Key Indicator
United States: PPI: NSA
United States: University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index (CCI): Preliminary: Anomaly
United States: ISM Manufacturing PMI - Final (SA)
United States: CPI (NSA)
COMEX Inventory: Silver
S&P 500 Index
Global: GDP Gowth Rate - United States
Global Foundries' Revenue
DRAM Makers' Fab Capacity Breakdown by Brand
NAND Flash Makers' Capex: Forecast
IC Design Revenue
Server Shipment
Top 10 MLCC Suppliers' Capex: Forecast
LCD Panel Makers' Revenue
AMOLED Capacity Input Area by Vendor: Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Supplier
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only): Forecast
Smartphone Panel Shipments by Sizes: Total
Notebook Panel Shipments (LCD only)
PV Supply Chain Module Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Cell Capacity: Forecast
PV Supply Chain Polysilicon Capacity
PV Supply Chain Wafer Capacity
Global PV Demand: Forecast
Smartphone Production Volume
Notebook Shipments by Brand
Smartphone Production Volume: Forecast
Wearable Shipment
TV Shipments (incl. LCD/OLED/QLED): Total
China Smartphone Production Volume
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Global
ITU Internet Penetration Rate -- Global
ITU Mobile Phone Users -- Developed Countries
Electric Vehicles (EVs) Sales: Forecast
Global Automotive Sales
AR/VR Device Shipment: Forecast
China: Power Battery: Battery Output Power: Lithium Iron Phosphate Battery: Month to Date
CADA China Vehicle Inventory Alert Index (VIA)
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue
Micro/Mini LED (Self-Emitting Display) Market Revenue: Forecast
LED Chip Revenue (Chip Foundry+ In House Used): Forecast
GaN LED Accumulated MOCVD Installation Volume
Video Wall-Display LED Market Revenue: Forecast
Consumer & Others LED Market Revenue
2026-05-22
Less than two years ago, markets were debating how quickly the Federal Reserve would cut rates. Today, the conversation has shifted in the opposite direction. Minutes from the Fed's April 28–29 meeting, released on May 21, revealed that a majority of officials now see rate hikes as necessary if the Iran conflict continues to drive energy inflation. The meeting also logged four dissenting votes — the most since 1992 — reflecting deep internal disagreement over whether the Fed should even retain language signaling a bias toward easing. Into this charged environment steps Kevin Warsh, sworn in this week as the new Fed chair, who must navigate White House pressure for lower rates while confronting inflation that has stubbornly climbed back above 3%. The policy center of gravity is shifting. The root of this remarkable reversal lies in the energy shock triggered by the Middle East conflict. Strait of Hormuz disruptions have kept oil prices elevated for months, with the cost pressures spilling into transportation, manufacturing, and food supply chains. The resulting inflation profile has split the FOMC: doves argue the war shock is transitory by nature and warrants no policy response; hawks counter that tolerating elevated energy-driven expectations risks a broader de-anchoring that would be far costlier to reverse. Markets have already started voting with their feet. CME FedWatch data now shows traders pricing in a meaningful probability of a rate increase by late 2026 or early 2027 — a scenario that was almost entirely off the table just three months ago. Over the coming months, Warsh's first policy statement and press conference as chair will be the single most important event for recalibrating expectations. Should the Iran ceasefire stall and energy inflation remain sticky, rate hikes could graduate from tail risk to base case — sending long-end Treasury yields higher, strengthening the dollar, and applying meaningful pressure on emerging markets and high-multiple growth equities.
2026-05-14
The global trading order is now meeting its most symbolically charged moment of negotiation since the opening round of the U.S.-China tariff conflict in 2018. President Trump arrived in Beijing on the 14th to begin two days of talks with President Xi Jinping, with the agenda spanning tariffs, rare earths, semiconductor export controls, Taiwan and Iran. The sheer scale of the visit signals its weight, with the chief executives of Tesla, Nvidia and Apple accompanying the U.S. delegation. Their presence underlines that this round of dialogue is no longer simply a political gesture but a substantive negotiation reaching directly into supply chains and technological sovereignty. What has brought the two sides back to the table is not a fundamental warming of bilateral ties but the convergence of internal and external pressures that have built up on both ends. In the United States, sticky inflation and the pass-through effects of a new round of tariffs have begun to eat into consumer spending and corporate margins, leaving the Trump administration to find a balance between an assertive trade posture and price stability. In China, slowing export momentum, mounting youth employment pressure and rising energy import costs driven by Middle East tensions have raised the political value of a more predictable external environment. The key divergence among market observers is whether this summit represents another transitional extension of the existing truce or the genuine beginning of a longer-term framework, with most major banks leaning toward the former while not ruling out targeted breakthroughs on specific issues. Looking out over the next three to six months, the most plausible outcome is a renewed extension of current tariff suspensions, paired with limited compromises on rare earth supply and selected semiconductor export controls, which would deliver near-term relief to global supply chain anxiety. The deeper structural variables, however, remain unresolved, including the precise language used around Taiwan, follow-up U.S. action on Chinese industrial subsidies and the room for Beijing's posture on Iran to shift. For corporates, treating this summit as the closing chapter of the trade war would be a strategic miscalculation. A more realistic reading is to view it as the opening phase of a fresh rule-setting cycle, and to reassess capacity footprints, customer concentration and technology partnership structures accordingly.
2026-05-07
With just eight days remaining before Jerome Powell formally steps down as Federal Reserve Chair on May 15, the world's most influential central bank is being squeezed by two structural forces at once. The first is the timing of the leadership handover, which coincides with the first true stagflation bind the Fed has confronted in four decades. The second is the combination of incoming Chair Kevin Warsh's policy leanings and Powell's unusual decision to remain on the Board of Governors, a pairing that will determine whether the Fed holds its hawkish anchor through the second half of 2026 or yields to the Trump administration's persistent calls for rate cuts. This is more than a personnel change; it marks an inflection point between the easy-money framework of the past decade and a new policy paradigm. Driving this transition is not any single variable but the convergence of geopolitics, energy prices, and political pressure. The Middle East conflict pushed Brent crude as high as $120 per barrel in recent weeks before settling near $100 on hopes for a U.S.-Iran peace framework, yet the inflation impulse has already worked its way through to consumers, lifting core PCE back above 3% even as unemployment has climbed to 4.4%. Markets that started the year pricing in at least two rate cuts have now compressed those expectations down to one, and in some cases zero. Notably, Warsh advanced through the Senate Banking Committee on a 13-11 party-line vote, the first fully partisan committee vote on a Fed Chair nominee in history, meaning the credibility of the incoming leadership will be tested from day one. Over the next six to twelve months, the Fed's policy path will be defined less by any single inflation print and more by how Warsh balances inflation-fighting credibility against political pressure for accommodation. In the near term, a sustained pullback in oil prices could ease risk premia and re-flatten the curve. But if the stagflation profile persists, long-end yields and credit spreads will face continued upward pressure.
2026-04-29
The supply-side shock unleashed by the widening Middle East conflict is fundamentally rewriting the logic of global monetary policy. The Federal Reserve is widely expected to hold rates steady at this week's meeting for the third consecutive time, and the question is no longer simply about lingering core inflation but about a structural collision between an energy-driven supply shock and softening demand. The World Bank's commodity outlook released this week now points to the largest annual energy price surge in four years, all but eliminating the easing room that markets had penciled in for 2026. For major central banks, the gradual cutting path many had planned has been forced into wholesale reassessment, with the policy narrative pivoting from "winning the last mile of disinflation" to "managing supply-side uncertainty." Three forces are converging to produce this policy bind. The first is a geopolitical regime shift in which the U.S.–Iran conflict has elevated the Middle East from a regional risk into a global energy security issue, with Brent crude markedly higher than at the start of the year and price volatility well above the average of the past decade. The second is a structural weakening of supply chain and inventory buffers, as years of selective deglobalization have left many economies more, not less, exposed to single-region disruptions, while the legacy energy system remains fragile during the broader transition. The third is a recalibration of inflation expectations, visible in breakeven pricing and a renewed embedding of persistence into long-end yields. Market consensus is now meaningfully split between those who view the shock as transitory and those who see a longer regime change underway, and that very split is itself a reflection of policy uncertainty. Looking out over the next six to twelve months, the asymmetry of central bank behavior is the feature most worth watching. With inflation pressures rising even as growth softens, major central banks are gravitating toward prolonged inaction rather than active adjustment, which suggests the high-rate environment will likely extend well beyond what was priced in just a quarter ago. The principal tail risk is that prolonged supply disruptions cause inflation expectations to unanchor, potentially forcing reluctant policymakers back into a tightening cycle reminiscent of the 1970s.
2026-04-23
On Monday, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officially launched the CAPE portal, opening the door for more than 330,000 importers to reclaim tariffs paid between April 2025 and February 2026 under emergency IEEPA authority. The amounts at stake are extraordinary: approximately $166 billion in total duties, accruing roughly $650 million in interest every month. This moment traces back to the Supreme Court's 6-3 ruling in February declaring IEEPA an improper basis for tariff authority—marking the largest legal setback to the Trump administration's trade architecture in its second term. What looks like a legal resolution is better understood as the opening of a more complex second act. The forces shaping this transition are operating simultaneously on legal and policy tracks. On the legal side, CAPE is being deployed in phases: the first phase covers entries liquidated within the past 80 days and is expected to account for over 60% of eligible refunds, with payments arriving 60 to 90 days after a declaration is accepted. A secondary market has already emerged, with hedge funds offering to purchase importer refund claims at a discount—a clear signal that markets see meaningful timeline and administrative risk in the process. On the policy side, the administration moved quickly to replace IEEPA with Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, maintaining a 10% global baseline tariff, with Treasury Secretary Bessent signaling the rate could be reinstated more formally by July. Meanwhile, USTR has launched Section 301 investigations into more than 75 economies, laying the groundwork for the next round of sector-specific duties. Market opinion is divided: some analysts see judicial constraints as a long-term stabilizer for trade policy predictability, while others warn that the refund windfall will be short-lived, and that tariffs rebuilt on firmer statutory ground could ultimately entrench protectionism more durably. Over the next three to six months, three variables will define the trajectory. First, whether CAPE can absorb the enormous filing volume without triggering a liquidity crisis for businesses waiting on refunds. Second, whether Section 122 authority is seamlessly extended past its 150-day window or leaves a policy gap. Third, whether Section 301 investigations translate into a new wave of industrial tariffs that once again reshuffle supply chain costs in pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and metals. For investors, the refund window is a one-time cash flow tailwind, and the legal reconstruction underway will determine whether this period marks a genuine stabilization of U.S. trade rules or simply the opening move in the next cycle of policy disruption.
2026-04-16
The global economy has been hit by an acute geopolitical energy shock. Since late February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran, Tehran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz has severed roughly one-fifth of the world's crude oil and liquefied natural gas supply, stranding more than 200 tankers in the Persian Gulf. Brent crude, which began the year at around $77 a barrel, surged into the $105–$110 range, and the depth of this disruption already dwarfs the energy turbulence triggered by the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. In its April 14 World Economic Outlook, the IMF was explicit: before this conflict, it had been preparing to upgrade its 2026 global growth forecast to 3.4%. Instead, it has been forced to cut that projection to 3.1%, while raising its global inflation forecast to 4.4%. What makes this crisis structurally dangerous is the convergence of multiple transmission channels. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely the world's oil artery — it is also the transit route for roughly 30% of internationally traded fertilizers, meaning the disruption has cascaded from energy costs into agricultural inputs and industrial feedstocks. European chemical and steel manufacturers have already begun imposing energy surcharges of up to 30%. For emerging markets, the pain is particularly acute: commodity-importing economies face simultaneous currency depreciation and surging import bills, with already-strained fiscal buffers limiting room for policy relief. Market opinion is sharply divided: optimists point to advancing ceasefire negotiations, arguing that a short-lived conflict would allow energy markets to normalize; pessimists counter that even a ceasefire will not quickly resolve the logistical backlog, noting that clearing hundreds of stranded tankers will take weeks, not days. Over the next three to six months, oil price dynamics will serve as the key anchor for global inflation expectations. Under the IMF's base case — a contained, short-lived conflict — central banks will face classic stagflationary pressure, unable to rely cleanly on rate hikes when supply-driven inflation is hammering growth. The IMF's severe scenario, where disruption extends into 2027, puts global growth at around 2%, uncomfortably close to the technical threshold for a global recession — a threshold breached only four times since 1980. For investors, the most underappreciated tail risk is not the conflict's direct destruction, but the possibility that persistently elevated energy costs unanchor inflation expectations, forcing central banks to tighten monetary conditions even as growth deteriorates — a policy trap with no clean exit.
2026-04-10
The Middle East took a dramatic turn this week, only to plunge back into uncertainty almost immediately. On April 7, the U.S. and Iran announced a two-week temporary ceasefire, with Tehran pledging to reopen the Strait of Hormuz for transit. Oil prices tumbled more than 15% on the news, and global equities staged a broad relief rally. Within days, however, Iran accused Washington of violating the agreement, passage through the strait fell back into dispute, and the market's brief celebration gave way to a wait-and-see stance. The roots of this energy shock trace back to late February, when U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran triggered the largest oil supply disruption on record. At the height of the blockade, global crude output losses were estimated at roughly ten million barrels per day, and wholesale oil prices had surged more than 30% from pre-conflict levels. What is driving this crisis goes beyond a short-term geopolitical flare-up — it reflects a deeper strategic contest over the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which roughly a quarter of the world's seaborne oil must pass. Iran's demand that tankers pay a toll of up to one dollar per barrel, settled in cryptocurrency to sidestep sanctions, makes clear that even under a nominal ceasefire, Tehran intends to retain effective control over the waterway. Goldman Sachs reported that throughput had recovered to only around 10% of normal levels, and the scale of refinery capacity disruption across the region is too large to absorb within a matter of weeks. Kuwait's national oil company was more blunt in its assessment, warning that a full production restart could take three to four months. Looking ahead, the trajectory of this energy crisis turns on two threads: whether the Islamabad talks on April 10 can produce a more durable ceasefire framework, and whether Israeli operations in Lebanon — the flashpoint Iran cited as grounds for potentially exiting the deal — show meaningful signs of restraint. Even if the ceasefire holds, analysts broadly expect a war risk premium to remain embedded in crude prices for months to come, meaning energy inflation is unlikely to recede fully in the near term. For investors, this translates into sustained volatility across energy-linked assets and continued margin pressure on industries exposed to petrochemical supply chains.
2026-04-02
U.S. President Donald Trump delivered a national address on April 1, 2026, providing an update on the ongoing military operations against Iran. He claimed that U.S. military objectives were nearing completion and warned of an intensified wave of strikes to be launched within the next two to three weeks. Following the address, market sentiment quickly turned anxious, driving global oil prices higher. Brent crude has surged 65% since the conflict began, approaching $120 per barrel — more than 50% above last month's average price. The spike in oil prices has driven up energy costs broadly, with U.S. gasoline prices jumping sharply from $2.30 per gallon last month to $3.60. Financial markets were also rattled, reflecting mounting pressure on global supply chains and energy markets — and posing a direct threat to consumer spending and economic growth. The address also deepened market concerns about a potential Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, prompting oil tankers to reroute away from the waterway and raising the risk of disruptions to global oil supplies, with cost pressures cascading through to everyday consumer goods. Trump also reiterated his intention to impose 25% tariffs on countries that maintain trade relations with Iran. U.S. tariffs on China currently stand at 47%, and any further addition could push the total above 70% — well above late last year's levels — potentially widening trade frictions. Against this backdrop of intertwining geopolitical tensions and tariff policies, market volatility has intensified considerably. Goldman Sachs has forecast that rising oil prices will stoke inflationary pressure and push unemployment higher, while the gradual depletion of consumer savings is expected to further dampen spending momentum. Looking ahead, if military operations are prolonged in the near term, oil prices are likely to remain elevated, with estimates suggesting a drag on global GDP growth of around 0.15% and an increase in inflation of approximately 0.4%. IMF data also indicates that energy shocks of this nature tend to suppress demand recovery. Over the medium term, if U.S. forces achieve a decisive victory and the strait is reopened, markets could gradually stabilize; however, continued expansion of tariff policies risks triggering retaliatory cycles. The World Economic Forum has cautioned that such developments could constitute a structural shock, with particularly significant implications for manufacturing-oriented and trade-dependent economies.
2026-03-24
Since the outbreak of the conflict between the United States and Iran in late February 2026, the situation has now entered its fourth week, with Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz severely disrupting global crude oil supply. Brent crude prices briefly surged to USD 114 per barrel on March 22, marking an increase of more than 60% from around USD 70 before the conflict, while West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude hovered near USD 98. The sharp rise in oil prices has begun to feed into inflation data, with the U.S. February CPI recording a slight increase and market expectations pointing to further inflationary pressure in March. Amid soaring energy prices and heightened geopolitical uncertainty, global equity markets have experienced volatility, with Dow Jones futures declining 0.73% and S&P 500 futures falling 0.61%. Higher energy costs are not only weakening consumer purchasing power but also increasing manufacturing expenses, and Taiwan’s energy import costs could rise by more than 20% year-over-year. The key driver of turbulence in the global energy market lies in the Strait of Hormuz. The waterway transports approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil per day, accounting for about one-fifth of global supply; any disruption therefore creates a substantial supply gap. On March 22, U.S. President Donald Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum demanding Iran reopen the strait, warning that failure to comply would result in strikes on Iranian power plants and energy facilities. Iran, in response, threatened retaliation against U.S. assets in the Middle East, escalating the risk of further confrontation. Recent joint U.S.-Israel airstrikes have reportedly destroyed multiple Iranian missile bases and naval facilities, with missile inventories declining sharply over the past 72 hours. However, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard continues retaliatory actions near Israeli nuclear facilities, increasing the geopolitical risk premium in oil markets. As energy supply instability spreads, several energy-intensive industries have begun to feel the impact. For example, aluminum smelters have shut down approximately 19% of production lines, further disrupting global supply chains. Markets are also concerned that the conflict could expand to Kharg Island, Iran’s key oil export hub, which could push oil prices toward the USD 120 range. In the short term, if the United States delays military action and engages in substantive negotiations, oil prices could retreat below USD 100 per barrel, potentially allowing global equity markets to rebound. However, supply risks remain elevated. In the medium term, if the conflict continues through the end of March, oil prices could surge beyond USD 150, intensifying global inflationary pressure and forcing the Federal Reserve to maintain tighter monetary policy. Taiwan’s export-oriented manufacturing sector would also face rising cost pressures. Market participants should closely monitor signs of internal military shifts within Iran as well as progress in U.S.-Iran negotiations. While energy diversification and strategic reserves may partially mitigate the shock, persistent geopolitical tensions could continue to weigh on global economic growth through the second half of 2026. Investors may increasingly turn to safe-haven assets such as gold and the U.S. dollar while also tracking developments among alternative energy suppliers.