Key Indicator
United States: PPI: NSA
United States: University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index (CCI): Preliminary: Anomaly
United States: ISM Manufacturing PMI - Final (SA)
United States: CPI (NSA)
COMEX Inventory: Silver
S&P 500 Index
Global: GDP Gowth Rate - United States
Global Foundries' Revenue
DRAM Makers' Fab Capacity Breakdown by Brand
NAND Flash Makers' Capex: Forecast
IC Design Revenue
Server Shipment
Top 10 MLCC Suppliers' Capex: Forecast
LCD Panel Makers' Revenue
AMOLED Capacity Input Area by Vendor: Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Supplier
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only): Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Sizes: Total
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only)
PV Supply Chain Module Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Cell Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Polysilicon Capacity
PV Supply Chain Wafer Capacity
Global PV Demand: Forecast
Smartphone Production Volume
Notebook Shipments by Brand
Smartphone Production Volume: Forecast
Wearable Shipment
TV Shipments (incl. LCD/OLED/QLED): Total
China Smartphone Production Volume
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Global
ITU Internet Penetration Rate -- Global
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Developed Countries
Electric Vehicles (EVs) Sales: Forecast
Global Automotive Sales
AR/VR Device Shipment: Forecast
China: Power Battery: Battery Output Power: Lithium Iron Phosphate Battery: Month to Date
CADA China Vehicle Inventory Alert Index (VIA)
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue: Forecast
LED Chip Revenue (Chip Foundry+ In House Used): Forecast
GaN LED Accumulated MOCVD Installation Volume
Video Wall-Display LED Market Revenue: Forecast
Consumer & Others LED Market Revenue
2026-08-27
Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook's legal team issued a formal rebuttal letter this Wednesday, stating plainly that this marks the second time in just over a year that Trump has been shown to lack legal grounds to remove a Fed governor "for cause," and pushing back directly on the mortgage fraud allegations by arguing that "an inadvertent error is not fraud." The clash traces back to Trump's renewed accusation that Cook committed mortgage fraud, which gave her three weeks to respond and marked his second such attempt in just over a year; the first round ended in June with a narrow five to four Supreme Court ruling that barred Trump from firing a Fed governor at will. That ruling, however, left key questions unresolved, and Cook's camp is now meeting the challenge head-on through formal legal channels, putting market confidence in the Fed's decision-making autonomy back under scrutiny. At its core, this is not a dispute about personal conduct but a structural tension between executive power and an institution designed to sit apart from it. Under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, governors may only be removed "for cause," a safeguard meant to insulate monetary policy from short-term political cycles, yet the Supreme Court's split decision left the definition of "cause" unresolved, effectively inviting repeated challenges. Market participants remain divided on what this means in practice: some worry that a more compliant, dovish-leaning board could eventually tilt policy toward premature or excessive rate cuts before inflation is durably under control, while others argue that prolonged litigation makes any near-term policy shift unlikely, treating the latest move as political theater rather than an immediate threat. Over the next one to three months, expect this legal and political standoff to keep escalating, particularly as the September policy meeting approaches and every shift in the board's voting composition gets scrutinized for its market implications. Looking further out, even if Cook ultimately retains her seat, the risk premium built up from repeated challenges to Fed independence is unlikely to fade quickly, a dynamic already visible in the steepening Treasury yield curve and relative resilience of long-dated yields, as markets price in the risk that monetary policy could eventually be steered by fiscal and political considerations rather than anchored inflation expectations.
2026-08-20
Just days before a threatened 50% punitive tariff on Canadian goods was set to take effect this week, Washington and Ottawa struck a last-minute pause, delaying the blanket tariff hike by three days, though officials on neither side have formally confirmed the full details of any agreement, and even Trump's own public remarks alongside those of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney have stopped at describing the talks as making progress. What stands out is not the delay itself, but the direction the negotiations appear to be taking: agriculture and autos are emerging as categories with distinct treatment, while any adjustment to steel and aluminum tariffs remains, for now, confined to reporting attributed to unnamed sources. This continues a pattern that has defined Trump's trade approach throughout the year, threaten first, negotiate later, but the sectoral detail surfacing this time is more specific than in past rounds, even as many of the key terms have yet to be put in writing. This shift toward sector-by-sector bargaining reflects the intersection of political, industrial, and supply-chain realities on both sides of the border. Canada's export economy is heavily tied to the American market, with roughly 72% of its goods shipped south of the border last year, giving Washington considerable leverage. Yet the United States' own farm and auto sectors are just as deeply embedded in cross-border supply chains, meaning an indiscriminate blanket tariff risked hurting American farmers and automakers as much as Canadian exporters. Trump stated publicly that Canada had previously imposed substantial tariffs on American goods and that those tariffs are now gone, meaning it is U.S. farm exports entering Canada that stand to benefit from the removal, rather than the reverse arrangement some coverage might imply. U.S. officials have framed the arrangement as one that protects American workers and supply chains, but Carney described the talks only as having made "substantial progress," stopping short of calling it a finished deal, a gap in language that itself signals how much remains unresolved between the two sides. In the near term, markets will need to watch the specific formula for calculating auto tariffs based on U.S. domestic content, the most discussed and contentious element of this round of talks; according to Reuters, citing industry sources, the rate under discussion could fall from 25% to 15%, but this remains a negotiating position rather than a signed outcome. Whether steel and aluminum tariffs are cut in parallel is, for now, based only on Bloomberg reporting citing people familiar with the matter, which Reuters said it could not immediately verify, leaving that piece of the puzzle highly uncertain. Over the medium term, if this model of trading sector-specific concessions for phased de-escalation is ultimately confirmed to work, it could well be replicated in future negotiations with the European Union, Japan, or Mexico, gradually reshaping the global tariff landscape into a more fragmented but more flexible patchwork of sector-based agreements.
2026-08-13
For much of this year, the market's central anxiety was not when the Federal Reserve would start cutting rates, but whether tariff pass-through would force the central bank back into a hiking cycle. That worry built steadily in the first half of the year as tariff costs worked their way into consumer prices and raw material costs climbed. The latest U.S. July CPI report showed both headline and core inflation decelerating from the prior month, with core price growth cooling back to the same level last seen in January and February this year. The conversation has now shifted from whether the Fed will hike again to how long this pause can hold, and that pivot is the structural signal worth watching most closely right now. The main forces behind this cooling are continued easing in energy price pressure and a broad market view that most of the tariff cost pass-through into consumer prices has already worked its way into the data, while a modest year-over-year decline in real average hourly earnings in July has cooled consumer momentum and further undercut the case for renewed tightening. Yet the cooling is not uniform: prices for computer software and peripheral equipment rose more than a fifth from a year earlier to a record high, reflecting upstream cost pressure from AI data centers scrambling for memory chips, a reminder that tech-related goods remain a corner the tariff relief story has yet to reach. The Fed itself is showing internal division, with some officials at last month's meeting already arguing for a hike, and a September decision that falls awkwardly close to the sensitive window around the year's midterm elections is pushing policymakers toward a more cautious pace. Whether the inflation risk has truly passed remains a genuine point of disagreement in the market. Looking one to three months ahead, a September hold remains the dominant market expectation, and hawkish bets have eased only modestly from where they stood before the data, meaning most traders are still pricing in some risk of a policy path skewing slightly hawkish. If the labor market keeps softening and consumer momentum stays weak over the next six to twelve months, the doves could gain further ground, opening the door to a policy pivot next year. This is not an all-clear signal, however: Washington's recent reliance on drawing down oil inventories to cushion price spikes is not a sustainable fix, and any renewed climb in oil prices could reaccelerate energy inflation later this year, giving the hawkish narrative room to resurface.
2026-06-25
Gold fell below the $4,000 mark on June 24 for the first time since November 2025, retreating more than 25% from its all-time high of $5,589 reached in late January. This is not a routine pullback but the convergence of two structural reversals. First, new Fed Chair Kevin Warsh's inaugural FOMC meeting delivered an unmistakably hawkish signal — the updated dot plot showed most committee members expecting at least one rate hike this year, driving the US dollar to a 13-month high. Second, the Israel-Iran ceasefire agreement has materially reduced geopolitical uncertainty, unwinding much of the war-risk premium embedded in gold since the conflict erupted earlier in the year. Together, these forces leave gold facing a materially more difficult near-term environment than at any point in 2026. The structural pressure stems from a dual tightening of real rates and dollar strength. Since May CPI printed at 4.2%, market expectations for Fed tightening have accelerated sharply — September is now viewed as a live meeting for a potential hike, with an 80%-plus probability of at least one increase by year-end. A stronger dollar directly raises the cost of gold for non-dollar buyers while lifting the opportunity cost of holding a non-yielding asset. The unwinding of Middle East geopolitical risk removes a second pillar of support that had anchored prices for much of the past six months. Market views diverge at this juncture: while near-term sentiment is bearish, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank both maintain year-end targets of $4,600 to $4,900 per ounce, arguing that central bank de-dollarization buying remains a structural demand force that short-term rate moves have not dislodged. Looking ahead, $4,000 serves as both a technical and psychological line in the sand. Should it fail to hold, markets anticipate the next key support zone near $3,800 — a level that aligns with a scenario in which the Fed delivers three to four rate hikes. Over the medium term, if inflation retreats meaningfully before year-end and the tightening cycle remains modest, the downside for gold appears manageable, and institutional year-end targets retain their relevance. The tail risk profile is asymmetric: to the upside, a renewed geopolitical escalation or large-scale accumulation by emerging market central banks could reignite the rally; to the downside, an aggressive Fed tightening path combined with a persistently strong dollar poses the sharpest threat.
2026-06-18
When markets had broadly priced in a Federal Reserve pivot toward rate cuts, the June 17, 2026 FOMC decision delivered a strikingly different signal: inflation is not fading—it is accelerating back. In new Chair Kevin Warsh's first policy meeting, the Federal Reserve unanimously held the federal funds rate steady at 3.50%–3.75%. But the more consequential development was buried in the updated dot plot: nine of nineteen officials now anticipate at least one rate increase before year-end, up from zero just three months ago. Since the Fed launched its easing cycle in late 2024, this marks the sharpest hawkish inflection point yet—a potential pivot away from the pivot. The primary engine behind this inflation resurgence is energy-driven cost pressure stemming from the U.S.-Iran conflict. Officials sharply revised their 2026 inflation projections, lifting the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index forecast to 3.6% on a year-over-year basis from 2.7% in March, with core PCE revised up to 3.3%—both running well above the Fed's 2% target. Notably, Warsh himself declined to publish a personal rate forecast and announced task forces to overhaul major Fed operations, signaling a leadership approach that prizes policy optionality over forward guidance. Markets are divided: some analysts believe that if the Iran ceasefire holds and energy prices continue retreating, inflation will naturally cool in the second half of the year; others warn that wage stickiness and persistent services inflation make a genuine rate hike increasingly unavoidable. In the near term, markets face the challenge of repricing the tension between rising rate hike expectations and the disinflationary tailwind from falling oil prices following the Iran deal. Should inflation data from June through September continue to surprise to the upside, the September FOMC meeting could become the first live hike under Warsh's tenure. Over a six-to-twelve-month horizon, any genuine return to rate increases would fundamentally reprice fixed income markets and add meaningful pressure on high-valuation equities. The key tail risk: if U.S.-Iran negotiations unravel and conflict re-escalates, a second wave of energy inflation could place the Fed in a far more acute policy dilemma—forced to simultaneously contain inflation and cushion a growth slowdown, with limited room to maneuver on either front.
2026-06-11
With the Federal Reserve's June policy meeting just days away, markets have largely moved past the question of whether rates will move — they won't — and are now focused on something far more consequential: how newly installed Chair Kevin Warsh intends to reshape the Fed's policy framework. Warsh was officially sworn in as the 17th Fed Chair in late May 2026, making the June 16-17 FOMC meeting his first at the helm. Critically, this meeting includes the Summary of Economic Projections and the dot plot, transforming it from a routine rate decision into a defining moment for how markets recalibrate their expectations over the next six to twelve months. The anxiety embedded in this meeting stems from a convergence of persistent inflation and Warsh's well-established hawkish instincts. Core U.S. inflation remains stubbornly elevated, with multiple measures clustering in the 2.8–3.4% range — well above the 2% target — and Middle East tensions this spring added fresh upside pressure through energy prices. When Warsh's nomination was announced in January, gold fell more than 10% in a single session and the dollar surged, as markets immediately priced in a lower tolerance for inflation overshoot. Futures markets now assign virtually zero probability to a rate cut this year, and the debate has shifted from "when does the Fed cut?" to "how long does the Fed hold?" The key divergence among institutional forecasters is whether Warsh will use the dot plot to signal an explicitly hawkish path, or whether practical constraints around labor market health and financial stability will produce more measured communications than his reputation implies. Over the next three to six months, the policy trajectory hinges on whether inflation shows meaningful cooling and how Warsh navigates his first press conference.
2026-06-04
As U.S. equity indices continue to notch record highs, the forces shaping market sentiment are quietly shifting. For much of the past two years, labor market data set the tone; now, inflation and Federal Reserve policy credibility are claiming that role. According to options market data compiled by Citigroup, traders view the Fed's June 17 rate decision as a more significant market event over the next month than the June 10 CPI release — a ranking that itself signals how deeply investor psychology has rotated toward monetary policy risk. The persistence of inflation stems from a convergence of pressures rather than any single factor. U.S. April PCE inflation ran at 3.8% year-over-year while PPI surged to 6%, both well above the Fed's 2% target. Energy costs remain elevated as the Iran conflict keeps upward pressure on oil. Structurally, the pass-through of the sweeping 2025 tariff regime is approaching its peak in mid-2026, layered on top of a widening fiscal deficit and labor market tightness from immigration policy shifts. This "supply-shock inflation" leaves the Fed with limited conventional tools — markets have priced a hold at the June meeting to near-certainty at 98%, and the rate-cut window continues to be pushed out. The risk of a policy credibility gap is rising: a Fed that appears reactive rather than proactive could see long-end yields reprice sharply, regardless of what it actually decides. The June 10 CPI release and the June 17 Fed rate decision together form the most critical information nodes for markets in the near term. If June 10 CPI surprises to the upside, the conversation about rate hikes will move from tail risk toward base case for some market participants, applying renewed pressure to duration-sensitive assets.
2026-05-29
Global oil markets are at an acutely sensitive inflection point. Since U.S. and Israeli-led strikes against Iran in late February, the Strait of Hormuz has been largely paralyzed, halting the flow of roughly 20% of the world's oil and LNG supply and triggering a rapid drawdown of global crude inventories. As May draws to a close, meaningful diplomatic signals have begun to emerge: President Trump publicly described negotiations as "proceeding nicely," and reports citing U.S. officials suggest both sides have reached a preliminary understanding on a 60-day memorandum of agreement. Markets responded immediately, with Brent crude falling more than 5% in a single week to near $94 per barrel — a sharp repricing of the energy inflation trajectory that had dominated sentiment for months. Whether this optimism is running ahead of reality is precisely the question dividing market participants. The deal has yet to receive Trump's final approval, and core sticking points — including Iran's enriched uranium stockpile and tolls on Hormuz transit — remain unresolved. Diplomatic signals have reversed within hours before, and the geopolitical risk premium has not truly dissipated; it has merely been suppressed by expectations. Compounding the complexity, tariff-driven inflation remains structurally embedded in the U.S. economy, with Fed research confirming full pass-through of tariff costs to consumers — meaning that even a sustained oil price decline may not be enough to meaningfully ease core inflation stickiness. Over the next one to three months, the actual pace of Hormuz reopening will serve as the decisive variable for global monetary policy direction. A confirmed deal and gradual restoration of shipping traffic would relieve energy price pressures and give the Fed more room to hold rates steady. A breakdown or prolonged delay, however, would push oil back onto an upward path, reignite rate hike expectations, and sharply elevate the risk of a eurozone recession.
2026-05-22
Less than two years ago, markets were debating how quickly the Federal Reserve would cut rates. Today, the conversation has shifted in the opposite direction. Minutes from the Fed's April 28–29 meeting, released on May 21, revealed that a majority of officials now see rate hikes as necessary if the Iran conflict continues to drive energy inflation. The meeting also logged four dissenting votes — the most since 1992 — reflecting deep internal disagreement over whether the Fed should even retain language signaling a bias toward easing. Into this charged environment steps Kevin Warsh, sworn in this week as the new Fed chair, who must navigate White House pressure for lower rates while confronting inflation that has stubbornly climbed back above 3%. The policy center of gravity is shifting. The root of this remarkable reversal lies in the energy shock triggered by the Middle East conflict. Strait of Hormuz disruptions have kept oil prices elevated for months, with the cost pressures spilling into transportation, manufacturing, and food supply chains. The resulting inflation profile has split the FOMC: doves argue the war shock is transitory by nature and warrants no policy response; hawks counter that tolerating elevated energy-driven expectations risks a broader de-anchoring that would be far costlier to reverse. Markets have already started voting with their feet. CME FedWatch data now shows traders pricing in a meaningful probability of a rate increase by late 2026 or early 2027 — a scenario that was almost entirely off the table just three months ago. Over the coming months, Warsh's first policy statement and press conference as chair will be the single most important event for recalibrating expectations. Should the Iran ceasefire stall and energy inflation remain sticky, rate hikes could graduate from tail risk to base case — sending long-end Treasury yields higher, strengthening the dollar, and applying meaningful pressure on emerging markets and high-multiple growth equities.