2026-07-21
The institutional environment for North American nearshoring is changing. On July 1, 2026, the United States, Mexico, and Canada completed the first joint review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), six years after it entered into force. Because the United States did not agree to extend the agreement directly for another 16 years under the existing provisions, the three countries will next enter annual joint reviews, while the United States and Mexico will continue addressing disputes involving automobiles, steel and aluminum, and economic security through bilateral negotiations. The USMCA remains in effect, and Mexican goods that meet the rules of origin can continue to receive preferential tariff treatment under the agreement. What has truly changed is the predictability of long-term policy for businesses. U.S. imports of goods from Mexico have remained at elevated levels in recent years, reflecting the deep integration of U.S.-Mexico manufacturing and cross-border supply chains. In the past, multinational companies could assume that North American trade rules would remain stable for an extended period and use that assumption to build factories in Mexico, organize supplier networks, and plan production capacity. Now, automotive rules of origin, the use of Asian components, and restrictions on strategic products could all be renegotiated through the annual review process and U.S. negotiating demands, making companies more cautious about new factories and major capacity expansions. Read More at Datatrack The USMCA Has Not Immediately Terminated, but Investment Faces the Risk of Annual Reviews The USMCA officially entered into force on July 1, 2020, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Under Article 34.7 of the agreement, the three countries conduct their first joint review six years after the agreement takes effect. If all three countries agree to an extension, the agreement’s term can be extended for another 16 years. If they fail to reach a consensus, joint reviews must be conducted annually during the remaining term. Under the agreement’s original timeline, the USMCA will remain in effect until July 1, 2036. Before then, the three countries can still extend the agreement’s term for another 16 years through written confirmation by their heads of government. Annual joint reviews do not mean that companies must requalify for the agreement every year, and existing tariff preferences and rules of origin will not immediately become invalid because of the outcome of the first review. The problem is that the construction and payback periods for automobile, battery, electronics assembly, and component plants often extend over many years. When future rules-of-origin thresholds, tariff treatment, and restrictions on non-North American components remain uncertain, companies may apply a higher risk discount to investment projects and respond by expanding capacity in stages, reducing the initial scale of projects, or retaining backup production capacity in the United States. Time USMCA Development Impact on Businesses July 1, 2026 The United States did not agree to a direct 16-year extension Existing rules remain in place, but the agreement enters annual joint reviews From July 21, 2026 onward (ongoing) The United States and Mexico launch the third round of bilateral negotiations in parallel with the USMCA trilateral joint review process The talks focus on automobiles, steel and aluminum, economic security, and rules of origin, and the outcome may affect subsequent trilateral negotiations From 2027 until the agreement’s term expires Annual joint reviews will be conducted until an extension consensus is reached Long-term investment decisions must incorporate potential changes in rules and tariff scenarios July 1, 2036 If no extension is agreed, the agreement’s term expires The three countries can still agree to a 16-year extension before this date The United States Proposes Raising “U.S. Content,” Making Automobiles and Strategic Manufacturing Core Issues The third round of U.S.-Mexico bilateral negotiations began in Mexico City on July 21 and is proceeding in parallel with the USMCA trilateral joint review process. The bilateral negotiations mainly address specific trade disputes between the United States and Mexico. The current round covers steel and aluminum and their derivative products, automobiles, economic security, labor, agriculture, and electronic payment services. The first two rounds discussed automobiles, rules of origin for specific industrial products, steel and aluminum, economic security, agriculture, labor, the environment, and regulatory compatibility. The two sides are attempting to narrow their main differences, but changes involving USMCA provisions or common trilateral rules must still be further negotiated and agreed upon by the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The USMCA currently requires at least 75% of the regional value of passenger vehicles and light trucks to originate in North America. It also includes rules covering core components, steel and aluminum sourcing, and labor value content. This framework primarily requires production to remain within North America, but the United States further hopes to increase the share of U.S. components in automobiles and tighten rules of origin for strategic products such as electronics and pharmaceuticals, preventing Chinese and other third-country components from obtaining USMCA benefits after being assembled in Mexico. The United States may also use tariffs, quotas, or stricter source-verification rules to regulate steel, aluminum, and certain industrial products. If these requirements are implemented, companies will need to increase their use of North American suppliers, adjust the division of production capacity between the United States and Mexico, and establish more comprehensive certificates of origin and supplier-tracking systems. The automotive industry is a major pillar of Mexico’s manufacturing sector and export supply chain to the United States, while Mexico’s vehicle production also reflects the country’s mature vehicle and component manufacturing base. Automotive components, electronics, servers, and metal-processing industries that import large volumes of parts from Asia, assemble them in Mexico, and then export them to the United States will face relatively greater adjustment pressure. Negotiating Area Main U.S. Demand Potential Adjustment for Businesses Automobiles and components Increase the share of U.S. components and manufacturing Companies may need to reconfigure sourcing and production capacity between the United States and Mexico Steel and aluminum Prevent third-country products from being transshipped or used to circumvent tariffs Raw material costs and source-tracing requirements may increase Electronics and pharmaceuticals Tighten rules of origin for strategic products The compliance threshold for assembling Asian components in Mexico may rise Economic security Reduce the ability of non-member countries to benefit from the agreement Reviews of investment backgrounds and supplier origins may expand Labor and the environment Strengthen enforcement and compliance requirements Production and administrative costs may increase Initial FDI Reached a Record First-Quarter Level, but Foreign Investment Still Consists Mainly of Reinvested Earnings Preliminary statistics from Mexico’s Ministry of Economy show that foreign direct investment reached US$23.591 billion in the first quarter of 2026. Compared with the initially reported figure for the first quarter of 2025, this represented a year-on-year increase of 10.4% and marked a record high among initial first-quarter releases. However, because the figure for the same period in 2025 was subsequently revised upward, foreign direct investment in the first quarter of 2026 declined by 3.36% when calculated against the current revised figure. Overall foreign investment performance therefore still needs to be assessed through the sources and structure of investment before determining whether new investment momentum has improved. From the perspective of investment structure, reinvested earnings reached US$22.222 billion in the first quarter of 2026, while new investment totaled US$1.705 billion and intercompany accounts recorded a net outflow of approximately US$336 million. New investment accounted for only about 7.2% of total FDI and declined by 26.6% from the revised figure for the same period in 2025, while reinvested earnings increased by 14.35%. Existing foreign companies are continuing to retain earnings in Mexico, but new capital investment remains relatively cautious. Trade uncertainty is also beginning to affect Mexico’s economic outlook. The medium-term trend in Mexico’s real GDP indicates that the economy continues to expand, although growth momentum has become more moderate than in the previous period. A mid-July market survey lowered the median forecast for Mexico’s 2026 economic growth from 1.5% in the April survey to 1.1%, while the 2027 forecast was reduced from 1.9% to 1.8%. Mexican exports remain resilient, but industrial production is weak, and uncertainty over trade rules is making companies more inclined to postpone long-term capital expenditure. Automobiles and other export-oriented industries are particularly exposed to this effect. Nearshoring Shifts from Rapid Expansion to More Precise Calculations Mexico still benefits from its proximity to the United States, relatively low labor costs, well-developed manufacturing clusters, and mature cross-border logistics. The U.S.-Mexico supply chain also cannot be fully replaced in the short term. However, completing product assembly in Mexico does not necessarily mean that a product qualifies for USMCA treatment. Companies must still satisfy regional value-content requirements, tariff-shift rules, and origin-documentation requirements. If the United States further raises U.S.-content thresholds, a model that relies solely on Asian components and assembly in Mexico will become more difficult to sustain. Nearshoring investment is therefore shifting from the previous phase of rapid factory construction to a second phase that places greater emphasis on compliance and the allocation of production capacity. Companies need to compare the costs of production capacity in Mexico, the United States, and Asia, while evaluating the feasibility of increasing North American sourcing, moving key production processes to the United States, or retaining capacity across multiple locations. Investment will not stop entirely, but decision-making periods will lengthen, and capital expenditure may be divided into phases to preserve flexibility. For Taiwanese companies that already have operations in Mexico, the immediate priority is to reassess the rules-of-origin eligibility of their products, the share of Asian components, and supporting documentation, while modeling costs under different tariff and rules-of-origin scenarios. Companies preparing to establish factories in Mexico must also incorporate U.S. production capacity, customer locations, and supply-chain backup arrangements into their assessments, rather than relying only on wages and geographic proximity when making investment decisions. The USMCA annual review has not yet undermined Mexico’s position as a North American manufacturing base, but it has raised the decision threshold for major new investments. The key issues going forward will be whether the United States formally advances U.S. value-content requirements for automobiles, whether strategic products are subject to stricter sourcing rules, and whether foreign investment in Mexico can gradually shift from reinvestment by existing companies toward a larger number of newly established factories. The core of future nearshoring competition will increasingly center on compliance with rules of origin, the share of North American suppliers, and the ability to allocate production capacity between the United States and Mexico.
2026-07-20
France’s public debt and interest payments continue to rise. With fiscal reform becoming more difficult ahead of the 2027 presidential election, investors have begun reassessing the risk compensation required to hold French government bonds. At the same time, Germany’s expansion of defense and infrastructure spending is increasing the supply of European government bonds and pushing up the regional yield benchmark. As of July 17, 2026, the yields on 10-year German and French government bonds stood at approximately 3.12% and 3.93%, respectively, resulting in a France-Germany spread of about 81 basis points. This shows that German government bonds remain the benchmark asset in the euro area, while the fiscal and political risk premium demanded by investors for holding French debt remains elevated. Debt and Interest Payments Rise in Tandem, Increasing the Risk of a French Debt Snowball Data from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies show that France’s public debt reached €3.5361 trillion in the first quarter of 2026, an increase of €75.6 billion from the previous quarter. The debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 115.7% at the end of 2025 to 117.5%. During the same quarter, real GDP contracted by 0.1% quarter over quarter, household consumption declined by 0.2%, and gross fixed capital formation fell by 0.6%, indicating that domestic demand and investment momentum remained weak. The OECD forecasts that the French economy will grow by only 0.7% in 2026 and 0.8% in 2027, leaving economic expansion insufficient to meaningfully dilute the debt burden. Fiscal indicator Latest figure or 2026 baseline Medium-term scenario Fiscal implication Public debt €3.5361 trillion in the first quarter of 2026, equivalent to 117.5% of GDP Could exceed 130% of GDP by 2030 without adjustment The debt ratio continues to rise, while weak growth makes the burden difficult to dilute Fiscal deficit The OECD forecasts approximately 5.0% of GDP in 2026, although the government has warned that the target will be increasingly difficult to achieve Could approach 7% by 2030 without adjustment The deficit remains well above the EU’s 3% ceiling, indicating limited progress in fiscal consolidation General government interest expenditure Approximately €77.4 billion to €78.0 billion in 2026 Could rise to €124.0 billion by 2030 Rising interest payments are increasingly crowding out other public expenditure Central government budget interest payments €64.8 billion in 2026 Expected to rise to €74.2 billion in 2027 The central government’s discretionary budget space is becoming increasingly constrained The report estimates that France will need to implement approximately €126.0 billion in cumulative fiscal adjustments by 2032 to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio during the next presidential term. If action is postponed until after the 2027 election, the required scale of adjustment could increase further. The rapid increase in interest expenditure mainly reflects the gradual maturity of government bonds issued during the low-interest-rate period. When the French government refinances maturing debt with new borrowing, it must do so at the currently higher market interest rates, causing the average cost of debt to rise over time. The €77.4 billion to €78.0 billion shown in the table refers to the general government fiscal measure, while the €64.8 billion figure refers to interest payments within the central government budget. The two figures cover different scopes, but both show that interest costs are reducing the fiscal space available for education, healthcare, defense, and industrial investment. France is currently facing weak growth, a large fiscal deficit, and rising refinancing costs at the same time, increasing the risk of a debt snowball. The main obstacle to fiscal adjustment remains political. France lacks a stable parliamentary majority, and measures such as reducing social expenditure, reforming the pension system, or increasing taxes could all trigger political resistance. As the 2027 presidential election approaches, continued delays to reform would require larger future adjustments and could further weaken investor confidence. Germany Is Also Expanding Fiscal Policy, but Markets Price It Differently From France Germany has also entered a period of fiscal expansion and increased government borrowing. Under the German government’s draft federal budget for 2027, total expenditure will reach €555.4 billion, while net borrowing under the core federal budget will amount to €118.7 billion. Including the Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality and the special fund for defense, related borrowing will total approximately €203.6 billion. The increase in government bond supply will put downward pressure on bond prices and raise the yield on German government bonds, which serve as the euro area’s benchmark. Based on data from the end of 2025, Germany’s public debt stood at 63.5% of GDP, while France’s was close to 116%, leaving a gap of more than 50 percentage points. Germany’s latest spending expansion focuses on defense, infrastructure, climate action, and innovation investment. Markets believe that some of this expenditure could improve long-term growth conditions and therefore continue to assign Germany a lower risk premium. Government bond yields in France and Germany are therefore being driven by different forces. German government bonds mainly reflect additional supply, inflation, and the broader interest-rate environment. France, in addition to facing the same European benchmark rates, must pay further compensation for its high debt, persistent fiscal deficits, and political uncertainty. This also explains why the France-Germany spread has not narrowed significantly despite Germany’s increase in borrowing. Energy Inflation Raises Europe’s Interest-Rate Benchmark, Leaving France Under Dual Pressure Developments in the Middle East and rising energy prices have prompted markets to raise their expectations for European inflation and further ECB rate hikes. Although euro-area inflation fell from 3.2% in the previous month to 2.8% in June 2026, it remained above the ECB’s 2% target. The ECB raised the deposit facility rate to 2.25% in June and forecasts that average inflation could reach 3.0% for the full year of 2026. If energy costs remain elevated, policy rates and long-term government bond yields will be less likely to decline rapidly. Read More at Datatrack For France, each increase in the European benchmark interest rate will gradually be reflected in the cost of newly issued government bonds and the refinancing of maturing debt. France therefore faces two layers of pressure. The first is the increase in Europe’s overall interest-rate benchmark, represented by rising German government bond yields. The second is the additional spread demanded by markets to compensate for France’s fiscal and political risks. Germany’s increased bond supply, energy inflation, and France’s own fiscal concerns are jointly driving the current repricing of European bond markets. The 2027 Budget Will Determine Whether the France-Germany Spread Can Stabilize The France-Germany spread of approximately 81 basis points does not yet indicate that France faces an immediate financing crisis. However, it shows that markets no longer assign French government bonds a risk valuation close to that of German government bonds, while the fiscal and political risk compensation demanded by investors remains elevated. Market attention has also shifted toward when the French government will be able to stop the debt-to-GDP ratio from rising. The next major test will be France’s 2027 budget, which the government is expected to present in the autumn of 2026. The government must balance rising defense and social expenditure, rapidly increasing interest costs, and the absence of a parliamentary majority. If the budget lacks credible and executable expenditure-control measures, higher government bond yields will continue to raise interest payments through refinancing and further constrain the fiscal choices available to future governments. If the government can present a concrete and executable multi-year adjustment plan, it would help reduce fiscal and political risk premiums and create conditions for the France-Germany spread to narrow.
U.S. money market fund assets remain near historical highs, but fund managers are changing how they allocate capital. According to the Investment Company Institute’s weekly market-wide statistics, total U.S. money market fund assets stood at US$7.89 trillion in the week ended July 15, 2026, down US$59.9 billion from the previous week. By fund type, government money market funds held US$6.51 trillion in assets. By investor type, institutional funds held approximately US$4.81 trillion, accounting for about 61% of the total, indicating that cash management demand from corporations and institutional investors remains an important source of market support. While total assets remain elevated, the average maturity of fund holdings has shortened significantly. Crane Data showed that, as of the week ended July 10, the weighted average maturity of the Crane Money Fund Average declined from 42 days one month earlier to 38 days, while that of the Crane 100 Money Fund Index shortened from 44 days to 40 days. Funds are increasing portfolio liquidity and reinvestment speed to cope with continued uncertainty surrounding the Federal Reserve’s policy direction. Uncertain Interest Rate Outlook Prompts Funds to Preserve Reinvestment Flexibility Money market funds primarily invest in short-term U.S. government debt, repurchase agreements, floating-rate notes, and other short-term credit instruments. Under U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, a fund portfolio’s weighted average maturity may not exceed 60 days, while its weighted average life may not exceed 120 days, helping to control interest rate and liquidity risks. Shortening maturities allows funds to recover principal more quickly and reallocate it at prevailing market rates. If a fund holds three-month or six-month Treasury bills and short-term yields subsequently rise, the existing positions will continue to earn the yields locked in at the time of purchase, preventing the fund from immediately capturing the new, higher returns. Increasing exposure to overnight and very short-term assets can reduce the opportunity cost of being locked into lower yields, but it also causes fund returns to follow changes in money market rates more quickly. Read More at Datatrack Funds Shift From Fixed-Rate Treasury Bills Toward Repurchase Agreements and Floating-Rate Notes The shortening of maturities is already reflected in actual holdings. Asset allocation data from the fund sample tracked by Crane Data showed that, as of the end of June 2026, the sample funds’ holdings of U.S. Treasury bills declined by US$96 billion to US$3.3 trillion, accounting for approximately 39.9% of total holdings. Repurchase agreement holdings increased by US$68 billion to US$3.06 trillion, raising their share to 37.2%. Holdings of U.S. Treasury floating-rate notes, or FRNs, also increased by US$32 billion to US$523 billion. Repurchase agreements are generally concentrated in overnight or very short maturities, allowing them to reflect money market rates quickly. FRN coupons are periodically reset in line with short-term interest rates. Compared with holding longer-maturity fixed-rate Treasury bills, these two instruments can reduce the risk of being locked into lower yields when interest rates rise, while FRNs can also lower a portfolio’s sensitivity to changes in fixed interest rates. Demand from money market funds for short-term assets has therefore not disappeared. Instead, allocations are shifting toward instruments that mature more quickly or allow interest rates to reset on a floating basis. Rising Treasury Financing Needs Make Maturity Matching More Important for Short-Term Debt Supply and Demand The U.S. Treasury estimates that it will borrow US$671 billion in privately held marketable debt from July through September 2026. This estimate covers marketable Treasury securities across different maturities and does not mean that the entire amount will be financed through short-term Treasury bills. The actual maturity structure will depend on subsequent quarterly refunding and auction arrangements. Treasury bills remain one of the Treasury’s key tools for adjusting its cash balance and financing volume. The Treasury General Account, or TGA, reflects the Treasury’s operating cash balance held at the Federal Reserve and fluctuates with tax receipts, government spending, and debt issuance. Money market funds holding nearly US$8 trillion have substantial capacity to absorb new supply, but as funds shorten portfolio maturities, demand for Treasury bills of different tenors may diverge. If additional Treasury bill supply is concentrated in shorter maturities preferred by money market funds, auctions are more likely to attract sufficient demand. If supply shifts toward longer-dated bills, yields may need to rise to compensate funds for taking on greater yield-locking risk. The outlook for the short-term debt market therefore depends not only on whether overall funding is sufficient, but also on whether the Treasury’s maturity mix aligns with money market fund demand. Nearly US$8 Trillion Cannot All Be Viewed as Cash Waiting to Enter the Stock Market Money market funds are often viewed as cash positions that could flow back into stock and bond markets, but their assets include corporate operating cash, institutional liquidity reserves, household emergency funds, and short-term investment positions. Institutional funds account for approximately 61% of total assets, indicating that a large share of the money has clearly defined cash management and payment purposes and cannot easily be redirected into long-term risk assets. U.S. money market fund assets declined by US$59.9 billion in the week ended July 15, indicating that some investors are adjusting their cash allocations. However, total fund assets remain near historical highs. The more significant change is currently taking place within portfolios, with funds shifting from longer-maturity Treasury bills toward repurchase agreements, shorter-term Treasury bills, and FRNs. This cannot yet be interpreted as a broad withdrawal of capital from the money market. Money Market Fund Returns and Short-End Allocations Will Reflect Policy Expectations More Quickly Key indicators to monitor include the weighted average maturity of money market funds, Treasury bill and repurchase agreement holdings, and auction results across different Treasury bill maturities. If funds continue concentrating in overnight and very short-term instruments, portfolio returns will reprice more quickly with market interest rates. Capital movements among repurchase agreements, short-term Treasury bills, and FRNs may also affect relative yields across different short-end instruments. Money market funds holding nearly US$8 trillion remain an important source of funding for the U.S. short-term financing market. The central change reflected by shorter maturities is that this large pool of cash is increasing liquidity and reducing fixed-rate exposure. As Treasury financing needs rise, money market fund allocation choices among Treasury bills, repurchase agreements, and floating-rate notes will have a more direct impact on the relative demand, yields, and funding costs of short-end assets.
2026-07-17
The U.S. consumer market has recently shown a clear divergence. Nominal retail sales were broadly stable in June 2026, jobless claims remained low, and household credit conditions have not deteriorated across the board. However, consumers remain pessimistic about prices, job opportunities, and the economic outlook. This combination of relatively strong hard data and weak soft data indicates that U.S. households are still capable of maintaining spending, but concerns about future income and living costs are rising. Whether the U.S. economy is merely slowing gradually or approaching a more pronounced turning point will depend on whether weaker hiring eventually develops into higher unemployment and whether real income can continue to support consumption. Retail Sales Growth Slows, but Underlying Consumer Demand Remains Resilient The U.S. Department of Commerce reported that retail and food services sales rose 0.2% month over month and 6.7% year over year in June 2026, below the upwardly revised 1.0% monthly increase in May. Although overall growth slowed, the main drag came from a 5.3% monthly decline in gasoline station sales, reflecting the effect of lower gasoline prices on nominal sales values. Excluding gasoline stations, retail sales rose 0.7% in June. Excluding both motor vehicles and gasoline stations, sales still increased 0.4%. Sales at motor vehicle and parts dealers and nonstore retailers both rose 1.9% month over month, while nonstore retailer sales increased 14.2% from a year earlier, showing that e-commerce remains an important pillar of the retail market. If motor vehicles, gasoline stations, building materials, and food services are further excluded, the retail control group, which more closely corresponds to the consumption component used in gross domestic product calculations, rose by approximately 0.5% in June. This indicates that goods consumption continued to expand at the end of the second quarter and has not yet shown a clear loss of momentum. However, performance was uneven across categories. Motor vehicles, e-commerce, and some recreational goods continued to grow, while clothing, food and beverages, and health and personal care were relatively weak. This suggests that promotions, price differences, and the necessity of goods are exerting a greater influence on consumer purchasing decisions. Read More at Datatrack Consumers Are Still Spending, but Are More Pessimistic About Employment and Living Costs Actual retail data reflect spending that has already taken place, while consumer confidence incorporates households’ expectations for future income, employment, and prices. The two can therefore move in different directions over the short term. The Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index edged up from a downwardly revised 90.6 to 91.2 in June, but the Present Situation Index, which reflects consumers’ assessment of current business and labor market conditions, declined to 116.4. The share of consumers who said jobs were hard to find rose from 19.8% to 22.5%, the highest level since early 2021, showing that concerns about the employment outlook are continuing to rise. The University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index rose from 44.8 to 49.5 in June, but remained 18.5% lower than a year earlier. More than half of respondents continued to mention that high prices were eroding household finances. The CPI fell 0.4% month over month in June, while the core CPI was unchanged from the previous month, confirming that inflation had cooled. However, headline CPI still rose 3.5% year over year, while core CPI increased 2.6%. A lower inflation rate only means that prices are rising more slowly. The high price level accumulated over the past several years remains in place, so the improvement in official inflation data has not yet fully translated into better household living conditions. The Labor Market Has Entered a Low-Hiring, Low-Layoff Phase The labor market is central to whether consumption can be sustained. U.S. nonfarm payrolls increased by only 57,000 in June, while job gains for April and May were revised down by a combined 74,000, indicating that corporate hiring appetite is weakening. Job openings remained at 7.594 million in May, but the hiring rate was only 3.3%, while the quits rate also remained low, reflecting a simultaneous slowdown in both corporate recruitment and worker mobility. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate remained at 4.2% in June. Initial jobless claims fell to 208,000 in the week ended July 11, indicating that companies have not yet begun broad-based layoffs. Read More at Datatrack The labor market is currently closer to a low-hiring, low-layoff environment. Most households still have jobs and wage income, so consumption is unlikely to fall sharply in the immediate term. However, greater difficulty finding work may encourage households to shift toward discounted products, postpone major purchases, and reduce discretionary spending. If both initial and continuing jobless claims continue to rise, weaker hiring could begin to transmit more clearly to income and consumption. Consumer Resilience Masks Income and Asset Divergence The resilience of overall U.S. retail sales is also partly related to differences in income and asset ownership. High-income households account for a larger share of total consumption, while the wealth effect generated by rising equity prices can support spending on travel, dining, motor vehicles, and online shopping. Low- and middle-income households are more exposed to the costs of food, housing, insurance, and energy. The Federal Reserve’s July Beige Book noted that some regions benefited from World Cup-related demand for dining, accommodation, and tourism. However, several regions also reported that consumers were cutting discretionary spending or switching to cheaper alternatives. The economic benefits of the World Cup were concentrated in specific cities and industries and therefore cannot represent the daily consumption conditions of U.S. households as a whole. Household credit data have not shown a broad deterioration. Total U.S. household debt reached US$18.8 trillion in the first quarter of 2026, while the overall delinquency rate remained at 4.8%. However, serious delinquency rates among some credit card borrowers remained higher than a year earlier, indicating that financial stress has become more concentrated among households with weaker repayment capacity. U.S. disposable personal income rose 0.7% month over month in May, while real consumer spending increased 0.3%. However, the personal saving rate was only 3.0%. Average hourly earnings rose 3.5% year over year in June, broadly in line with the annual increase in CPI, indicating that improvements in real wage purchasing power remained limited. Households can still rely on income to support spending, but the low saving rate leaves them with less room to absorb unemployment, a rebound in energy prices, or a correction in asset prices. The U.S. Economy Appears Closer to the Late Stage of Expansion, but a Full Recession Signal Has Not Yet Formed U.S. real GDP grew at an annualized rate of 2.1% in the first quarter of 2026, meaning that the economy remained in expansion. However, real final sales to private domestic purchasers increased by only 1.7%, showing that the pace of domestic demand growth had slowed. Retail sales, real income, jobless claims, and household credit data have not yet shown the synchronized deterioration typically seen during a recession. Weak consumer confidence alone is also insufficient to prove that the economy is about to contract. Nevertheless, slower hiring, downward revisions to employment data, a low saving rate, and reduced discretionary spending among low- and middle-income households all exhibit some characteristics of the late stage of an economic expansion. Based on the current data, the U.S. economy appears closer to a period of slower growth and gradual cooling and has not yet entered a recession characterized by simultaneous deterioration in consumption, income, and employment. Going forward, attention should focus on whether initial and continuing jobless claims continue to rise, whether retail growth can broaden beyond e-commerce and motor vehicles, and whether real income can improve steadily. If consumption growth remains concentrated in a small number of categories and among high-income households, the overall economy will become more sensitive to changes in employment and asset prices. Cooling Inflation and Resilient Consumption Allow the Federal Reserve to Remain Patient The Federal Reserve currently maintains the federal funds rate target range at 3.5% to 3.75%. The easing of core inflation in June reduced the need for further tightening, but resilient retail sales and a stable unemployment rate also mean that the Federal Reserve lacks an urgent reason to cut rates rapidly. Energy prices are one of the key variables. Lower gasoline prices in June improved both inflation and household cash flow. If renewed tensions in the Middle East push oil prices higher again, energy spending could once more compress household disposable income and increase the risk of a rebound in inflation, making the Federal Reserve’s policy assessment more complicated. Overall, U.S. consumption has not yet lost momentum, but whether its resilience can continue will depend on whether weaker hiring develops into higher unemployment and whether real income can continue to support household spending.
The U.S. housing market entered a distinctive phase in mid-2026, with transaction volumes declining while home prices continued to set new records. According to data from the National Association of Realtors (NAR), existing-home sales in June 2026 fell 2.4% month over month to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4.09 million units, below the market expectation of 4.20 million units. Compared with the same period last year, however, sales still increased slightly by 2.8%. The median existing-home sales price rose 1.8% year over year to US$440,600, reaching another record high. The simultaneous decline in transactions and rise in prices shows that high interest rates are reducing market liquidity from both the supply and demand sides. Prospective buyers are postponing purchases because of elevated home prices and financing costs, while homeowners with low-rate mortgages are reluctant to sell or move. As both buyers and sellers retreat from the market, weaker demand has not immediately translated into broad price declines, while limited housing supply continues to support transaction prices. Read More at Datatrack High Home Prices and Mortgage Rates Are Jointly Suppressing Housing Demand As of July 9, 2026, the average U.S. 30-year fixed mortgage rate stood at 6.49%, up from 6.43% in the previous week but below 6.72% a year earlier. Mortgage rates briefly fell below 6% at the beginning of 2026 before rising again, and have recently remained near 6.5%, making it difficult for monthly mortgage burdens to improve meaningfully. The combination of high home prices and elevated interest rates has had the greatest impact on households with limited down payments and cash flow. First-time buyers accounted for 33% of existing-home transactions in June, up from 30% a year earlier, but still below the roughly 40% level commonly seen when the housing market is more active. Even small changes in mortgage rates can directly affect buyer decisions. When rates decline slightly, some demand temporarily returns, but purchasing activity cools rapidly when rates rise again, causing monthly sales data to fluctuate continuously. Read More at Datatrack The Mortgage Rate Lock-in Effect Is Causing Existing Homeowners to Delay Selling High interest rates are also constraining the supply of existing homes. Many U.S. homeowners purchased properties or refinanced their mortgages during the pandemic and still hold fixed-rate loans below 5%. If they sell their current homes and purchase new ones, they must give up their existing low-rate mortgage terms and refinance at market rates close to 6.5%, substantially increasing the cost of moving. Without job relocations, changes in household size, retirement, or financing needs, homeowners are generally more willing to remain in their existing properties. This mortgage rate lock-in effect reduces new listings and slows housing market turnover. At the end of June, the nationwide inventory of existing homes for sale stood at approximately 1.56 million units, down 0.6% from May and only 1.3% higher than a year earlier. At the current sales pace, the existing inventory represented about 4.6 months of supply. Buyers are waiting because of limited affordability, while homeowners are withholding properties because their low-rate mortgages carry significant economic value. This keeps transaction volumes at low levels. Limited listings also mean that even when demand weakens, prices are unlikely to decline rapidly, forming the main structural basis of the current environment of lower sales and rising prices. Existing-Home Supply Is Constrained, While the New-Home Market Faces Inventory Pressure The mortgage rate lock-in effect is concentrated primarily in the existing-home market, while supply conditions in the new-home market are markedly different. Existing homeowners can choose to postpone selling, but builders have already committed capital to land, materials, and construction, and must generate sales to recover cash. As a result, they have greater difficulty maintaining previous prices and sales terms when demand weakens. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development showed that new single-family home sales fell to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 580,000 units in May 2026, down 7.3% month over month and 6.8% year over year. New homes available for sale increased to 496,000 units, while months of supply rose from 9.3 months in the previous month to 10.3 months, far above the 4.6 months recorded in the existing-home market. The higher inventory burden is forcing builders to offer price discounts, mortgage rate buydowns, closing cost assistance, or home upgrades to maintain sales momentum. Existing homeowners without an urgent need to sell can still maintain their asking prices or withdraw listings, so the new-home market generally offers greater room for negotiation. The U.S. housing market currently faces both a shortage of existing-home listings and an accumulation of new-home inventory, indicating that the supply problem has shifted from a single nationwide shortage to a clear mismatch across housing types and regions. Record Existing-Home Prices Do Not Mean Home Prices Are Rising Nationwide The record-high median existing-home sales price in June was also influenced by changes in the composition of transactions. As some first-time buyers and lower- and middle-income households exit the market, higher-income or cash-rich buyers can continue purchasing more expensive homes. The transaction mix therefore shifts toward higher-priced properties, pushing up the overall median. This figure is useful for reflecting the actual composition of transactions during the month, but it does not directly mean that the price of every home is rising. The house price index compiled by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) using repeat-sales data showed that nationwide home prices fell 0.1% month over month in April 2026, but still increased 2.0% year over year. This indicates that home prices have not entered a nationwide decline, although both price growth and short-term momentum have weakened significantly. This does not conflict with the record-high median existing-home sales price. Regional differences are also continuing to widen. Texas, Florida, and some Sun Belt cities, where housing construction expanded significantly in recent years, are now facing rising inventories, higher insurance costs, and increasing property taxes, giving buyers gradually more bargaining power. In contrast, Northeastern cities with limited land supply and slower housing construction continue to receive stronger price support because listings remain scarce. Existing-home sales increased in the Northeast in June but declined in the Midwest, South, and West, further demonstrating the significant regional divergence beneath the national averages. The Housing Market Lacks the Conditions for a Broad Collapse, but a Recovery in Transactions Will Take Time The current U.S. housing market differs materially from the environment before the 2008 financial crisis. Most homeowners hold fixed-rate mortgages, while post-pandemic home price gains have also created a degree of housing equity. As long as employment and household income do not deteriorate sharply, homeowners can choose to continue holding their properties. Distressed transactions, including foreclosures and short sales, accounted for only 2% of sales in June, down from 3% a year earlier. The median number of days on the market for listed properties increased only from 27 days to 28 days, indicating that large-scale forced selling has not emerged. However, the absence of selling pressure also means that price corrections will remain limited. High home prices, mortgage rates, property taxes, homeowners’ insurance, and maintenance costs will continue to restrict the ability of ordinary households to enter the market. Even if mortgage rates begin to decline, additional demand may first compete for a limited supply of existing homes, supporting prices. If builders reduce future housing starts because of weak new-home sales, the shortage of housing supply may continue over the medium to long term. Whether Interest Rates and Supply Improve Together Will Determine the Housing Market Outlook The main contradiction in the U.S. housing market in 2026 is the simultaneous presence of high financing costs, constrained existing-home supply, and accumulating new-home inventory. Record existing-home prices are primarily supported by limited listings and the composition of transactions, while new-home sales and inventory data show that some markets with greater supply are gradually shifting toward buyers. Going forward, key indicators include whether the 30-year mortgage rate can continue to decline, whether new existing-home listings increase, the level of new-home inventory and builder incentives, and changes in employment and mortgage delinquencies. If interest rates fall but the supply of existing homes remains restricted by the lock-in effect, home prices may continue to consolidate at elevated levels. If employment weakens and forces more homeowners to sell, markets with higher inventory may experience more pronounced corrections. The U.S. housing market remains in a low-liquidity adjustment phase, and weaker demand has not yet been fully transmitted into prices. For the market to move beyond the current pattern of lower sales and rising prices, financing costs must decline, existing homeowners must regain the willingness to move, new housing supply must become better aligned with demand, and household income must continue to improve. Small fluctuations in interest rates alone will not be sufficient to restore normal transaction activity.
2026-07-16
The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has once again fallen to its lowest level in more than 43 years. According to data from the U.S. Department of Energy, SPR inventories decreased by approximately 3 million barrels in the week ending July 10, 2026, falling to 316.5 million barrels, the lowest level since April 1983. Since the U.S.-Iran conflict broke out in late February, the United States has continued releasing emergency crude oil reserves to offset supply shortages in the Middle East and curb fuel prices. As of July 10, SPR inventories had fallen by approximately 98.9 million barrels from the end of February, equivalent to about 57% of the originally planned 172 million-barrel release. The United States still has substantial crude oil production and commercial inventories, so the decline in the SPR does not mean the country is about to run out of oil. However, strategic reserves, commercial inventories, and inventories at key delivery hubs are all relatively low, indicating that the buffer the United States can immediately deploy in response to the next supply disruption has already diminished. U.S.-Iran Conflict Forces the United States to Draw Heavily on the SPR Again The SPR was established after the oil crises of the 1970s and is primarily stored in underground salt caverns along the coasts of Texas and Louisiana, with a statutory storage capacity of approximately 714 million barrels. Its purpose is to provide crude oil rapidly to refineries and the market during wars, natural disasters, or major supply disruptions. After the U.S.-Iran conflict escalated in late February 2026, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted. Before the conflict began, the strait carried approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products per day, making it one of the world’s most important energy shipping routes. Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have some alternative pipeline capacity, it is insufficient to fully offset the supply shortfall caused by disruptions in the strait. To stabilize the market, 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency agreed in March to jointly release 400 million barrels of emergency oil reserves, the largest coordinated release in the organization’s history. The United States committed to supplying 172 million barrels, making it the main contributor to the coordinated action. If the remaining approximately 73.1 million barrels are delivered in full as planned and no large-scale replenishment occurs during the period, the SPR could fall further to approximately 243 million barrels under a static scenario, equivalent to 34% of its statutory storage capacity. This figure is a scenario estimate based on the existing plan, while actual inventory levels will still depend on delivery schedules, contract adjustments, and the timing of crude oil returns by companies. U.S. Crude Oil Production Remains High While Total Crude Inventories Continue to Contract In the week ending July 10, U.S. crude oil production was approximately 13.86 million barrels per day, about 486,000 barrels per day higher than a year earlier and still near a historical high. During the same period, U.S. commercial crude oil inventories fell to 409.7 million barrels, while the SPR declined to 316.5 million barrels, bringing the combined total to approximately 726.2 million barrels. High production has not prevented inventories from falling, mainly because refining and export demand have remained strong. U.S. refineries processed approximately 17.10 million barrels of crude oil per day that week, with utilization reaching 96.2%, while crude oil exports rose to approximately 3.72 million barrels per day. Additional domestic production continued to be absorbed by refinery demand and overseas buying, leaving limited crude oil available to build inventories. Since late February, U.S. commercial crude oil inventories and the SPR combined have fallen by approximately 129 million barrels. The combined inventory had already dropped to its lowest level since 1984 on July 3, and then declined further from 730.8 million barrels to 726.2 million barrels on July 10, meaning total U.S. crude oil inventories once again reached a new low in more than 40 years. Refined product inventories also remained below seasonal averages. In the week ending July 10, U.S. gasoline inventories fell to 210.5 million barrels, declining by 1.5 million barrels from the previous week and standing approximately 8% below the five-year average for the same period. Distillate inventories increased by 4.6 million barrels during the week to 108.2 million barrels, but remained approximately 11% below the five-year average. This indicates that inventory buffers in the gasoline and diesel markets remain limited and have yet to show a broad-based recovery. Cushing Inventories Approach a Critical Range, Increasing Short-Term Supply Sensitivity In addition to the decline in nationwide inventories, crude oil stocks in Cushing, Oklahoma, also remain relatively low. Cushing is the main physical delivery hub for West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures, and changes in its inventories directly affect U.S. crude oil spot supply and demand as well as futures prices. As of July 10, Cushing crude oil inventories stood at approximately 20 million barrels, still hovering near the operational low closely watched by the market. Market analysts have noted that when inventories fall below this level, crude oil quality and withdrawal constraints near the bottom of some storage tanks may increase the operational difficulty of transfers, blending, and futures delivery. Following the supply disruption in the Middle East, U.S. refineries raised operating rates, while overseas buyers also increased demand for U.S. crude oil. Even with the SPR continuing to supply crude oil to the Gulf Coast market, the releases have remained insufficient to fully offset inventory drawdowns caused by exports and refinery demand. The SPR Can Still Lower Short-Term Oil Prices, but the Duration of Intervention Has Shortened The most direct effect of releasing oil from the SPR is to rapidly bring crude oil that does not normally participate in daily trading into the market. When crude oil imports are disrupted, these reserves can help keep refineries operating and reduce the risk of sudden supply contractions in gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. However, reserve releases mainly alter the timing of crude oil supply and cannot permanently increase global production. When the government uses inventories in advance, fewer barrels remain available for future hurricanes, wars, or export disruptions in other oil-producing countries. Based on the July 10 level of 316.5 million barrels, the SPR currently stands at approximately 44% of its statutory capacity. This volume is still sufficient to support emergency action on a certain scale, but it is far below the levels commonly seen over the past several decades. If the U.S.-Iran conflict continues, the United States will face greater difficulty balancing short-term price stability with medium- and long-term energy security when considering additional releases. The effectiveness of SPR policy is also constrained by infrastructure capacity. Crude oil must be withdrawn from underground salt caverns and then transported to refineries through pipelines and ports. Frequent withdrawals increase maintenance pressure on aging equipment, meaning the volume that can be delivered rapidly to the market may not fully correspond to the number of barrels remaining underground. Repeated Shifts in U.S.-Iran Relations Cause Oil Prices to Reprice Supply Risks In mid-June, the United States and Iran temporarily reached an interim arrangement, leading the market to expect shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to gradually recover and causing oil prices to fall. However, the two sides resumed fighting in mid-July, disrupting vessel traffic through the strait and triggering a rapid rebound in international oil prices. On July 14, Brent crude oil futures rose to approximately US$84.7 per barrel, while WTI crude oil climbed to approximately US$79.3 per barrel, both reaching their highest levels in nearly one month. The sharp short-term increase in oil prices showed that even though countries had released emergency reserves on a large scale, they still could not fully eliminate the risk premium associated with disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. The futures market also shifted into backwardation, with near-term prices exceeding longer-dated prices, indicating that traders were willing to pay more for immediate access to crude oil. The market’s focus therefore shifted from the possibility of future oversupply to whether current physical crude oil supplies were sufficient to meet refining and export demand. Read More at Datatrack The Exchange Program Will Support Future Replenishment, but Low Inventories Are Unlikely to Recover Quickly The current U.S. oil release has primarily taken the form of an exchange or loan arrangement. After receiving crude oil from the SPR, energy companies must return the same amount in the future and pay an additional quantity of crude oil as an in-kind premium. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the release of 172 million barrels could ultimately result in the return of approximately 200 million barrels, about 20% more than the amount released. If the contracts are fulfilled successfully, the government will be able to rebuild inventories without directly bearing substantial crude oil purchase costs. However, the return schedules differ across exchange contracts, with replenishment expected to begin in November 2026 and continue through 2029. The SPR may therefore remain at a low level in the short term. Future purchases by companies seeking to fulfill their return obligations could also increase demand in the physical market and limit the downside in oil prices. Low Inventories Will Amplify the Market Response to the Next Supply Shock The SPR falling to its lowest level since 1983 does not mean that oil prices will inevitably continue rising. If the U.S.-Iran conflict de-escalates, the Strait of Hormuz returns to normal operations, OPEC+ raises production, and global demand slows, commercial inventories could begin accumulating again. The key issue is the oil market’s ability to withstand sudden events after its inventory buffer has declined. When commercial inventories and the SPR are both high, geopolitical shocks can initially be absorbed by inventories. When both fall simultaneously, the market is more likely to reflect potential supply shortages directly in spot prices, futures curves, and fuel costs. Key indicators to monitor going forward include the remaining pace of SPR releases, commercial crude oil and Cushing inventories, vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and the actual return schedule for exchanged crude oil. If Middle East supply risks persist while U.S. inventories fail to recover, low SPR levels will gradually weaken the government’s ability to restrain oil prices and energy inflation.
2026-07-15
After the U.S. dollar strengthened again in 2026 and neared a one-year high, the foreign exchange strategies of global large pension funds have also begun to change. Hedge ratios tracked by Wells Fargo show that some pension funds in Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark are scaling back the USD hedging positions they established in 2025. This adjustment reduces USD selling pressure in the foreign exchange forward market, adding a layer of capital support for the dollar's rebound from long-term institutional investors. Read More at Datatrack Pension funds are currently mostly allowing existing forward hedging contracts to expire without rolling them over, thereby gradually lowering their USD hedge ratios. While this adjustment typically does not bring an equivalent amount of USD spot buying, it reduces the regularly occurring USD forward sell orders, thereby lowering the capital headwinds faced by the dollar. Simultaneous Decline of USD and US Equities in 2025 Pushes Hedging Demand When offshore pension funds hold US equities or Treasuries, their investment returns are simultaneously affected by asset prices and the USD exchange rate. If the dollar depreciates, even if US asset prices do not fall, the returns when funds convert back into their domestic currencies will still be eroded. Therefore, large institutions typically sell USD through forward contracts to reduce the impact of exchange rate volatility on their portfolios. After the U.S. announced its "Liberation Day" global tariff measures in 2025, the dollar failed to act as a traditional safe haven, instead weakening in tandem with US stocks. Foreign investors suffered from simultaneous drops in equity prices and the USD exchange rate, prompting pension funds to rapidly increase their USD hedge ratios. Data from Danmarks Nationalbank shows that the USD hedge ratio of local insurance companies and pension funds rose from 61.8% at the start of 2025 to 73.5% in May of the same year. At that time, the Danish insurance and pension sector held approximately DKK 1.431 trillion in USD assets, representing about 30% of its investment portfolio, making USD volatility sufficient to significantly impact overall returns. During the period of USD weakness in the first half of 2025, the relevant hedging contracts reduced potential losses for the Danish insurance and pension sector by around DKK 80 billion. By the end of 2025, the USD hedge ratio for the entire Danish insurance and pension sector remained at 72.2%, with the relevant hedging operations contributing approximately DKK 87 billion in investment income for the full year. This experience illustrates that raising hedge ratios in 2025 had a clear risk management effect, but it also left funds facing higher hedging carrying costs as the dollar rebounded and US interest rates rose. Pension Funds Begin Rolling Back Some Hedging Positions in 2026 Entering 2026, some funds began reducing the USD hedging they had previously established. Wells Fargo's analysis shows that the hedge ratios of some Danish pension funds declined by about 5 percentage points from a year earlier, while some Canadian funds saw a decline of about 1 percentage point. The Danish funds tracked by Wells Fargo had also unwound about half of the hedging positions they added in mid-2025 by early 2026, and Dutch pension funds similarly saw a decline in hedging demand. While Danmarks Nationalbank statistics cover the entire insurance and pension sector, Wells Fargo's analysis tracks a selection of large funds, so the two sets of data reflect different scopes. Observing the two together reveals that Danish institutions significantly ramped up USD hedging in 2025, and some funds subsequently began unwinding these newly added positions in 2026, marking a turnaround in hedging direction. Pension funds mostly adjust their positions by letting them gradually mature rather than unwinding them all at once. Because long-term hedging contracts require continuous rolling, once funds stop rolling them over, the USD selling pressure that repeatedly entered the market will disappear period by period. Given the massive scale of assets managed by pension funds, their strategy shifts are typically slow, and the associated capital impact may persist over a longer period. High U.S. Interest Rates Increase USD Hedging Costs The primary reason pension funds are scaling back hedging is the widening interest rate differential between the U.S. and other major economies. When offshore investors sell USD in the forward market, the contract price reflects the interest rate gap between the two currencies. The higher US interest rates are, the higher the cost typically is for European investors to hedge USD assets back into their domestic currencies. Currently, short-term US interest rates are about 140 basis points higher than those in the Eurozone, meaning USD hedging continues to eat away at offshore investors' net returns. Higher US real interest rates simultaneously increase the yield attractiveness of USD assets, creating a combination of "higher USD asset returns and lower hedged yields," prompting some large investors to retain more unhedged US equity and USD assets. Read More at Datatrack This shift also demonstrates that high interest rates have a dual-layered effect on the dollar. USD assets themselves provide higher interest and yield spread income, and if offshore funds reduce their hedging, they can also retain more of the returns generated by USD appreciation. As long as a significant gap remains between US interest rates and offshore markets, the incentive for pension funds to restore high hedge ratios will be relatively limited. USD Restoring Safe-Haven Function Reduces Demand for Currency Protection The relationship between the USD and US equities is also an important reason behind the pension funds' strategy adjustments. In the past, when the market entered risk-off mode, drops in US equities were often accompanied by USD appreciation, with USD foreign exchange gains offsetting some of the equity losses. After the USD and US equities fell in tandem in 2025, this natural buffer temporarily failed, prompting offshore funds to increase exchange rate protection. In 2026, when the U.S.-Iran conflict triggered market risk aversion, the USD strengthened again as risks escalated, once again demonstrating its function as a safe-haven asset. With the relationship between the dollar and risk assets restored, unhedged US equity positions once again provide a certain degree of risk offset, reducing the necessity for pension funds to maintain high hedge ratios. Changes in Federal Reserve leadership have also improved market perception of the dollar. Kevin Warsh assumed office as Federal Reserve Chair on May 22, 2026, easing previous market concerns regarding central bank independence and policy credibility. Coupled with hawkish policy expectations and higher real interest rates, USD assets have once again won the favor of long-term foreign capital. Fading Hedging Sell Pressure Formulates Marginal Capital Support After pension funds reduce their hedging, even if the scale of US assets they hold remains unchanged, the USD forward sell orders that the FX market needs to absorb will decrease, and the capital headwinds generated by the "sell US" trades of 2025 will also recede. This force can improve the supply and demand of USD capital, though its impact remains primarily of a marginal supportive nature; Fed policy, US economic data, geopolitics, and global risk appetite will continue to dominate short-term USD fluctuations. Whether this support can be sustained depends on US interest rates, USD yield spreads, US equity returns, and the AI investment cycle. As long as the relative returns of US assets remain attractive, pension funds may maintain lower USD hedge ratios. However, if AI investment returns disappoint, the US economy cools significantly, or Federal Reserve rate cuts narrow the yield spread, hedging costs will fall, and institutions may once again increase currency protection. The shift in pension fund strategies has already removed a major source of selling pressure for the USD rebound, but the medium-to-long-term trend still depends on whether US interest rates and asset returns can maintain their advantages.
The artificial intelligence race is expanding from chips and data centers into the power system. AI model training and inference require large numbers of servers to operate around the clock, along with cooling, storage, networking, and backup equipment. As a result, the electricity consumption of a single large-scale campus is gradually approaching that of a major industrial facility. The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that total U.S. electricity consumption will increase from 4.195 trillion kilowatt-hours, or 4,195 TWh, in 2025 to 4,269 TWh in 2026, before rising further to 4,399 TWh in 2027. Electricity demand growth is expected to be more pronounced in the commercial and industrial sectors, with data center expansion serving as an important driver. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates that data centers could account for approximately 11.8% of total U.S. electricity consumption by 2030, with different scenarios ranging from 9.5% to 15.3%. As electricity demand increases rapidly, market attention is no longer focused solely on whether sufficient power is available. The question of who should pay for new power plants, transmission lines, and substations has also become a policy dispute. If utilities incorporate these investments directly into general electricity rates, households, small and medium-sized businesses, and traditional manufacturers may end up sharing the cost of technology companies’ AI infrastructure expansion. Data Center-Intensive Regions Are Already Facing Higher Electricity Costs Data centers can affect electricity prices through three main channels: generation, reserve capacity, and transmission and distribution investment. When new demand exceeds existing supply, grid operators must activate more expensive generating units and pay higher fees to ensure sufficient capacity remains available during peak periods. If transmission systems cannot accommodate the electricity demand of large campuses, utilities must also build substations, transmission lines, and interconnection facilities. These pressures are particularly evident in PJM, the largest regional power grid in the United States. Due to rising data center demand, power plant retirements, and the slow pace of new supply additions, PJM capacity prices have increased more than tenfold over two years. Ohio-based Belden Brick saw its monthly capacity charges rise from approximately US$1,600 to US$12,000, while its total electricity costs increased by as much as 90%. As of December 2025, industrial electricity prices in Pennsylvania and Ohio had risen by 31% and 26% year over year, respectively, compared with a national average increase of 7%. Data centers are not the only cause of rising electricity prices. Natural gas prices, extreme weather, transmission congestion, power plant retirements, and aging equipment can also affect electricity bills. The price impact of AI-related electricity demand also varies significantly by region. Areas with high data center density, limited supply margins, and lagging grid construction generally face greater pressure. The White House Is Encouraging Technology Companies to Pay for New Power Infrastructure In March 2026, the White House introduced the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, which was signed by Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, Oracle, and xAI. The participating companies pledged to build, procure, or bring online the new generation resources needed to meet data center demand and to pay for the grid upgrades required to serve those facilities. They must also negotiate dedicated rate structures with utilities and state governments. Even if actual electricity use falls below initial projections, the companies would still be responsible for the power and infrastructure built on their behalf, reducing the risk that the cost of unused capacity is shifted to existing customers. The pledge remains voluntary and has not directly established a nationwide, legally enforceable cost-allocation framework. Implementation still depends on state regulation, utility rate structures, and corporate contracts. Reuters reported on July 13 that the White House was planning to invite utilities, data center developers, and state governments to participate in a follow-up initiative. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also directed six regional grid operators on June 18 to explain within 60 days whether their existing rate structures were just and reasonable or to propose revisions. The review covers accelerating interconnection for large loads, preventing transmission construction costs from being shifted to other customers, establishing flexible load services, and addressing rules for data centers co-located with dedicated power generation. Direct Corporate Cost Assumption Cannot Eliminate Broader Supply-Demand Pressure Requiring technology companies to pay for dedicated interconnection facilities and new generation can reduce the risk that ordinary customers directly subsidize data centers, but it cannot fully isolate the power market from broader price changes. When multiple companies simultaneously purchase transformers, gas turbines, switchgear, and engineering services, they may still drive up equipment and construction costs, affecting the expansion plans of other utilities. Supply-chain constraints have become a major limitation on data center development. In the first quarter of 2026, lead times for generator step-up transformers in the United States exceeded 160 weeks. Some equipment must be ordered three to five years in advance, while transformer prices are expected to rise by approximately 4% to 10% over the next year. Because large transformers are generally customized, expanding factory capacity, completing engineering certification, and training specialized workers all require significant time. Even when data center buildings and servers are ready, operations may still be delayed because essential power equipment has not yet been delivered. Technology companies’ capital expenditures therefore no longer cover only GPUs, servers, and cooling systems. They must also secure generation capacity, transformers, transmission and distribution equipment, and engineering contractors well in advance. The price and delivery schedule of power infrastructure are beginning to determine when AI computing resources can enter service. Behind-the-Meter Generation and Long-Term Energy Contracts Are Emerging as Alternatives As public grid expansion fails to keep pace with data center development, some developers are adopting behind-the-meter generation. Under this model, natural gas generators, fuel cells, renewable energy systems, or energy storage facilities are installed behind the customer’s meter to supply power directly to the campus. Between 2024 and 2025, announced behind-the-meter generation projects for data centers in Texas exceeded 20 GW, while planned capacity nationwide reached approximately 56 GW over the same period. On-site generation can shorten the wait for grid interconnection, but it must still address fuel supply, equipment redundancy, emissions, and local environmental concerns. Most large campuses also cannot fully disconnect from the public grid and still depend on it for backup power, frequency regulation, and emergency dispatch. Whether data centers pay rates sufficient to cover these system services therefore remains an important element of cost allocation. Technology giants are also expanding their use of long-term energy contracts. In January 2026, Meta signed agreements with Vistra, TerraPower, and Oklo to support up to 6.6 GW of existing and new nuclear capacity by 2035. Long-term corporate contracts can provide revenue support for nuclear plant life extensions and new reactor technologies, but new nuclear projects still face uncertainty over approvals, construction timelines, and costs. They therefore cannot independently fill all data center power needs in the near term. AI Competition Is Beginning to Encompass Energy Access and Grid Management Capabilities Expanding generation and transmission remains central to meeting long-term electricity demand, but smart grids, energy storage, and demand flexibility can also reduce peak-load pressure. Dynamic line ratings, power flow control, and topology optimization can improve utilization of existing transmission assets, while virtual power plants and on-site storage can adjust loads when the grid is under stress, reducing the need to build large amounts of reserve capacity for a limited number of peak periods. Some AI training workloads can also be shifted to off-peak hours or transferred to data centers in other regions. Real-time inference, cloud services, and critical systems, however, still require highly reliable, round-the-clock power. Future data center competitiveness will therefore depend simultaneously on computing efficiency, energy access, grid interconnection speed, and load management capabilities. Technology giants’ commitment to paying for new generation and grid upgrades can reduce the risk that AI construction costs are directly shifted to households and small and medium-sized businesses. However, equipment shortages and tight overall supply-demand conditions may still affect regional electricity prices. The ultimate effectiveness of these policies will depend on whether new supply can come online on schedule, how local rates are designed, and whether corporate commitments can be converted into specific and enforceable contracts. As the constraints on AI infrastructure expand from chip supply to the power system, grids, transformers, energy storage, and energy management equipment will also become critical infrastructure shaping the pace of the next phase of computing expansion.
2026-07-14
The artificial intelligence investment boom is expanding from internal corporate spending into the bond market. As demand for funding for data centers, AI chips, and cloud infrastructure rises rapidly, tech giants are relying more frequently on debt issuance to finance expansion. As of July 9, 2026, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Oracle, Nvidia, and SpaceX had issued approximately US$244 billion in bonds worldwide this year, far above the US$108 billion issued in all of 2025. The rapid increase in issuance has made AI financing one of the most significant supply-side changes in the investment-grade bond market in 2026. Weak Demand for Amazon’s Bond Sale Shows That Market Absorption Is Not Unlimited Over the past several weeks, Nvidia, SpaceX, and Amazon have brought approximately US$75 billion of new bonds to market, with the rapid increase in supply beginning to test investor absorption capacity. Amazon’s latest offering comprised US$25 billion of investment-grade bonds with maturities ranging from three to 40 years. Orders peaked at approximately US$62 billion before falling to about US$41 billion, resulting in a subscription multiple of roughly 1.6 times. Demand also varied by maturity, with orders for the five-year bonds about 20% higher than those for the 30-year bonds. Investors remained confident in Amazon’s near-term debt-servicing capacity but were more cautious about industry and credit risks several decades into the future. Clear selling pressure has also emerged in the secondary market. MarketAxess data show that prices of long-duration AI-related bonds have generally weakened, with declines among bonds with maturities of 10 years or longer standing out within the investment-grade market. The yield on one of SpaceX’s 30-year bonds rose from approximately 6.7% at issuance to 7.3%, pushing its price lower. Amazon also had to pay borrowing costs above its own historical levels to attract sufficient demand. Large cloud providers still have access to the bond market, but the scale of future issuance is becoming an increasingly important factor in technology bond pricing. Many funds already hold substantial amounts of AI-related corporate debt and may need to sell existing positions to make room for new offerings, adding to selling pressure in the secondary market. If new supply continues to exceed expectations, companies will face wider issuance spreads and higher borrowing costs. AI Spending Is Approaching Operating Cash Flow, Accelerating External Financing Technology companies have traditionally been viewed as asset-light, cash-generative businesses. Advertising, software subscriptions, and cloud services can produce stable operating cash flow, leaving them less dependent on external financing than utilities, telecommunications companies, or energy producers. AI infrastructure has changed this financial model. Training and running large models require substantial investment in GPUs, high-speed networks, storage equipment, land, power facilities, and data centers, leaving tech giants with long-term construction spending that was once less common among software companies. Consensus estimates as of mid-May 2026 showed that capital expenditure by major AI hyperscalers had risen from US$152 billion in 2022 to US$408 billion in 2025. Spending was projected at approximately US$688 billion in 2026 and could reach US$870 billion in 2027. As companies continued to raise their construction plans, more recent estimates increased to approximately US$725 billion for 2026. Heavy spending is also compressing free cash flow. Capital expenditure by major AI cloud providers is estimated to account for about 94% of operating cash flow in both 2026 and 2027, far above the 40% recorded in 2023. Even if these companies remain highly profitable, the funds available for share buybacks, dividends, acquisitions, and liquidity reserves will shrink. To balance construction progress with financial flexibility, tech giants are using a combination of operating cash flow, corporate bonds, equity financing, and project financing to fund AI investment, while matching long-term liabilities with long-lived assets such as data centers and power infrastructure. Debt at Five Tech Giants Has Doubled, but Their Credit Profiles Differ Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle have added approximately US$350 billion in debt over the past five years, bringing their combined debt burden to roughly twice its level five years ago. Their combined interest expenses exceeded US$10 billion last year, more than double the 2019 level. However, several highly rated issuers also hold large cash balances, so the increase in debt has not produced a proportional rise in net leverage. Alphabet, for example, still generated approximately US$64 billion in free cash flow, calculated as operating cash flow minus capital expenditure, as of the end of March 2026. Average net leverage among A-rated and higher hyperscalers remains close to zero, well below the broader US investment-grade corporate bond market, while technology remains one of the less leveraged sectors in the investment-grade universe. The companies differ considerably in financial buffers, capital expenditure pressure, and funding needs. Highly rated issuers face greater pressure from new bond supply and market pricing, while companies with higher leverage are more exposed to free-cash-flow pressure, rating changes, and refinancing costs. Company Financial and Funding Position Key Concerns for Bond Investors Alphabet Operating cash flow and free cash flow remain strong, while its credit rating and balance sheet remain solid. However, AI capital expenditure and cross-currency bond issuance are increasing rapidly. Whether new bond supply will continue to expand, the pace of returns on AI investment, and long-duration bond spreads Microsoft Strong cash flow and profitability, relatively low leverage, and ample funding capacity Whether cloud revenue growth can support the scale of long-term data center investment Meta Its advertising business continues to generate substantial cash, while AI capital expenditure, corporate debt, project financing, and long-term lease commitments are all increasing Further capital expenditure increases, off-balance-sheet financing, and future cash-flow pressure Amazon Accelerating AWS data center construction, rapidly rising capital expenditure, a temporary shift to negative free cash flow, and repeated issuance across global bond markets during the year Whether AWS revenue can keep pace with investment, future issuance frequency, new-bond pricing, and market absorption capacity Oracle Higher leverage and cash-burn pressure than other large technology companies, with a credit rating near the lower end of investment grade Free cash flow, customer concentration, ratings, and refinancing costs Long-Term Uncertainty and High Interest Rates Are Weakening Demand at the Long End Pressure in the bond market is currently concentrated in longer maturities. When purchasing five-year bonds, investors primarily assess a company’s cash flow and refinancing capacity over the next several years. Holding 30-year or 40-year bonds also requires a judgment on whether the issuer’s competitive advantages, industry position, and asset values can be sustained for decades. AI chips and computing architectures evolve rapidly, and existing equipment may become obsolete within a few years because of weaker performance or energy efficiency. The long-term distribution of profits across the AI value chain also remains unclear. With US interest rates remaining relatively high, short-term US Treasury securities and highly rated corporate bonds already offer attractive yields. Investors extending duration must also accept greater interest-rate sensitivity, technology-upgrade risk, and uncertainty over future supply. In early July, the spread on Alphabet’s 10-year bonds widened by 12 basis points in one week, while the spread on Meta’s 10-year bonds increased by 16 basis points. The average investment-grade spread widened by only two basis points over the same period, leaving technology bonds with a much larger adjustment than the broader market. Insurance companies and pension funds have traditionally been major buyers of ultra-long corporate bonds because these assets help match long-term liabilities. These institutions generally follow conservative investment strategies and have limited tolerance for changes in corporate strategy or long-term credit deterioration. Continued issuance of 30-year and 40-year bonds by AI-related borrowers is also testing the absorption capacity of traditional long-end investors. Large-Scale Issuance Is Reshaping the Investment-Grade Bond Market and Funding Structure As tech giants continue to expand their borrowing, their bonds are gaining weight in investment-grade indices. Index-tracking funds must increase their allocations, while active managers need to control the difference between their technology bond exposure and benchmark weights. When issuance volumes or bond prices deviate from expectations, the allocation to a single sector can materially affect fund performance. AI credit exposure is increasingly becoming a broader investment-grade market allocation issue. Alphabet, Amazon, and other companies have expanded issuance in euros, pounds sterling, Japanese yen, Canadian dollars, and Swiss francs to reach more international investors and reduce the burden of absorbing large volumes in the US dollar market. Both Alphabet and Amazon conducted multiple overseas bond offerings in 2026. Amazon’s C$14 billion offering in June set a record for the Canadian corporate bond market. Beyond publicly issued corporate debt, technology companies are also obtaining funding through data center leases, private credit, special-purpose vehicles, and project financing. As of the end of the first quarter of 2026, several large cloud and data center-related companies had disclosed approximately US$850 billion in future lease commitments. Meta added around US$79 billion during the quarter, bringing its total commitments to US$182.9 billion. These figures may also include offices, warehouses, and other facilities, while some agreements contain termination provisions. They are therefore more accurately described as future lease commitments and should not all be classified as AI data center debt. AI Releveraging Risks Are Rising, but the Telecom Bubble Has Not Been Repeated The current AI cycle and the telecommunications investment boom of the late 1990s were both driven by technological competition, with companies building infrastructure before demand had fully matured. If supply growth remains above actual utilization for an extended period, idle capacity, asset impairment, and declining investment returns may follow. However, the two cycles began under different conditions. Telecom companies entered the downturn with higher leverage, weakening profitability, and heavy dependence on external funding. Current AI investment is led by large technology companies with strong cash flow. Capital expenditure by major cloud providers is consuming most of their operating cash flow, but it remains below the levels of more than 150% or even 200% reached by some telecom companies late in their investment cycle. Current risks more closely resemble large technology companies gradually increasing debt from a low-leverage starting point. The market has not yet reached the combination of widespread high leverage and deteriorating profitability seen in the telecom sector. However, free-cash-flow and balance-sheet buffers are shrinking, making future investment returns increasingly important to credit pricing. Bond Markets Are Still Providing Capital, but Financing Hurdles Have Risen Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft retain strong near-term debt-servicing capacity. The weakness in technology bond prices in July primarily reflects growing new supply and a repricing of long-duration risk and is not yet sufficient to constitute a broad credit crisis. Bond markets remain willing to finance AI construction, but wider spreads, a stronger preference for shorter maturities, and tighter deal terms are raising the funding hurdle for tech giants. The next key question is whether AI revenue can keep pace with capital expenditure and long-term fixed-payment obligations. If market absorption continues to weaken, companies may need to offer larger new-issue concessions, increase equity or project financing, and reprioritize data center construction. The price and maturity constraints imposed by the bond market will directly affect the pace of the next phase of AI infrastructure expansion.
2026-07-13
Indian assets have recently returned to the radar of global capital. Over the past year or so, the Indian market had cooled due to elevated valuations, foreign investors shifting toward Taiwan and South Korea’s AI and semiconductor trades, Middle East tensions pushing oil prices higher, and depreciation pressure on the rupee. However, since late June and into July, conditions have started to change. Oil prices once fell back toward levels seen before the U.S.-Iran conflict, while India’s central bank and government also introduced measures to stabilize the rupee, attract dollar inflows, and encourage foreign purchases of Indian bonds. As a result, foreign investor interest in Indian equity and bond assets has begun to recover. The core of this shift lies in lower oil prices easing external balance and inflation pressure, a stable rupee reducing foreign investors’ currency-loss concerns, and capital inflows into Indian bonds and financial stocks improving market confidence. However, Middle East tensions and the direction of the U.S. dollar could still interrupt this recovery process. Lower Oil Prices Ease India’s External Pressure, but Middle East Tensions Remain the Biggest Variable India is one of the world’s major crude oil importers, so oil prices have a more direct impact on Indian assets than on many other emerging markets. Rising oil prices push up import costs, widen the trade deficit and inflation pressure, and weigh on the rupee. Falling oil prices, by contrast, help improve India’s external balance, lower corporate costs, and strengthen foreign investor confidence in Indian equities and bonds. Data from India’s Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell (PPAC) show that India’s petroleum import dependence rose to 88.2% in FY2024–2025 and further increased to 88.4% from April to September in FY2025–2026. India’s total crude oil imports also remained close to 4.9 million barrels per day in June 2026. This means changes in oil prices directly affect India’s import costs, inflation pressure, trade balance, and rupee exchange rate. From late June to early July, as Middle East tensions temporarily eased and oil prices retreated, Indian assets benefited noticeably. The rupee strengthened with support from lower oil prices and policy measures, while Indian equities were again included by some investors as a diversification option. This was especially the case after AI-heavy markets such as Taiwan and South Korea had already risen sharply, making India’s relatively lower AI exposure a source of diversification. However, this support remains fragile. On July 8, renewed U.S.-Iran tensions drove Brent crude sharply higher, putting pressure on Indian equities, the rupee, and government bonds at the same time. The Nifty 50, Sensex, rupee, and Indian government bond prices all came under pressure. By July 13, Middle East tensions and risks surrounding the Strait of Hormuz again pushed oil prices higher, with Brent trading above US$78 per barrel intraday. Market focus therefore shifted back to oil prices, the U.S. dollar, and India’s external balance pressure. Rupee Stability Is a Key Precondition for Foreign Capital Returning to India The rupee is one of the most important variables foreign investors consider when reassessing Indian assets. If the rupee continues to depreciate, returns from Indian equities or bonds may still be eroded by currency losses. If the rupee can remain relatively stable, foreign investors’ willingness to enter Indian equities and bonds will increase. This is also why the Reserve Bank of India’s recent policy focus has been on attracting dollar inflows and stabilizing the foreign exchange market. In early June, the RBI announced a series of foreign exchange measures, including a concessional dollar swap facility to encourage overseas borrowing by state-owned enterprises and inflows into foreign-currency non-resident deposits. This swap facility can subsidize banks’ hedging costs for three- to five-year foreign-currency non-resident deposits and allow banks to provide leverage arrangements for related deposits. The goal is to increase dollar supply and stabilize the rupee. These policies have started to show up in corporate and market behavior. Latest data show that foreign exchange hedging activity by Indian exporters and importers rose sharply in June, with total corporate FX hedging reaching a record high. Exporters returned to the hedging market, reflecting some easing in expectations of one-way rupee depreciation. Importers’ hedging demand also increased, due to Middle East risks, oil price volatility, and the need to manage dollar costs. Short-term market reactions also show that oil prices, the rupee, and Indian equity and bond sentiment remain highly connected. On July 9, lower oil prices and possible RBI support in the FX market helped the rupee, equities, and government bond prices recover at the same time. By July 13, however, Middle East tensions had risen again, bringing market attention back to oil prices, the U.S. dollar, and currency pressure. Indicator Data timing and latest change Market interpretation Rupee exchange rate Closed at 95.3250 per U.S. dollar on July 10 The latest full trading-day close was broadly stable, but Middle East risks and oil prices continue to drive short-term movements Brent crude Around US$78.5 per barrel intraday on July 13 Renewed Middle East risks are again testing India’s external pressure Nifty 50 Rose 0.3% on July 9 Indian equity sentiment improved when oil prices retreated and the rupee stabilized India 10-year government bond yield Fell by 2 basis points on July 9; closed at 6.7139% on July 10 The bond market is still affected by oil prices, foreign bond buying, U.S. Treasury yields, and inflation data Corporate FX hedging Around US$120 billion in total in June A record high, showing companies are actively managing rupee and oil price volatility Exporter hedging US$46.3 billion, up 45% YoY Exporters increased hedging again after expectations of one-way rupee depreciation eased Importer hedging Nearly US$74 billion, up 55% YoY Oil price and dollar-cost uncertainty remain high, keeping importers’ hedging demand elevated Government Bonds Become an Important Entry Point for Policy-Led Foreign Inflows Indian policymakers have recently placed rupee stability and long-term capital inflows on the same policy track, making the government bond market an important entry point for foreign capital returning to India. Through the Fully Accessible Route (FAR), foreign investors can more directly allocate to eligible Indian government bonds. As of early July, foreign investors had net purchased around INR 346 billion, or about US$3.6 billion, of Indian government bonds through FAR since June. Foreign buying had previously pushed India’s 10-year government bond yield lower, with the yield still hovering near the 6.70% low range in early July. However, yields turned more volatile in early July, and short-term movements were no longer one-directional. On July 10, India’s 10-year government bond yield closed at 6.7139%. For the week of July 13, the market expected a trading range of 6.65% to 6.77%. Foreign bond buying remains an important support for India’s bond market, but oil prices, U.S. Treasury yields, inflation data, and foreign capital flows will continue to jointly affect future bond performance. Financial Stocks Become the Main Entry Point for Foreign Investors Rebuilding Indian Equity Exposure On the equity side, foreign inflows first showed up in Indian financial stocks. In the second half of June, foreign portfolio investors bought INR 146.34 billion, or about US$1.54 billion, of Indian bank stocks, the highest half-month inflow in 14 months. During the same period, foreign investors also turned net buyers of Indian equities, with total inflows reaching INR 141.09 billion, ending four consecutive months of net selling. Financial stocks have attracted capital mainly due to policy support, valuation repair, and expectations of stable earnings. The RBI’s foreign exchange swap facility helps banks lower overseas funding costs, while the government’s removal of capital gains tax and interest income tax on certain foreign bond investments also improves incentives for international capital to enter India’s financial markets. Bank stocks rose 6.1% in June, significantly outperforming the Nifty 50’s 1.4% gain over the same period. At the same time, the funding structure of India’s stock market has also changed from the past. Even when foreign investors had previously withdrawn heavily, Indian domestic mutual funds and systematic investment plan (SIP) flows still provided market support. In June, inflows into Indian equity mutual funds rose 26.5% MoM to INR 289.73 billion, or about US$3.04 billion, marking the 64th consecutive month of net inflows. SIP inflows also rose 3% MoM to INR 317.81 billion, close to the record high reached in March. Foreign buying and selling still affect Indian equities, but as the domestic capital pool continues to expand, the market is no longer driven solely by foreign investors, and its ability to absorb external capital volatility has improved. Indian Asset Revaluation Still Needs Support From Corporate Earnings The initial recovery in foreign investor interest in India mostly reflects position rebuilding after oil and rupee pressure eased. For equities, India’s long-term growth story remains attractive, including its demographic dividend, domestic demand expansion, infrastructure investment, and financial deepening. However, Indian equities have long traded at relatively high valuations, so for capital to shift from short-term covering to medium- and long-term allocation, corporate earnings still need to catch up with valuations. Financial results, bank asset quality, consumer demand, and policy continuity will be key variables for foreign investors judging whether the recovery in Indian assets can continue. The bond market also has fundamental constraints to watch. Although India’s 10-year government bond yield has retreated, its absolute level remains higher than that of most major economies. The government’s interest burden and fiscal space remain long-term concerns for the market. For India to attract more stable foreign bond inflows, it will need to maintain rupee stability, policy transparency, and bond market liquidity, while convincing international investors that capital inflows are not just short-term arbitrage, but can also become part of the internationalization of India’s bond market. Key Watchpoints Ahead: Whether Oil Prices, the Rupee, and Foreign Bond Buying Can Stay Stable The key for Indian assets going forward remains whether oil prices, the rupee, and foreign bond buying can stay stable. When oil prices surged on July 8 due to geopolitical risks, Indian equities, the rupee, and bonds all came under pressure at the same time. This shows that energy prices remain the most direct external pressure source for Indian assets. If oil prices rise sharply again, India’s inflation, current account, and currency pressures could all increase again, while foreign inflows could easily turn more cautious. India is now being included again in some foreign allocation discussions mainly because oil and rupee pressures have eased compared with earlier levels, while policy measures have attracted capital into Indian government bonds and financial stocks. Compared with the concentration risk after the sharp rise in Taiwan and South Korea’s AI trades, India offers another emerging market allocation logic: domestic demand resilience, valuation repair, bond inflows, and domestic capital support. In the coming weeks, markets will focus on whether oil prices remain manageable, whether USD/INR stays within the 95–96 range, whether foreign investors continue buying Indian government bonds, and whether corporate earnings can support further revaluation of Indian equities.
2026-07-10
Japan’s bond market has recently become a focal point for global markets. On July 9, the yield on Japan’s 10-year government bond (Japanese Government Bond, JGB) rose to 2.9%, reaching its highest level in about 30 years. It also increased for the ninth consecutive trading day, marking the longest rising streak in nearly 20 years. Selling pressure also expanded across long-dated and super-long-dated bonds, with 30-year and 40-year JGB yields both rising to around 4%. This shows that the pressure no longer reflects only changes in short-end policy rate expectations, as the entire yield curve is being repriced. Rising bond yields mean falling bond prices. If this were only a short-term interest rate fluctuation in a single country, it would usually not attract such high attention from global markets. However, Japan’s long-standing low-rate and weak-yen environment has served as an important underlying condition for global capital circulation for decades. As Japan’s long-end yields rise rapidly, markets are reassessing whether the Japanese government can withstand higher borrowing costs, whether the Bank of Japan (BOJ) can independently control inflation, and whether Japanese capital will flow back from overseas markets into domestic assets. Long-End Yields Hit Highs as Markets Reassess Japan’s Fiscal and Inflation Risks From the perspective of the yield curve, pressure in Japan’s bond market is concentrated at the long end and super-long end, and has already been reflected in a steepening of the curve. On July 8, the yield spread between 10-year and 2-year JGBs widened to about 143 basis points, the highest level since 2004, reflecting rising market concerns over long-end inflation and price risks, while expectations for BOJ rate hikes at the short end have also moderated. The following day, on July 9, Japan’s 10-year JGB yield rose further to 2.9%, reaching an approximately 30-year high. This indicates that investors are demanding a higher term premium to hold long-dated Japanese bonds, reflecting a reassessment of fiscal expansion, sticky inflation, and BOJ policy credibility. July 9 JGB Yield Indicator Data Latest Change Current Interpretation 2-Year JGB Yield 1.445% Reflects market pricing of the BOJ policy rate path 10-Year JGB Yield 2.900% Reached an approximately 30-year high, becoming the core focus of market attention 20-Year JGB Yield 3.890% Selling pressure on long-dated bonds has intensified 30-Year JGB Yield 4.030% Super-long-end yield has risen above 4% 40-Year JGB Yield 4.055% Long-term fiscal risk premium is rising Fiscal Expansion and Import Inflation Drive Bond Market Selling Pressure The core background behind this wave of JGB selling pressure is the simultaneous rise in fiscal expansion and inflation pressure. The government of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is promoting a long-term investment plan of more than JPY 370 trillion, equivalent to about USD 2.28 trillion based on the exchange rate at the time, covering areas such as AI, chips, and space development. The policy goal is to raise Japan’s growth potential through public and private investment. However, with Japan’s government debt already exceeding 200% of GDP, markets are more concerned about funding sources, bond issuance pressure, and fiscal discipline. When long-end interest rates rise, the Japanese government’s borrowing costs, interest expenses, and debt sustainability pressures also increase simultaneously. Read More at Datatrack Inflation pressure is making bond market concerns harder to ease. Middle East tensions and oil price volatility have pushed up global energy prices, while a weak yen has further increased Japan’s import costs. The latest data show that Japan’s June corporate goods price index rose 7.1% year over year, reaching its highest level in more than three years. Fuel prices rose 22.8% year over year, while yen-denominated import prices increased 29.7% year over year. If import prices and corporate costs continue to rise, they may further pass through to broader prices and increase pressure on the BOJ’s inflation and rate-hike path. BOJ policy normalization is also facing a test of trust. In June, the Bank of Japan raised its short-term policy rate from 0.75% to 1%. However, language in the government’s economic blueprint involving coordination between monetary policy and growth targets had raised market concerns over whether the BOJ would keep interest rates low due to fiscal and growth pressures. The Japanese government later considered adding wording to the economic blueprint to respect BOJ independence, with the aim of reducing market concerns about political interference in monetary policy. 10-Year Yield Nears 3%, Debt Sustainability Becomes Market Focus The 10-year JGB yield approaching 3% is viewed by the market as an important threshold because it may change the pricing assumptions for Japan’s debt costs. In the past, Japan was able to sustain a massive level of government debt largely because of low interest rates, stable holdings by domestic institutions, and long-term BOJ bond purchases that suppressed financing costs. As the 10-year yield approaches 3% and super-long-end yields rise to around 4%, markets are beginning to evaluate whether the Japanese government’s future bond issuance costs will rise faster than fiscal revenue. This is also why some strategists have compared Japan with the United Kingdom’s 2022 “Truss moment.” The key point is that markets are examining the trust foundation among Japan’s fiscal policy, central bank policy, and exchange rate. Japan’s Long-Term Low-Rate Assumption Changes, Global Capital Allocation Needs Recalibration The spillover effect of Japan’s bond market mainly comes from yen carry trades and Japanese institutional capital allocation. For a long time, low-cost yen funding has supported investors in buying overseas assets such as U.S. Treasuries, European bonds, high-yield bonds, and equities. When Japanese interest rates rise, the spread supporting carry trades narrows, and some leveraged positions may face deleveraging or unwinding pressure. On the other hand, Japanese investors have long been important buyers in global bond markets. As of April 2026, Japan held about USD 1.21 trillion in U.S. Treasuries, remaining the largest foreign holder of U.S. government debt. If JGB yields continue to rise, the attractiveness of domestic Japanese bonds will increase, and overseas bond allocations may undergo rebalancing, further affecting global bond yields and risk asset valuations. Policy-level signals of capital repatriation are also emerging. On July 10, the Japanese government said it would study ways to encourage pension funds to increase investment in domestic financial assets, especially the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), which manages JPY 293.4 trillion, or about USD 1.81 trillion, in assets. If this type of long-term capital adjusts its domestic and overseas allocation, the impact may not be limited to Japan’s bond market, but could also affect the supply-demand structure of overseas bond, equity, and foreign exchange markets. Japan’s Bond Market Has Not Lost Control, but Global Sensitivity to Long-End Rates Has Increased At present, it is still inappropriate to directly interpret selling pressure in Japan’s bond market as a global bond market crisis. Japan’s bond market still has a deep domestic investor base, and banks, insurers, pension funds, and the BOJ remain important participants. Even as long-end yields have risen rapidly, Japan’s 5-year government bond auction on July 9 remained relatively stable, with a bid-to-cover ratio of 3.43, slightly higher than the previous auction, showing that market demand has not disappeared completely. From the perspective of global fixed income markets, capital has not fully withdrawn from bond assets. The more obvious change is that investors are reassessing interest rate risk, duration risk, and country allocation. Pressure in Japan’s bond market does not necessarily mean that all bonds will fall simultaneously, but it does increase the sensitivity of global long-end rates to repricing. The Next Focus Will Be BOJ Policy Signals, the Yen, and Long-Term Capital Allocation The key factors for Japan’s bond market going forward will be BOJ policy signals, yen movements, and whether Japan’s long-term capital allocation changes. If the BOJ can clearly maintain policy independence and preserve room for further rate hikes as inflation pressure rises, market concerns over out-of-control long-end inflation may ease. If investors believe the BOJ will delay rate hikes due to government fiscal pressure, long-end yields may continue to reflect higher risk compensation. The 30-year high in JGB yields reflects that Japan is entering a new stage in which fiscal policy, inflation, and monetary policy are all being tested by the market at the same time. Japan’s bond market has not yet formed a systemic crisis, but it has already changed global capital’s pricing assumptions for Japan’s low-rate environment. Over the next few weeks, markets will continue to watch whether the 10-year JGB yield breaks above 3%, whether the BOJ releases a clearer policy path, and whether Japanese long-term capital begins to reallocate.
2026-07-09
In the first half of 2026, global equity markets were largely driven by AI capital expenditure. From major U.S. cloud service providers and AI servers to Taiwan’s semiconductor supply chain and South Korea’s memory sector, capital became highly concentrated in AI infrastructure beneficiaries, making Taiwan and South Korea two of the strongest-performing markets in Asia. However, after entering July, foreign investors’ attitude toward Asian technology stocks began to shift. South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, all markets that had rallied strongly earlier, came under selling pressure, reflecting that capital is now rebalancing away from crowded AI trades. The main drivers behind this selling pressure include profit-taking after sharp gains, deleveraging of leveraged positions, and regional capital rotation. Taiwan and South Korea AI stocks remain important supply chain pillars for global AI infrastructure, but in the short term, they have entered a phase of high-level consolidation and position adjustment. Taiwan and South Korea Become the Core of Foreign Selling as AI Stock Gains and Position Concentration Create Pressure From the perspective of fund flows, recent foreign selling in Asia has been concentrated mainly in South Korea and Taiwan. According to CTBC Investments, emerging Asian equities saw a net outflow of US$15.65 billion last week, with South Korea seeing foreign net selling of US$12.96 billion and Taiwan seeing net selling of US$3.52 billion. During the same period, foreign investors bought about US$790 million in Thailand and about US$300 million in India, showing that capital is shifting from markets that had previously posted stronger gains toward lower-base or relatively more diversified markets. Year to date, although Taiwan and South Korea have continued to face foreign selling pressure, their benchmark equity indices remain among the strongest performers in Asia. Data as of July 8 showed that Thailand was the only emerging Asian market to record foreign net buying this year, at around US$1.27 billion. South Korea saw the largest foreign net selling, at US$100.16 billion, followed by India at US$28.7 billion and Taiwan at US$24.3 billion. Nevertheless, the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) and the Taiwan Weighted Index (TAIEX) have still risen 71.9% and 57.9% year to date, respectively, indicating that foreign selling and overall stock market performance have not moved fully in sync. This phenomenon of “foreign investors selling while indices remain strong” reflects that Taiwan and South Korea have entered a stage of divergence between foreign and domestic investors. From a global asset allocation perspective, foreign investors are reducing overly concentrated AI positions. In Taiwan, however, domestic investment trusts have stepped in to absorb selling pressure, while in South Korea, retail investors have provided buying support, preventing the market from immediately shifting into a one-way decline due to foreign selling. Taiwan Stock Selling Pressure Expands in Early July, but Investment Trusts Buy Against the Trend Taiwan is one of the most representative markets in this round of capital rebalancing. On July 7, affected by weakness in Asian technology stocks, the Taiwan stock market saw an intraday swing of more than 1,500 points and closed down 1,077.28 points, or 2.31%. From the perspective of institutional flows, selling pressure that day did not come only from foreign investors. Proprietary traders’ hedging positions also saw significant adjustment, pushing the combined net selling by the three major institutional investors close to NT$100 billion and amplifying market volatility. However, Taiwan did not see domestic capital withdraw at the same time. From July 8 to July 9, foreign investors continued to sell Taiwanese stocks, but investment trust buying expanded at the same time. This shows that domestic institutions were still absorbing some positions during the pullback, leaving Taiwan’s market in a short-term pattern of “foreign selling, investment trust buying, and high-level index consolidation.” Date Foreign and Mainland Chinese Investors Investment Trusts Proprietary Traders Total Institutional Investors Market Implication 2026/7/7 Net sell NT$54.731 billion Net buy NT$9.683 billion Net sell NT$48.733 billion Net sell NT$93.781 billion Foreign investors and proprietary traders both posted net selling, amplifying downside pressure amid risk reduction 2026/7/8 Net sell NT$37.949 billion Net buy NT$11.961 billion Net sell NT$16.942 billion Net sell NT$42.930 billion Foreign investors continued to sell, while investment trusts provided buying support 2026/7/9 Net sell NT$47.133 billion Net buy NT$15.410 billion Net sell NT$7.671 billion Net sell NT$39.394 billion Foreign investors continued to trim positions, while investment trust buying expanded From a sector perspective, foreign investors’ adjustment in Taiwan does not mean they are simply selling all risk assets. On July 8, foreign buying was tilted toward financial stocks, airlines, and some lower-base electronics names, indicating that capital may be shifting from high-volatility technology stocks toward relatively defensive or lower-base targets. Investment trust buying also showed a diversified allocation pattern. On July 7 and July 9, their top net-buying targets covered financials, telecoms, airlines, plastics, semiconductor packaging and testing, memory, passive components, PCBs, and ETFs, indicating that Taiwan’s market is entering a more evident sector rotation phase during high-level consolidation. South Korea Faces More Severe Selling Pressure as Deleveraging Amplifies Technology Stock Volatility Compared with Taiwan, South Korea has seen more severe volatility recently. In the first half of the year, South Korean equities benefited from AI and high-bandwidth memory demand, with large technology stocks such as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix posting sharp gains. This also made the KOSPI highly dependent on a small number of heavyweight stocks. When the market began to question the sustainability of AI capital expenditure, or when investors started reducing technology stock exposure, South Korean memory stocks, which had seen the strongest gains and the most concentrated positioning, naturally became the first targets of adjustment. The reason selling pressure in South Korea was amplified was not only foreign investor selling, but also retail leverage, margin positions, and leveraged ETFs linked to individual stocks. These instruments amplify buying when stock prices rise, but when prices reverse lower, they can also create passive selling through rebalancing and stop-loss mechanisms. In other words, the recent correction in South Korean technology stocks looks more like deleveraging after an overly concentrated trade. This is also the biggest difference between the current correction in Asian technology stocks and a typical cyclical downturn-driven selloff. If the issue were a fundamental reversal, the market would usually see simultaneous downward revisions to corporate earnings and demand expectations. At present, however, the market is more focused on whether AI capital expenditure can continue, whether valuations have already priced in too much optimism, and whether capital has become overly concentrated in a small number of large semiconductor and memory stocks. Japan Also Sees Foreign Selling as Asia’s Earlier Winners Enter Adjustment Together Foreign investor adjustment has not occurred only in Taiwan and South Korea. Data from Japan’s Ministry of Finance showed that in June 2026, foreign investors sold a net JPY 2.9911 trillion in Japanese equities, marking their first reduction in Japanese stocks in three months and the second-largest monthly net selling so far this year. Foreign investors also heavily sold JPY 2.4894 trillion in Japanese medium- and long-term bonds, the largest monthly net selling in 41 months. Including short-term bonds, total foreign outflows from Japan’s financial markets reached JPY 9.5718 trillion in June. It is worth noting that the Nikkei 225 still rose 5.6% in June and reached a record high on June 25. This is similar to the recent situation in Taiwan, where the index has still found support despite foreign selling. It shows that foreign selling does not necessarily lead to an immediate market trend reversal, especially when domestic capital, corporate buybacks, passive flows, or fundamental expectations can still provide support. Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are all important beneficiaries of AI, semiconductors, or advanced manufacturing supply chains, and they had all posted strong earlier gains. Therefore, when global capital needs to reduce concentration risk, these markets naturally become priority targets for adjustment. Three Main Lines Behind Capital Rebalancing Based on recent foreign fund flows and market performance, this shift in Asian capital can be divided into three main lines. AI trading is shifting from one-way momentum buying to a phase of earnings and valuation verification. In the first half of the year, capital flowed heavily into semiconductors, memory, AI servers, and data center supply chains. After entering July, however, investors began reassessing the sustainability of AI capital expenditure, especially whether major cloud service providers can continue expanding investment, whether related orders can translate into corporate earnings, and whether stock gains have already priced in future growth. Foreign capital is shifting from highly concentrated markets toward lower-base or relatively defensive assets. South Korea and Taiwan have high exposure to AI heavyweight stocks and had led gains earlier, making them key targets for foreign profit-taking. Thailand and India, by contrast, received some capital inflows because their earlier gains were relatively more limited. Similar rotation has also appeared within Taiwan. Although foreign investors were net sellers overall, they still bought some financials, airlines, and lower-base electronics names. Domestic capital support has become a key source of resilience for Asian equities. Taiwan’s investment trusts have continued to buy, while South Korean retail investors have bought against foreign selling pressure, showing that Asian markets are not fully driven by foreign capital alone. As long as corporate earnings expectations do not see clear downward revisions, domestic capital may continue to provide support during pullbacks and help indices remain in high-level consolidation. What to Watch Next: AI Earnings Calls, Foreign Selling, and Whether Domestic Buying Can Stay Balanced Over the next few weeks, the key issue for Asian AI stocks will be whether fundamentals can keep up with share price gains. For Taiwan, the earnings call of the leading foundry will become an important window for the market to assess AI demand, advanced processes, advanced packaging, and customer capital expenditure. If corporate guidance and order outlooks can continue to support high-growth expectations, foreign selling pressure may gradually shift from trend-driven adjustment to position rotation within a range-bound market. However, if the earnings call sends a conservative signal, adjustment pressure on high-valuation AI stocks may continue. For South Korea, memory pricing, HBM supply and demand, Samsung and SK Hynix capital expenditure, and the pace of leveraged position unwinding will determine whether technology stocks can stabilize. If margin positions and leveraged ETF selling pressure have not yet been fully digested, short-term volatility in South Korea may remain higher than in other Asian markets. Recent foreign selling in Taiwan, South Korea, and other Asian markets that had rallied strongly shows that the market is entering a new phase of “verifying earnings, valuations, and capital concentration.” Taiwan and South Korea AI stocks remain indispensable supply chain pillars for global AI infrastructure, but after the strong gains in the first half of the year, capital needs to rebalance positions, and the market also needs to wait for corporate earnings and order data to confirm the next stage of growth momentum. Therefore, Asian technology stocks may remain in high-level consolidation in the short term, while foreign selling and domestic buying continue to pull against each other. In the medium term, the markets and sectors that can continue to outperform after capital rebalancing will depend on whether companies can convert AI demand into stable revenue, margins, and cash flow.
In the first half of 2026, global equity markets were mainly driven by AI capital expenditure, the semiconductor supply chain, and large-cap technology stocks. However, after entering late June to early July, the market began to reassess the earnings visibility of high-valuation growth stocks. Investors are no longer simply chasing the AI growth narrative, and have started to place greater emphasis on whether companies can convert capital expenditure into revenue, cash flow, and investment returns. High-Beta Momentum Trades Correct Rapidly as AI Valuations Enter Verification Phase The rapid correction in high-beta momentum trades is the clearest signal of this style rotation. Goldman Sachs’ High-Beta Momentum Basket (GSPRHIMO) fell 18% over two trading days in early July, marking its largest two-day decline since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Goldman Sachs noted that the momentum factor had once risen by about 127% year-to-date, but has since pulled back by about 24% from its peak, with the pace of this correction significantly faster than the historical average. This shows that positions with large prior gains, high valuations, and crowded positioning are more sensitive to liquidity tightening and profit-taking. The semiconductor sector is one of the main sources of pressure in this round of adjustment. Morgan Stanley pointed out in early July that the upward momentum of previously strong semiconductor stocks is weakening, and funds may rotate toward relatively lagging hyperscalers, as well as parts of consumer, transportation, biotechnology and healthcare sectors that may benefit from catch-up rotation. This type of rotation shows that investors are no longer chasing semiconductor stocks indiscriminately, but are instead looking for next-in-line opportunities whose valuations have not yet fully reflected potential upside. Although the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index continues to benefit from demand for AI infrastructure, after valuations have already largely reflected growth expectations, the market has begun to question whether AI capital expenditure can quickly translate into corporate revenue and investment returns. By comparison, hyperscalers still have support from core business cash flow, leading funds to reassess whether the valuation gap between chipmakers and cloud service providers is reasonable. Read More at Datatrack ETF Fund Flows Show U.S. Equities Still Attract Inflows, but Market Structure Is Changing ETF fund flows further show that U.S. equities remain a major allocation destination for global capital, but the internal structure is changing. According to Bloomberg ETF fund flow statistics as of July 8, 2026, U.S. equities recorded about US$547.4 billion in net inflows year-to-date, of which large-cap stocks attracted about US$498.1 billion, significantly higher than small-cap stocks. This indicates that funds remain in the U.S. equity market, but preferences are shifting toward large companies with better liquidity, more stable financial quality, and higher earnings visibility. Asset Class Fund Flows Over the Past Week Fund Flows Over the Past Month Year-to-Date Fund Flows Market Implication U.S. Equities US$37.1 billion US$138.0 billion US$547.4 billion Funds continue to concentrate in U.S. equities Growth Stocks US$5.8 billion US$26.9 billion US$119.3 billion Growth style has not exited, but willingness to chase prices has declined Value Stocks US$4.3 billion US$16.0 billion US$60.7 billion Low-valuation and cash-flow assets are gaining attention Large-Cap Stocks US$31.2 billion US$127.2 billion US$498.1 billion Funds prefer high-quality large-cap stocks Small-Cap Stocks US$1.2 billion US$7.3 billion US$7.2 billion Risk appetite has not yet broadened fully At the same time, global equity markets still maintained positive returns, but the structure of gains is no longer completely dominated by a single technology theme. As of July 8, the MSCI World Index was up 10.37% year-to-date, the U.S. was up 10.28%, Europe was up 11.30%, Japan was up 20.10%, and emerging Asia was up 24.92%. By contrast, the Chinese market was still down 13.70% year-to-date, showing clear divergence across regional markets. This divergence is prompting funds to look for defensive and low-volatility positions within U.S. equities, while also reassessing regional allocation and valuation safety margins across global markets. High Valuations, Capital Expenditure and Crowded Positioning Drive Demand for Defensive Assets Defensive assets are receiving renewed attention mainly due to three factors: High-valuation technology stocks are more sensitive to interest rates and discount rates. When the Federal Reserve’s policy path remains unclear and long-end yields remain volatile, valuation pressure on high-P/E assets can easily intensify. AI capital expenditure has entered a verification phase. Large technology companies continue to invest in data centers, chips, and cloud infrastructure, but the market is beginning to demand that these investments be reflected in revenue, gross margin, free cash flow, and return on capital. Momentum trades remain crowded. If funds are concentrated in a small number of AI and semiconductor heavyweight stocks, once earnings or guidance fail to exceed market expectations, systematic funds, hedge funds, and short-term capital may reduce positions at the same time. Therefore, financials, healthcare, consumer staples, and parts of the industrial sector have become the main defensive directions in this round of capital rotation. Financial stocks benefit from relatively low valuations, stronger capital return capacity, and a certain degree of spread support under a higher-rate environment. Healthcare demand is less affected by economic cycles, while large pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology firms also have merger and acquisition opportunities and product pipeline revaluation themes. Consumer staples and retail channels, due to demand rigidity, stable cash flow, and pricing power, are more likely to be viewed by funds as low-volatility allocations when market volatility rises. The bond market is showing a similar logic, but investors are not looking for pure hedging; rather, they are seeking allocations that combine income and defensiveness. Bloomberg statistics show that as of July 8, global high-yield bonds were up 2.29% year-to-date, outperforming global government bonds and long-term U.S. Treasuries. In terms of fund flows, investment-grade bonds recorded about US$133.9 billion in net inflows year-to-date, indicating that in an environment where long-end yields remain volatile, investors prefer income-generating assets with stronger credit quality and relatively controllable interest rate risk. Earnings, Rates and Market Breadth to Determine Whether the Rotation Can Continue Going forward, whether the rotation in U.S. equities can continue will depend on second-quarter earnings, interest rates, and market breadth. The earnings season will be the first test of AI capital expenditure returns, as the market watches whether large technology companies can translate investments in data centers, cloud infrastructure, and AI software into cloud revenue, subscription revenue, data center utilization, and gross margin improvement. Interest rates will determine whether high-valuation assets can expand their valuation multiples again. If the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield remains elevated, technology stocks will continue to face higher discount-rate pressure. Market breadth is also an important indicator for assessing the health of the rotation. If the S&P 500 Equal Weight Index continues to outperform the market-cap-weighted index, it would indicate that funds are spreading from a small number of AI heavyweights to more sectors. Conversely, if the broader market remains highly dependent on a small number of technology giants, concentration risk could again be amplified by earnings or technical pressure. Looking ahead over the coming months, AI remains the medium- to long-term growth theme for U.S. equities, but the trading logic has shifted toward valuation discipline and earnings verification. For global capital, U.S. equities remain attractive, but the second half of the year is more likely to show a structure of “large-cap support, technology stock divergence, defensive stocks filling the gap, and income assets attracting inflows.” Whether corporate earnings can keep up with valuations will determine whether the AI theme can continue. Before high-valuation assets deliver clearer cash flow results, low-volatility and defensive assets will continue to serve as a capital safe haven.